Nationalism in Chinese foreign policy: The case of China's response to the United States in 1989-2000. by Wu, Junfei
Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy:
the Case of
China's Response to the United States in 1989-2000
Junfei Wu
London School of Economics and Political Science 
University of London
PhD Thesis
UMI Number: U615311
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS  
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, th ese  will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615311
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
F« i 2 2 3
qmui
Library
0r1B*Ltyaryo<Po*«ca' 
Economc Soence
,^n e l
Declaration by Candidate
I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and that it has not been submitted 
anywhere for any award. Where other sources of information have been used, they 
have been acknowledged.
Signature:
Date: 2 -  ^ \  CCfjSL'
Abstract
This thesis is concerned with nationalism in Chinese foreign policy. Adopting methods of 
comparative studies and formalised language analysis, through the case study o f China’s 
response to US engagement, this thesis explores the nationalist momentum in Chinese foreign 
policy during 1989-2000 and how the CCP loosely controls Chinese IR scholars’ nationalist 
writings.
The thesis argues that China is not a revisionist state despite the rise of the new nationalism. 
Chinese foreign policy since 1989 is best understood as largely being the product of an 
effectively yet loosely controlled, plural and reactive nationalism and that the CCP’s 
domestic considerations keep Chinese foreign policy inward-looking. This thesis also argues 
that Chinese elites regard the US engagement policy as patronising and paternalistic and thus 
it fails to achieve its core objectives that centre on no unilateral use of offensive military 
force, peaceful resolution of territorial disputes and respect for international rules.
It has been found that focal points of nationalism in Chinese foreign policy are legitimacy of 
the CCP’s one-party rule, territorial control and modernization and that the new Chinese 
nationalism is a weak force. It has also been found that the US engagement policy toward 
China has generated nationalism in China and the CCP’s response is mainly defensive 
arguments rather than hostile acts.
I support my argument with a study of the CCP’s official terms and Chinese IR scholars’ 
writings. I examine how Chinese IR scholars try to follow the CCP’s party line in foreign 
policy and how various groups of Chinese IR scholars interpret the party line in different 
ways. Focusing on the case of China’s response to US engagement, I analyse Chinese elites’ 
nationalistic views on the US approach to China in respect of security, political, cultural and 
economic issues. The implication of my research is that the growing concern about China 
threat has been in regional perceptions of Chinese goals rather than the CCP’s diplomacy per 
se.
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Chapter I Introduction
Basic Questions and Arguments
What have been the dynamics of China’s foreign policy since Jiang Zemin became the 
CCP’s general secretary in the context of the post-cold war era? What are the focal points 
of this theme? Has China become a threat to the current international order due to this 
influence? The existing literature, including historical, ideological, realist, liberal and 
constructivist approaches, offers scattered insights into these questions, but leaves us with 
an incomplete understanding of Chinese foreign policy since 1989. In this thesis, the 
author will provide a nationalist interpretation of that policy and suggest new hypotheses 
regarding the motivations, sources, contents and consequences of Chinese foreign policy 
in the new era.
This thesis joins the controversy in the debate over China threat, and argues that China is 
not a revisionist state despite the rise of the new nationalism. I suggest that Chinese 
foreign policy since 1989 is best understood as largely being the product of an effectively 
yet loosely controlled, diversified, inconsistent and reactive nationalism that developed in 
the context of the post-cold war era after the collapse of communist regimes in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe.1 This nationalist Chinese foreign policy is greatly restrained 
by domestic issues while China continues to strive hard for modernisation. Chinese 
domestic considerations, particularly the strong sense of insecurity as to state integrity 
and accordingly the need for more uniform national identity, keep Chinese foreign policy 
inward-looking. A profound fear of chaos and disorder among CCP leaders is a defining 
aspect of Chinese politics. They appear to view foreign policy through the prism of its 
internal needs, seeking an external environment that will reduce the need to divert 
resources to conflict with the outside world.3 In practice, it is not on the agenda of 
Chinese foreign policy to challenge the current international order, though there are 
Chinese voices for modifying the current international system.
I will use the case of China-US relations to illustrate my analysis as US policy occupies
the key position in Chinese foreign policy. It is concerned with the Chinese foreign
1
policy response to the US China policy during 1989-2000 when the process of China’s 
modernisation was accelerated. It focuses on China’s US policy formulation centred on 
Chinese political elites, namely senior CCP leaders and various groups of Chinese IR 
scholars, using the method of comparative studies to examine the Chinese writings of 
Sino-US relations. Therefore, in addition to addressing the “China threat” debate, this 
thesis also seeks to offer some insights into the ongoing debate over the efficacy of US 
engagement policy toward China and help answer the question of why the Chinese elite 
regard engagement as containment. I argue that, due to strong nationalist sentiments 
toward the US, in the main the Chinese elite regard the engagement policy as patronizing 
and paternalistic, take an anti-America approach, partly dismiss its main requirements for 
joining the international community in a peaceful and orderly way (for instance, over the 
Taiwan issue and some international norms), and thus engagement fails to achieve its 
core objectives which centre on no unilateral use of offensive military force, peaceful 
resolution of territorial disputes and respect for international rules.
Theoretical Perspectives
Is China a threat? Scholars interpret Chinese foreign policy from different theoretical 
perspectives and offer different answers. There are mainly five approaches that have 
dominated Chinese foreign policy studies: historical,4 ideological,5 realist6, liberal7 and 
constructivist.8 The historical approach contends that one can only understand Chinese 
foreign policy on the basis of historical and cultural legacy. Drawing on historical 
sources, Buries, Shulsky, Gill and Mulvenon argue that China is indeed a threat to world 
peace,9 yet Lowell Dittmer argues that Chinese foreign policy is overall benign.10 
Scholars taking the ideological approach emphasize the principles of Marxism-Leninism 
and Maoism, and suggest that China's relationship with the outside world is in the main 
based on its ideological belief. They differ over to what extent Chinese foreign policy is 
hostile toward the West. Steven I. Levine argues that China is still a rival of liberal 
democracies due to its communism-turned anti-imperialism.11 Realists argue that one can 
actually better understand Chinese foreign policy with the support of such Western IR 
theories as balance of power, national interests, and domestic economic, military and 
systemic constraints. Swaine, Tellis and Goldstein suggest China might be a threat due to
2
1 • * its aggressive grand strategy, yet Nathan, Ross and Blank argue that China is still
1 Xvulnerable. Liberals do not regard China as a threat, as they believe interdependence 
brings about mutual benefits. Lampton argues that economic interdependence and 
common security will ensure peace between China and the US.14 Constructivists stress 
the significance of values rather than materials in international relations. Theorists like 
Hopf argue that learning and socialization generate peaceful foreign policies,15 yet 
Johnston deems it inapplicable in the Chinese case.16
This thesis is concerned with Chinese foreign policy since 1989, therefore historical 
factors are less important than contemporary issues despite their contribution to the 
research’s historical context. Communist ideology still lingers on in China yet it has not 
been regarded as a vital variable since China embraced market economy in 1992. 
Neorealism and neoliberalism share the rationalist assumption that states are self- 
regarding and interests-driven, but debate whether states pursue relative or absolute 
gains. In the Chinese case, the former has difficulty accounting for China’s WTO entry 
regardless of its high risk, the latter for China’s rapid military expansion in the 1990s. 
(Realism has another weak point as realists interpret China’s power in conflicting ways, 
so they draw different conclusions over China threat) Systemic constructivism advocated 
by Wendt fails to address China’s reluctance to reform its political reform in a world of 
liberal democracy,17 unit-level constructivism advocated by Katzenstein ignores China’s
1 ftadaptation, though selective, to international norms.
Nationalist Alternative
To grasp a more complete picture of Chinese foreign policy since 1989, this thesis offers 
an explanation from the perspective of nationalism. Many scholars like Segal equal 
nationalism to a “problem” if  not a “threat”.19 I suggest that nationalism does not 
necessarily amount to a threat and whether it leads to conflict is contingent. Nationalist 
threat comes from strong uniform consensus and external-oriented nationalism. In 
Chinese foreign policy, there is little sign of these two features. In the Chinese case, 
loosely controlled and domestic-oriented nationalism might not be a negative but rather a 
positive matter if not a contribution to international order.
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There are already many books and papers on the new Chinese nationalism in general, 
including works by Dean, Dittmer, Kim, Tu, Cohen, Zheng Yongnian, Christopher 
Hughes etc. Some scholars have already discussed new features of nationalism in 
China's foreign policy since 1989. For instance, in 1994 Robinson, Shambaugh and some 
other scholars observed the features of a nationalistic Chinese foreign policy: the Chinese 
are a great people and China is a great nation; the Chinese nation deserves a much better 
fate than that which it has experienced in the modem world; as a great nation, China 
naturally occupies a central position in world affairs and must be treated as a great
91power. Whiting states that, as China moves on from a planned economy to a market one 
with dramatic changes in people's economic and social life, legitimacy of the regime and 
national identity will be at stake. Therefore, he points out that an appeal to nationalism as 
a means of mobilising unity will be assertive, if not aggressive. In his view, how this 
affects Chinese foreign policy will depend on how foreign powers relate to China at that 
time.22
Is the new nationalism in Chinese foreign policy a threat to the world? Scholars such as 
Whiting, Downs, Sanders, Oksenberg and Unger are cautious in exploring the limits of 
Chinese nationalism and in raising the question of whether Chinese nationalism is 
affirmative, assertive or aggressive, though they believe Chinese nationalism is a 
problem. Some of them believe that Chinese nationalism is nothing more than normal 
patriotism that only becomes abnormal when provoked by highly threatening events 24 
Most of them deem that the new Chinese nationalism is still an on going process and has 
been restrained to date, yet its future is uncertain.
Some scholars clearly declare the new Chinese nationalism is not a threat. Zheng 
Yongnian contends that the CCP seems to be leaning towards a "voice" strategy and it 
has no intention to threaten Asia or challenge the US. He also believes that external 
factors can restrain Chinese nationalism, as he has noted that nationalistic voices decline 
in China when the West, especially the US, shows respect to China. Zhao Shuisheng has 
examined different orientations of the new Chinese nationalism, nativist, anti-
4
'yfstraditionalist, and pragmatist, and their different international orientations. He finds that 
pragmatic nationalism has been the dominant perspective in China since the 1980s. He 
agrees with Shambaugh who argued that post cold war Chinese nationalism was
97defensive, assertive in form and reactive in essence, and argues that the new Chinese 
nationalism is a pragmatic one: powerful when China’s national interests and territorial 
integrity are in jeopardy yet not making Chinese international behaviour aggressive. 
Edward Friedman joins them and argues that the new Chinese nationalism does not lead 
to conflict with the US if  forces that favour economic growth and international 
integration can prevail. He contends that a U.S. policy of cautious and vigilant 
engagement can somehow help these peaceful forces prevail against the dominant 
chauvinists in Chinese politics.
Li Nan argues in a 2001 paper that the new Chinese nationalism is overall conservative
9Qand defensive from the perspective of the PLA. He has examined the new dominant 
themes in Chinese military writings and deems that they have driven China's foreign 
policy away from Mao’s internationalist and revolutionary approach toward a more 
conservative and nationalist direction. In his 2003 paper PLA Conservative Nationalism 
Li Nan examines the growth of PLA nationalism and argues once again that Chinese
<)A
nationalism is conservative. He points out that the main role of the PLA has become to 
maintain China's territorial integrity.
There are other scholars who believe that the new nationalism in Chinese foreign policy 
is towards aggressiveness. They like to say that the nationalistic goal of the CCP is the 
restoration of China's historical position in Asia. Yu Ying-shih considers that the rise of a 
new Chinese nationalism aims at replacing the dominant position o f the West in the 
world and controlling the world in the twenty-first century. Huntington states that the 
Chinese have increasingly asserted their intention to resume the historic role of "the pre­
eminent power in East Asia" and "to bring to an end the overlong century of humiliation 
and subordination to the West and Japan." James Lilley proclaims that there is a rallying 
cry for Chinese everywhere that after a century of humiliation China's time has finally 
come. Bernstein and Munro warn the West, driven by nationalist sentiment, China is
5
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seeking to replace the US as the dominant power in Asia. In the eyes of these scholars, 
the new Chinese nationalism is quintessentially aggressive.
I focus on the core of Chinese foreign policy-making elites, namely Chinese IR 
(International Relations) scholars, and try to reveal the fracture of the new nationalism in 
Chinese foreign policy and the fact that it is still a weak force. Based on Goldman and 
Song’s contribution , I divide them mainly into 4 groups according to their closeness to 
the central power: personal advisers, institutional advisers, official intellectuals and 
liberals. (The views of liberals will be at times addressed yet not be focused upon due to 
their weak influence in the 1990s on which the author agrees with Zhao Suisheng.) The 
author claims that there exists a thin consensus regarding the nationalist approach to 
China’s foreign policy among Chinese IR scholars yet the disparities among them are so 
obvious that the current consensus manipulated and controlled by the CCP hardly appears 
to be a formidable force. It is not strong enough to “threaten” the current international 
order. As such, apart from concurring with Zheng Yongnian, Zhao Shuisheng, Li Nan 
and others that the new Chinese nationalism is largely domestic-oriented, I try to 
demonstrate that the nationalist Chinese foreign policy is not aggressive.
The author argues that the new Chinese nationalism is loosely yet still effectively 
controlled, therefore contributes to the debate on whether Chinese nationalism is top- 
down or bottom-up. Christensen and Munson argue that the CCP is trying hard to 
promote nationalism from above,34 yet Gries argues that the most forceful manifestations 
of nationalism surge up from the people and the CCP can hardly control it.35The author 
identifies with the top-down model and claims that Chinese nationalism is under control 
and is not chaotic enough to bring about “problems” to the world.
Definitions
In this thesis the author regards shared culture, common economy and the self- 
consciousness to control a territory as inseparable parts of a nation, so it is in line with the 
definition offered by Smith. Smith defines “nation” as a “named human population 
sharing an historic territory, common myths, and historical memories, a mass public
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culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members”, 
which stresses the idea o f territorial control. In Chinese nationalism, this territory refers 
to shenzhou (the holy land). This approach can better explain the Chinese urge to 
maintain national integrity and become a great power in terms of wealth and power. In 
my eyes, a nation is a collective of people and what makes a nation unique is that it is a 
collective united by shared cultural features, a common economic system and belief in 
the right to control a territory. The belief in the right to territorial control is central to 
distinguishing nations from other human groups. Many groups hold common economy, 
myths, values and symbols, yet they are not nations, as they are just unified by economy 
and culture. Thus, a nation is defined by the author as a self-conscious community, 
formed from one or more ethnicities, identified by common economy and values of its 
own, claiming the right to political loyalty, identity, autonomy as a people and the control 
of a specific territory.
Based on this understanding, nationalism is regarded in this thesis as a sentiment that 
believes a nation’s own interests and values should be defended at almost any cost 
through creation and maintenance of the integrity of its nation-state. It is about power 
struggle in the context of world politics. It is about a state’s political movement to 
consolidate its power in the modem world.38 Therefore the author largely regards 
nationalism as a political ideology that believes a nation’s own national ideas are 
especially valuable if not superior to others and that a nation has a unique identity due to 
these national ideas, which drives it to strive for more wealth and power. Breuilly says: 
“The term 'nationalism' is used to refer to political movements seeking or exercising state
•>Q
power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments.” The author concurs and 
holds that one can better understand the new Chinese nationalism when regarding it as a 
state- motivated political movement that aims to maintain national integrity and improve 
Chinese power in international society.
This definition is firmly based on Chinese understandings as well. He Xin believes “that 
the direct appeal of nationalism is statism and patriotism, namely regarding maintaining 
national and state interests as noble value and paramount principle.”40 For him,
7
nationalism means a political ideology based on traditional Chinese culture, guiding 
Chinese actions to promote national interests.41 Wang Jisi’s understanding is similar to 
He Xin, regarding nationalism as a value to defend national interests. In his eyes, 
“ . . .‘nationalism’ (or the almost synonymous concept o f ‘patriotism’ in this context) is an 
ethical principle that is desired to keep national cohesion and political stability in society” 
and the government is responsible for putting it into foreign policy practices.42 Stressing 
the political role of the nation state, he thus believes that value and actions to defend 
interests are intertwined in nationalism.
Rise of the New Nationalism
The new Chinese nationalism rose up when China’s stability and even survival was 
greatly challenged from both within China and abroad. It is the direct result of China’s 
response to the newly changed domestic and international environment after the 
shattering events of 1989-91.43 After the Tiananmen incident of June 1989 and its 
dramatic domestic consequences, the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union, a new world order emerged during and after the Gulf War, 
blighted abruptly China's plan to enter the international community as an equal to other 
global powers.44
Domestically the legitimacy of the communist ideology was more severely challenged 
than shortly after the death of Mao in 1976. The CCP began to realize that it should 
appeal for something spiritual that transcends disputes among the Chinese people in order 
to maintain national unity and social stability and to secure one-party rule. As the party 
knew that prolonged absence of political support might bring about “revolutionary 
alteration of political and social system,”45 and societies with legitimate authority systems 
are “more likely to survive than those without,”46 it did not ignore the danger.
Shortly after the crackdown in Tiananmen, the conservative force gained momentum.47 In 
view of the danger to his economic reforms, Deng, despite his deteriorating health, made 
a foray against the conservative wing in early 1992 and put forth his theory of Socialist 
Market Economy with Chinese Characteristics. Against heavy odds, he saved China's
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reform, but it does not follow that China would progress out of danger, as the party has to
A Q
pay for its brutal handling of the 1989 demonstrations. Due to his pragmatist approach 
to Marxism-Leninism, he brought in a great legitimacy crisis to the CCP. The Party’s 
performance is now judged on “how well the economy is performing”.49 Deng Xiaoping 
began to realize that it would be hard for the CCP to resort in crisis to the ranks time and 
again, and China needs a powerful spiritual source to ensure social stability, which can be 
seen from his judgement that the greatest mistake the CCP had committed since adopting 
the reform and open-door policy was in the field of political education.50 It is well known 
that he consulted many times the famous radical nationalist, He Xin, shortly after 
crushing the democratic movement by force.51 Since then, nationalism has played a 
significant role in the politics of the post-Tiananmen era.
After the June 4 event Jiang Zemin became the CCP’s new helmsman. As the third 
generation party secretary arising out of technocratic bureaucracy, Jiang could not gain 
the authority enjoyed by Mao and Deng. Both Deng and Jiang knew well that China’s 
way out was to continue reform and open door policies, and China would follow the route 
o f the Soviet Union if it stuck with dated communist ideology, yet they also understood 
clearly that reform had engendered and would continue to engender disparities in society. 
It seemed to them that the CCP’s rule would collapse if  the party continued to inculcate 
the Chinese people with communism or if  the party chose liberal democracy. In this
c-y
scenario the safest way for the CCP to unify the Chinese people was nationalism. He 
and his colleagues began to embrace traditional values. For example, the International 
Confucian Studies Association’s 1994 Conference in Beijing was introduced by Vice 
Premier Li Lanqing and former Minister Gu Mu and was concluded by Jiang Zemin and 
Li Ruihuan.53
The two most important personal advisers of Jiang Zemin, Liu Ji and Wang Daohan, are 
in the same league as He Xin in terms of nationalism regardless of their different 
approaches to the economic reform.54 Wang Daohan is among the first scholars who 
staunchly argued for an International Relations theory with Chinese characteristics.55 
Wang Daohan and Liu Ji advised Jiang Zemin to put zhonghua minzu de weida fuxing
9
(the Great Resurrection of the Chinese Nation) into Jiang’s report to the national party 
congress.56
On the world stage, the downfall of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
made the CCP’s open door policy more difficult. CCP leaders suddenly found out that 
China became a pariah of the world, shorn of its supposedly deserved status 
commensurate with its rising economic capabilities. All the bad behaviour of the Chinese 
authorities, in terms of human rights, economic protectionism and military adventurism, 
which was tolerated by the West during the Cold War, held the world spotlight. More 
often than not, Chinese officials were isolated on international occasions. Lacking 
confidence in Chinese ideology, CCP leaders put more faith in China's hard power, for 
example, economic growth and military build-up. Nevertheless, the 1990-1991 Gulf War 
overshadowed this effort. The US-led allied forces won the war with flying colours, and 
the US army demonstrated its capability to address alone, if need be, any international 
conflicts in the world. It made the CCP leaders open their eyes and began to worry about 
China’s security. Oksenberg and Economy regard China’s situation as perilous from a
cn
historical point of view.
Nationalist views are widely accepted by Chinese people. He Qinglian, who is one of the 
most liberal and outspoken intellectuals in China, also takes a hard nationalist approach
CO
to China’s security issues. (John Derbyshire was completely amazed that Miss He could 
regard his sympathy over the independence movements of Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan as 
“nonsense”.)59 Without reference to nationalism, one can hardly understand the reasons 
why China was still in good shape as the only major communist power against all odds, 
why the PLA became more assertive over the Taiwan problem; why to screw foreigners 
has been regarded as patriotic;60 why anti-Americanism (a means to distinguish Chinese 
from the West led by America and establish a unique Chinese identity) was steadily on 
the rise among Chinese youth in the 1990s;61 why, in 1996, China's Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs suspended English interpreting at its press conferences and required all foreign 
journalists to learn Chinese.
10
Nationalism does not amount to threat. It is contingent. There are conditions for 
nationalist threat. Firstly, (a) territorial claims of other countries, (b) imposition of local 
values or narrowly defined national values upon other countries; secondly, taking 
strategic actions toward achieving either or both these two objectives or even back up by 
force. If a foreign policy fails either of these two factors, it should not be called a 
“nationalist threat.” If it fails the second, it had better be regarded as “nationalist 
rhetoric.” From rhetoric to actions, there is a huge gap to bridge. Aggressive nationalism 
needs external-oriented policy ideas and strong uniform consensus among policy- makers 
to develop into the “maturity” stage, namely real nationalist threat, from only scattered 
voices.
In this thesis, I will inquire about the nature of the new nationalism in Chinese foreign 
policy and try to find whether it is aggressive. Is it strongly domestic-restrained in 
practice? Is it uniform enough to form a strong national will? The author will discuss (1) 
domestic constraints of the nationalist Chinese foreign policy, (2) whether there are 
variations, tensions and disparities among Chinese policy-makers, (3) whether the 
Chinese nationalist response to the US China policy is defensive.
Domestic Constraints
Though China’s self-perception changed considerably in the 1990s, when the CCP tried
69to transform China from object to subject in the international community, Chinese 
foreign policy is still very inward-looking. With cautious optimism, Lampton suggests 
that China’s future external behaviour will possibly continue to be shaped by domestic 
forces of change in China.63
The rise of China’s “new nationalism” is a complex phenomenon reflecting both 
domestic and international factors64, yet the decisive factors are internal concerns. The 
main concerns of the new Chinese nationalism are domestic issues and its external- 
oriented rhetoric is hollow and serves domestic needs. The most important priority is 
territorial integrity. Despite stem warnings from scholars like Goldman that nationalism
11
is unlikely to hold together China’s diverse and decentralized regions,65 in the post-Cold 
War era nationalist foreign policy rhetoric is intended to ensure China’s regime stability.
• Territorial Control
Territorial control is at the centre of the new Chinese nationalism. One has to bear in 
mind that China used to be a vast empire. Nationalism cannot be understood well without 
reflecting on past political forms and particularly ‘‘empires of the pre-modem and early 
modem sorts.”66 Due to this legacy the CCP claims most territories, namely shenzhou 
(the holy land), occupied by different dynasties in the past. CCP leaders see Taiwanese, 
Tibetan and Uighur separatists as threatening, and view outside support for their causes 
with great alarm. In recent years, Jiang Zemin’s talks have been peppered with 
Confucian sayings and PRC spokesmen have asserted that all previous dynasties were in 
fact Chinese and that all the people who inhabit these territories are members of the 
Chinese family.68
Almost all would agree that control over one's own nation-state is an objective for most 
nationalists. However, it is hard in reality to determine which territory belongs to 
whom.69 While concern with territory is a necessary component of nationalism, many 
nations lay claim to territory even when the nation’s members do not occupy it as a 
majority. Gellner's "Potato Principle" says that groups will look back to periods when 
they were mainly farmers to justify the control of land in an urban and industrial age,
70showing how territory itself is imagined. Just as there are no predetermined nations, 
there are no predetermined homelands.
Nevertheless, the CCP would not agree with Gellner on this point. The Chinese
71nationalism is a "'Sino-centric' cultural nationalism". The Confucian world was not 
"one big happy family" (tianxia yijia), but, rather, extremely Sino-centric, involving a
77"cultural superiority." Therefore the Chinese are inclined to claim all the territories that 
were sinicized by Chinese empires in history. If some of these territories are lost to 
powers other than China, Chinese will feel bitter and angry. Most educated Chinese are 
still painfully aware of the "unequal" treaties signed with the British at Nanking in 1842
12
and the Japanese at Shimonoseki in 1895 in which Hong Kong and Taiwan were ceded 
respectively to the British and Japanese.
• Modernisation
Modernisation plays a significant role in the new Chinese nationalism. Since the Self­
strengthening Movement of the nineteenth century, a recurring theme in Chinese 
nationalism has been how China should be modernized. Although there is no general 
theory, there is a broad consensus in the modernist school that nationalism both as a form 
of consciousness and as a political ideology has been the single most important factor 
shaping the structure and processes of the modem world.74 Most scholars from other 
schools of nationalism admit that nationalism remains the road to modernity, despite their 
disagreement with the modernists. For instance, Smith’s most important book, The Ethnic 
Origin of Nations, represents hitherto the strongest critique of modernism, yet he still 
accepts many modernist presuppositions.
Modernisation brings about political and economic gains for states, but it is a double- 
edged sword. It engenders political, economic and social problems for states to cope with. 
First of all, economic modernisation might give rise to devolution of power and go 
against nation-state building. Chinese nationalists used to hold the belief that China’s 
problem lies solely with its domestic economic weakness and believed material capability 
alone can catapult China into being a great power.76 Nevertheless China has been
77regarded as weak in its security in the post-Cold War world. The fundamental reason 
largely lies in problems emerging from China’s rapid economic modernisation and the 
dwindling of its central power. If there is always a danger of disintegration due to the 
process of modernisation, China will surely not be regarded by the world as a real great 
power.
• 70
Huntington says that modernisation breeds factors against social stability. As 
modernisation advances, social diversity is inevitable and then the tightly tailored 
"nation-state making and keeping" scheme is inclined to failure and a range of conflicts 
arise as the political order begins to destabilize. This process leads to repression at home,
13
causing new rifts between society and state due to the regime's unsatisfactory civil rights 
record. In the case of China, Deng’s reform and open-door policies have brought about 
overall economic increase and modernisation, yet the downside is also obvious: for one, 
wealth disparities between the rich and poor, the rise of localism and human rights
7Qmovements. In this scenario, Deng had always insisted on the policy of bu zhenglun (no 
debate), as he thought that this would rip up social stability.
China still faces uncertainties of economic development. In pursuit of modernisation, the 
CCP was boldly attempting to restructure its obsolete and unproductive state-owned 
enterprise system. It would not be an easy task. It was said that problems like falling 
foreign investment, rampant corruption and expected declines in China’s trade surplus
OA
were on the horizon. More important, and potentially destabilizing, was the widespread
81expectation that China’s growth rate would fall again.
Equally troubling to the CCP is increasing unemployment in both rural and urban areas. 
In 1998, according to one estimate, 26% of the rural workforce, were chronically 
unemployed. Some hundred million rural residents are adrift in China at any given time,
DO
migrants from the interior looking for work in the rich coastal areas. They streamed into 
cities looking for new opportunities to make a living, crossing boundaries and defying the 
government’s ability to “mould society into rigid, contradictory categories,”84 and crime 
and problems of social order increased.
One of the most adverse impacts of the post-Mao reforms has been endemic corruption. 
Elizabeth J. Perry writes that “in the fall of 1993, Deputy Procurator-General Lian 
Guoqing acknowledged that corruption was ‘worse than at any other period since New 
China was founded in 1949. It has spread into the Party, government, administration and
or
every part of society, including politics, economy, ideology and culture.’” The CCP’s 
corruption leads directly to people’s suspicion of the political ideology.
Due to the decline of the central power, civil society in China is getting stronger. An 
important development is occurring, manifest in the reappearance of non-governmental
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organizations including secret societies and criminal gangs. Those organizations with 
genuine indigenous roots enriched by a Chinese modernity — secret societies, Buddhism, 
lineage associations and professional agencies— are likely to spread more rapidly, have 
greater appeal and prove more difficult for the core state apparatus to control, precisely
O/'
because they cannot be dismissed as creatures of the outside world.
The spread of the Falun Gong sect is perhaps the most dramatic example of developments 
in this sphere. Falun Gong is a spiritual movement that is based on sinocized Buddhism. 
Out o f the fear that believers of the Falun Gong cult would challenge the CCP’s ruling 
power, the party has been engaging in a nation-wide movement to wipe it out in the name 
of purging heresy. This movement has brought about a political and human rights disaster 
and further displayed the CCP’s ideological crisis.
Problems generated by modernisation push the Chinese elite to nationalism. The 
proponents of nationalism in the 1990s have different agendas for Chinese reforms, yet 
the mainstream is statism.87 They do not challenge the power of the state and this is one 
of the most important reasons that even popular nationalism in the street is “managed,
oo
controlled and ultimately suppressed by the Party.” The new nationalists aim by all 
means to build a strong modem nation state, lest China fall a prey to the West again. In 
the 1930s, many Chinese intellectuals believed that it was the precondition for China to 
be transformed into a modem liberal democracy that a strong central government be
on
established. In their views, what is the point of discussing the modernisation of China if 
China does not survive at all? Since the end of the Cold War, the same consideration has 
grown on CCP leaders and Chinese IR scholars. In many ways, Deng and Jiang’s policies 
bear similarities to the political programmes of Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, Yuan 
Shikai, Sun Zhongshan, Jiang Jieshi and even Mao Zedong (“Mao Zedong's role as a 
pioneer of socialism will receive less attention and will appear far more problematic than 
his legacy as a nationalist modernizer.”),90in terms of commitments to create a strong 
state.91
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• Legitimacy
External threat may be used by nationalists for domestic purposes. When the elites or 
rulers of a nation feel threatened in terms of legitimacy, either by external pressure or 
domestic unrest, it might stoke up nationalism and require strong loyalty to the state from 
its members. For instance, the CCP began to stoke Chinese nationalism as a way to 
recoup its popularity after the Tiananmen debacle and began to employ images of the US
Q9as a swaggering hegemon. Zhao Suisheng says that, after the rapid decay of communist 
ideology in China, the communist state used nationalism to shore up its waning 
legitimacy.93Xiao Gongqing advocated in Zhanlue yu guanli the use of a nationalism 
derived from Confucianism to fill the ideological void left with the collapse of 
communism.94Wong Kaying holds that the effort to find an alternative ideology to 
replace the dwindling communism is important consideration of the CCP’s appeal to 
nationalism. He said that the call of nationalism under the glory of complete unification 
and nationalist revival easily replaced the dominant role played by the communist 
ideology and became the crucial measure of the party in uniting its people.95
Since early this century, the Chinese elite, no matter whether nationalists or communists, 
have called upon the Chinese people to fight for national rejuvenation in order to restore 
China’s glory. Chinese intellectuals just cannot forget the legacy of China’s historical 
achievements. Although radical intellectuals in the May Fourth/New Culture movement 
of the 1910s and 1920s sought for modernity, they did not, consciously or unconsciously, 
sever their ties with China’s “grand” tradition.96
The slogan of zhenxing zhonghua (rejuvenation of China) was started by Sun Zhongshan
07but it was continued by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin. The term 
“rejuvenation” refers to the psychological power contained in the concept of China’s rise 
to its former world status that can be seen in two common assertions. Firstly, the CCP 
regards China’s rise as regaining its lost international status rather than as obtaining 
something new. Secondly, the CCP considers the rise of China as a restoration of fairness 
rather than as gaining advantages over others. Enchanted by the grand target of the party,
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scholars began to rewrite Chinese modem history and even well -known liberals like Hu
QD
Shi are interpreted as nationalists. In Jiang’s era, China for the first time openly pursued 
great power diplomacy (daguo zhanlue), obviously and cautiously departing from Deng’s 
1989 advice to “hide our capacities while biding our time” (taoguang yanghui)99
To broaden the base of legitimacy the CCP has embraced Confucianism. It claims that 
Confucianism provides the “inheritance” and “spiritual resources” for spiritual 
civilization that needs to combine with material civilization for a socialist spiritual 
civilization.100 While China seeks advanced science and technology from the West, 
“China should strive to enlighten the rest of the world with its traditional concept of 
harmony and to promote peace in the international arena.”101 The task is to get the right 
synthesis: “Future globalization will integrate contributions from both the East and the
109West.” Though the voice sounds tough, it aims to modify rather than challenge the 
current international system for the sake of domestic constituency.
Weak Momentum
Due to the encouragement or acquiescence of the CCP, Chinese intellectuals and Chinese 
IR scholars in particular embarked on a journey to establish in the context of the post­
cold war era China’s own social and cultural identity for the sake of politics. This 
sentiment is no longer the sole province of the party and its propagandists and is
■I
functioning as a form of consensus beyond the bounds of official culture. In the early 
1990s a number of journals advocating national studies (guoxue), such as Zhongguo 
wenhua (Chinese Culture), Xueren (Scholar), Dongfang (Oriental) and Zhanlue yu guanli 
(Strategy and Management), emerged and soon swept over the Chinese intelligentsia. 
There is a long tradition of advice and dissent from within in Chinese intellectual 
history.104 Now the faction of advice has greatly increased their power through 
nationalism. Despite their appeal for democratisation105, many liberals also take 
nationalist views toward the US.106 People began to believe “an authoritarian party like
i onthe CCP is a necessary crutch” at the present stage of modernisation.” As a result, 
nationalist thinking that is concerned with political and social stability, economic
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development and nation-state rights over democratic change and individual rights now
1 OXdominates Chinese intellectual discourse.
This consensus has provided the CCP with an opportunity to cover domestic problems 
and survive against great odds. Nevertheless, it does not follow that this widespread 
nationalist momentum is one strong enough to challenge the current international order, 
as Chinese policy-makers still disagree with each other about many key issues while they 
agree on others to some degree.
• Consensus Engineering
To achieve consensus on the new nationalism, censorship in intellectual matters is carried 
out to guide Chinese scholars broadly to follow the party line. Chinese IR scholars, who 
are at the centre of this study, are among the most important parts in the CCP’s efforts to 
engineer a uniform foreign policy discourse. This is the reason why, normally, it is 
extremely difficult to openly formulate dissent, as there are few ways to express oneself 
other than resorting to the guideline that had been elaborated by the CCP. Nevertheless, 
the censorship policy is not as strict as before. Because academic journals have modest 
circulations, they are given somewhat more latitude than other publishing media. As long 
as scholars do not confront the CCP leader head-on, “they can write in scholarly journals 
pretty much as they choose.”109
Censorship used to rely heavily on pre-publication examinations, yet now it has been 
increasingly focused on formalised language control. Language manipulation carried out 
by governments is one of the important controlling instruments in authoritarian states. To 
counter the influence of pluralism and tradition, authoritarian states tend to promote a 
uniform value system from above, call on its citizens to be more like-minded and 
suppress dissenting voices. Mazrui has described how East African countries take in 
education and communication a process of “counter-selection”.110 Normally terms 
conducive to the present state are carefully selected by governments in these countries. 
Havel once talked about formalised language in the Czech totalitarian regime. In his 
view, what was created was “a system of ritual signs that replace reality with pseudo­
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reality."111 As a consequence, Havel argued, "In everyone there is some willingness to 
merge with the anonymous crowd and to flow comfortably along with it down the river
1 I
of pseudo-life." This is indeed an accurate description of the pseudo-consensus pointed 
out by Habermas and can be well applied to the Chinese intelligentsia.
In terms of politics, manipulated language is surely a powerful tool in winning public 
support for policies, particularly in an information society that increasingly relies on 
communication. To CCP leaders, manipulated language is more than promotion of 
certain ideologies. “It was a means to educate and mobilize a mass of people in the real or
1 I 'j
perceived benefits of Party programs.” It is also a powerful weapon in the struggle of 
nation states against nation states, worldview against worldview. Schwartz delineates 
how careful employment of specific communist terminology reflected an early 
ideological split between China and the Soviet Union. Noting that political terminology 
can reveal a regime’s intent, Schwartz illustrates how China, by coining the term “new 
democracy”, rejected the Soviet Union’s ideological tutelage.114 Rhetoric thereby passes 
for the tool of many strategic ends and therefore as a linguistic means for prolonging an 
authority’s life.
In the West the term “propaganda” (xuanchuan) has negative connotations, but in the 
Chinese context, its importance cannot be overestimated. 115Through its propaganda 
structure, the CCP has radically reshaped and reinvented virtually all the vocabulary that 
came into its sphere, including seemingly unremarkable or basic words as well as newly 
coined political terminology. Schoenhals has noted that political debates in China often 
boil down to attempts to create the correct and uniform “formulation” on a given 
question, a brief aphoristic statement of the party's current wisdom on the topic. 116In 
terms of language manipulation, Habermas is right to say that playing the game of 
language means playing the game of domination, violence and distortion.
In China there is always a set of officially sanctioned political terms to guide the writing 
of Chinese intellectuals. The official institutes have the power to “purify” their work. For 
instance, between January and October 1953, the Xinhua News Agency issued some 177
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“corrections” of no less than 243 domestic news items.117 Despite Deng Xiaoping’s open- 
mindness, he fell heir to this traditional policy. “Like Mao Zedong before him, he 
appears to have believed that it was possible to make one see things differently by
liftintentionally manipulating the tools with which one sees.”
Due to the paucity of theory development, the CCP under Deng and Jiang’s leadership 
found it even harder to play the role of ideological tutor and had simply to rely on some 
official terms rather than Marxist and Maoist theories to control Chinese intellectuals. 
This made their policy control more ineffective and loosening. For a new age they knew 
the party needed a new set of formalised language and a new way to make intellectuals 
follow official terms in order to promote their values and policies. The party’s official 
terms became guidelines rather than an enforcement of Chinese intellectuals’ writings. 
They are encouraged to exercise self-discipline and support the party’s interests in their 
interpretations and are less forced to follow these terms literally.
• Official Terms of Chinese Nationalist Foreign Policy
In the 1990s the new nationalism in Chinese foreign policy could be summarized into 
four categories with these official terms: he er butong (incorporating things of diverse 
nature), minzu zihao (national pride), weiji yishi (consciousness of crisis) and 
s/jow/*tf/(victim).119 They are a mixture of traditional Chinese values and Maoism, with 
apparently strong nationalistic sentiments, aiming at serving the rise of China as a great 
nation. (Fairbank’s argument is relevant today when he said that Maoism is itself
190Confucianism in Leninist garb, aiming to improve China’s world status. )
These terms are incorporated into China’s independent foreign policy of peace that 
promotes a peace-loving image of Chinese in the world. Many Chinese IR scholars claim 
that this policy is deeply rooted in the ren (benevolence) value in Confucianism, despite 
the fact that “adherents of another governing approach, the Legalist school, take a much
191harder view of relations between nations and the use of force.” Like reformists in the 
late Qing dynasty, Chinese scholars continue to uphold the classical constructs as their 
own most enduring points of reference; they infuse these age-old precepts with a
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radically new spirit and fuse them with present principles. The result is the same as 
before: tension rather than synthesis. 1220ne can see that minzu zihao (national pride), 
weiji yishi (consciousness of crisis) and shouhai (victim) apparently clash with Chinese 
peace-loving rhetoric. For Western IR scholars, the more the CCP promotes a worldview 
packaged largely in ideals, the more they will suspect that CCP leaders are trying to hide 
their actual intentions behind “flowery rhetoric.” This clash can only be explained by 
the inward-looking, self-absorbed, vulnerable and aggrieved nature of Chinese foreign 
policy.
The focus of the formulation he er butong (incorporating things of diverse nature) is 
“different”. It can also be called dou er bu po  (fight but not break) in terms of US-China 
relations. The early 1990s is a watershed in new China’s history. It was the time when the 
Chinese people realized that they are apparently unique if  not isolated in the world due to 
the collapse of communist regimes in the Soviet bloc. China becomes a lonely island 
among nations of liberal democracy. This shift necessitated a change in national 
identities, as national identity is a base for public opinion, policies, principles and policy 
platform. The awakening of Chinese self-consciousness began to nationalize Marxism- 
Leninism and make it a part of Chineseness. Together with the CCP’s resolute 
determination to become stronger economically, state capitalism started to take shape. 
This earthquake change is echoed in China’s foreign relations with its pursuit of a set of 
principles different from both China’s past and the West at present. This uniqueness is 
mainly constructed on China’s criticism of the West and America in particular. They 
have been depicted vividly as arrogant and dangerous, standing in the way of China’s 
great national resurrection. The CCP thus calls upon the Chinese people to be highly 
alerted, determined to enter the First World regardless of cost and international criticism.
Nationalist terms like minzu zihao (national pride), weiji yishi (consciousness of crisis) 
and shouhai (victim) aim to help maintain the relative stability of China and unite many 
social groups that are averse to follow Marxism-Leninism, thus the CCP can acquire 
“Hobbesian” legitimacy within the population “for delivering civil peace and civil 
order.”124 The common past of glory and humiliation is used to invent a common new
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identity. “In contrast to American nationalism of manifest destiny, Chinese nationalism is
i o r
powered by feelings of national humiliation and pride.”
One can discern clearly minzu zihao (national pride), weiji yishi (consciousness of crisis)
and shouhai (victim) through patriotic education in China. They are specifically designed
1
to create a sense of insecurity and danger, impose duties and demand joint efforts . 
They highlight China’s long and glorious history and juxtapose it to the humiliating 
recent 150 years of history (since the Opium War in 1840) of being belittled by the West. 
It tells the Chinese people that the world is not yet in peace and there would be a second 
Opium War if China remained a developing country. Deng Xiaoping once said in public 
that the West intends to keep China in poverty and underdevelopment forever.127 While 
CCP leaders revel in the great achievements they have contributed to their motherland, 
they also admit the backwardness of China and even exaggerate it, trying to bring out 
Chinese people’s instinct to survive.128
To certain extent, the CCP’s effort to encourage nationalism among the Chinese people 
through these symbols is quite similar to Wang Jingwei’s movement to seek the 
legitimacy of his puppet regime in the 1940s. Both Wang’s team and the CCP lack theory 
development and rely on slogans to ensure their legitimacy. The propagandists who 
defended Wang’s regime tended to stress five terms. Three of these were brought 
together in a slogan: "heping, fangong, jianguo" (peace, anti-communism, rebuilding the 
country). The other two were guofu (the father o f the country, that is, Sun Zhongshan)
190and zhongguo geming (the Chinese Revolution). Heping (peace) and jianguo 
(rebuilding the country), constituted the core of his self-legitimation efforts. These two 
ideas could best explain and justify why he decided to side with the Japanese when they 
were invading his country. In addition to these two terms, he selected guofu (the father of 
the country) and zhongguo geming (the Chinese Revolution) to consolidate further his 
claim of political legitimacy.
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• IR Scholars in Chinese Foreign Policy-making
These official terms need to be widely used and interpreted to take effect among the 
Chinese people. This task falls on to a special institutional group in Chinese foreign 
policy-making, namely, Chinese IR scholars. There is apparently a rich body of literature 
in foreign policy analysis on epistemic communities and bureaucratic politics but not 
necessarily IR scholars. By and large, Chinese IR scholars are still the carriers of the 
CCP’s propaganda and the official tasks of Chinese IR scholars are either interpreting the 
party line in a permitted way or acting as the party’s mouthpiece. Therefore, it is plausible 
to regard what they have published as a fair extension of official policies or a key link of 
foreign policy-making.
Chinese IR scholars play a crucial role in Chinese foreign policy-making. In general, the
relationship between CCP leaders and the Chinese academic community have been
gradually improving since 1989.131 The more significant role of Chinese IR scholars has
shown that “the pluralization of actors involved in foreign policy is proceeding 
110rapidly.” Their work is crucial for the CCP, because as Sutter argues, domestic 
concerns dominate the Chinese foreign policy-making agenda.133 In this regard Chinese 
IR scholars can demonstrate more powerful influence on the society than diplomats.
Shambaugh has noted Chinese scholars’ more active involvement in Chinese politics in 
Jiang Zemin’s era.134 Jiang has relied heavily on the intellectuals and specialists of Policy 
Research Office of the Central Committee, “many of whom he brought to Beijing from
n r
Shanghai, for policy advice on a broad range of issues.” During Jiang’s tenure, the 
number of think tanks has proliferated and their policy advice is more sought by leaders
11Aand government institutions. During the past two decades, the central-level think-tanks 
have evolved from being information-gatherers to information-analysers to policy
t ^ 7initiators. Fewsmith and Rosen have also noted Chinese intellectuals’ growing impact 
on foreign policy-making through opportunities for consulting with relevant 
bureaucracies.138
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The author bases the research of Chinese IR scholars on Western studies of Chinese
intellectuals. Goldman, Cheek and Hamrin analyse Chinese intellectuals in general
through 3 major groups: ideological spokesmen, professional and academic elite, and 
110critical intellectuals. They did a wonderful job in analysing Chinese intellectuals in 
general in the 1980s through this grouping, yet after the Tiananmen incident Chinese 
intellectuals have regrouped. It is said that, in the post-1989 era, Chinese intellectuals can 
in general be split into the Extreme Left (who uphold traditional Marxist Leninist dogma 
and ideology), the Left (New Marxists and some people from the liberal camp who have 
taken up some leftist ideas), the Extreme Right (whose basic principle is opposition to the 
rule of the Communist Party), the Right (the broad liberal camp), and the Centre 
(reformists within the Communist Party system).140 However, because the Extreme Left 
and the Extreme Right are at the two far poles o f Chinese social thought, they generally 
have little influence on the CCP’s policies.141
In the case of IR scholars, both ideological spokesmen and critical intellectuals are 
marginalized, and the former have gradually faded out and the latter have mostly been 
exiled. The group of professional and academic elites has divided into two major clubs: 
institutional advisers based in CASS (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) and other 
think-tanks, official intellectuals spreading out in universities. Song Xinning divides 
Chinese IR scholars into 3 categories: researchers in institutes under various government 
agencies, researchers in the CASS in Beijing and those at its provincial level and 
university professors and researchers.142 However, he also deems that the former two 
carry out similar studies: policy-oriented research.143 Therefore the author puts them into 
one category, namely institutional advisers.
Based on Merle Goldman and Song’s contribution and the change in Chinese intellectuals 
after the Tiananmen incident, I believe that Chinese IR scholars in foreign policy studies 
might be divided into 4 groups: personal advisors, institutional advisors, official 
intellectuals and liberals. Personal advisers are those scholar officials who have close 
personal contacts with top CCP leaders and whose economic and political interests are 
tied up with the fate of these leaders. In some sense they can be called the “brain trust” of
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Chinese leaders.144 Institutional advisers are those scholars who work with government 
agencies and research institutions like CASS and who are given orders to draft official 
policy initiatives, carry out practical foreign policy research and provide advices to top 
CCP leaders through the bureaucratic system. Official intellectuals mean those scholars 
working in Chinese colleges and universities. Liberals are those scholars who are tizhiwai 
(outside the official system) and most of whom do not work in state-funded units.
The author puts scholars in different groups according to their distance to China’s power 
centre -  in other words, the political power they have. A Chinese scholar's social/political 
position in the Chinese hierarchy substantially affects his writings. There might be some 
overlaps as some individuals may have changed jobs or positions in different times, but a 
scholar normally writes on behalf of the group at the higher position despite different 
positions the scholar might take in his or her career. For instance, an institutional adviser 
-  a higher position - might move and become an official intellectual -  a lower position -  
working with a university, but the scholar still writes as an institutional adviser due to his 
networking in the political hierarchy.
• Different Interpretations by Chinese IR Scholars
Human beings must embrace non-consequentialist norms if we hope to “make our lives 
meaningful over time."145 Our plurality of values must be incorporated into our theories 
of rationality, because we are called upon to try to make sense of the "variety of ways we 
have of valuing things".146 In order to do this, Chinese IR scholars have to submit their 
individual valuation to social practice and Chinese political culture in particular, so that 
social stability, continuity and consensus are maintained.147 Ideas like national interests
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have histories and a kind of "specific gravity" and tend to be uniform.
Nevertheless, as Wendt eloquently explained, national interests and practices, 
fundamentally speaking, stem from the national identity that itself is formed through an 
evolutionary and dynamic mechanism.149 As different interest groups, Chinese IR 
scholars have different needs of interests and then different discourse strategies.150 
Chinese IR scholars’ writings are shaped by national interests and individual or group
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interests as well. “Interest” is basic to politics. One cannot doubt that Chinese elites aim 
to enrich themselves through professional activities, within the constraints of the system. 
For most Chinese IR scholars, this means, among other things, engaging in social and 
professional activities in ways that will not risk the economic security the socialist system 
offers them. Due to their different interest pursuits they follow the CCP’s party line in 
different ways.
Chinese IR scholars have produced a large number of works interpreting the CCP’s 
official terms on Chinese foreign policy. In general they follow the CCP’s main theme, 
i.e. nationalism, yet the author tries to show that there are variance and tensions in 
different groups’ views if  one examines their writings.
The CCP’s political terms as to the nationalistic party line is rather mechanical while the 
way Chinese IR scholars interpret it is diversified, full of varied inner thoughts, 
displaying different social needs. In the early 1940s the CCP carried out the Yanan 
Rectification movement. The contest was most openly between the forces around Mao, 
his competitors at the top among the Soviet-trained “Internationalist Faction” around 
former party leader Wang Ming and the loose cannons in the theory and literary 
institutions of Yanan, most notably Wang Shiwei. Every faction tried to justify 
themselves with official formalised language, though from their own perspectives. Yet 
scholars find that even within the victorious and uniform Maoist faction there are at least 
three identifiable domains of discourse in which the term “revolution” has significantly 
different meaning.151
One can see this more clearly from cases in the Cultural Revolution, as this is the period 
when Chinese minds were extremely controlled by CCP dogmas and every Chinese was 
forced to recite Mao’s precepts (yulu). It is the basic rule to stick to the formalised 
language and then express your own idea. Yao Wenyuan, one of the Gang of Four, 
developed a prose style of debate widely imitated by the young Red Guards: “The 
method was, first, to declare yourself a defender of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong
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Thought; second, to pose a series of accusatory questions about your target; and third, to
152expose it as yet another example of counterrevolutionary infiltration of the party.”
• Power Distance and Different Interpretations
Chinese IR scholars have different distances from the CCP’s power centre, thus they have 
different interest pursuits and take different approaches to the party line. There are 
different decision-making patterns according to different issue areas,153 national interest 
concerns and power interaction; however, there are three basic patterns in China during 
1989-2000 in terms of who has the final say: the leader in command, the collective 
leadership and the bureaucratic organization. It is true that the Chinese foreign policy 
decision-making system is undergoing three trends simultaneously: “pluralization, 
institutionalisation and professionalization”,154 however, these three patterns are still 
effective. Chinese IR scholars differ in to what extent they contribute to policy output. 
Personal advisers mainly get involved with the former two, institutional advisers the 
latter two, official intellectuals the last one.
The author states that, in general, the closer Chinese IR scholars are to the power centre, 
the more radical, more sincere and truer they are, the more appropriately they apply 
official political terms; that across different groups of Chinese IR scholars, over security 
and political issues, there is in terms of intensity of nationalist sentiments an ascending 
order along the line from liberals to official intellectuals to institutional advisers and 
finally to personal advisers, while over economic and cultural issues an ascending order 
along the line from liberals to institutional advisers to personal advisers and finally to 
official intellectuals ( As personal and institutional advisers have in terms of nationalism 
more economic and political and social stakes in security and political issues, while 
official intellectuals have more stakes in economic and cultural issues.); while within the 
same group of Chinese IR scholars there is in terms of intensity of nationalist sentiments 
an ascending order along the line from economic, cultural, political and security issues 
for personal and institutional advisers, and an ascending order for official intellectuals 
and liberals along the line from political, economic, cultural and security issues. (So one 
can see security issues are the top concern for all groups of Chinese IR scholars.)
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Personal advisors have always been a group of individuals who are active behind-the- 
scenes but who are little known to ordinary people. They offer advice on strategies and 
work to consolidate the power of CCP leaders. They include people who work actively to 
perpetuate the rule of the party and others who seek to encourage the party to change in 
line with their own ideas.155 Compared with other groups of IR scholars, they are more 
concerned with the Marxism-Leninism-Maoism part of Chinese nationalism and the 
effectiveness of the CCP’s one-party rule.
They can largely ignore the formalised language in a physical way as they are entirely 
trusted by the CCP’s paramount leaders and they share the same value and sense of 
destiny to maintain both the unity of the whole state and the party. In fact, He Xin’s 
political life is closely related to Deng Xiaoping, Wang Zhen and Chen Yun; Liu Ji, 
Wang Daohan’s fate is personally related to Jiang Zemin.156
The author will discuss some important personal advisers here, namely, Liu Ji, He Xin 
and Deng Liqun. He Xin is surely Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Li Peng’s counsellor, 
Liu Ji mainly Jiang Zemin’s counsellor, yet Deng Liqun is regarded by many in the West 
as an Old Leftist who criticizes reform and open-door policy and is not close to Deng and 
Jiang. However, the truth is more complicated than Western scholars labelled him. As a 
well-known senior leader in the CCP, who used to be a member of the central politburo 
in the 1980s, he is in fact against the ultra-leftist party line, which comports with Deng 
Xiaoping’s policy. As an authoritative Marxist thinker, he is very influential in the 
Central Party Policy Research Office that is made up o f counsellors for members of the 
politburo. Teng Wensheng, the director of the Central Party Policy Research Office in the 
1990s and Jiang Zeming’s adviser, used to claim publicly that he is Deng Liquan’s 
mensheng (private student). In some sense, he is considered by many as Deng Xiaoping’s 
zhengyou (a friend that gives forthright admonitions). Therefore, the author regards him 
as one of Jiang and Deng Xiaoping’s advisers, though he is not as close to them as He 
Xin, Wang Daohan and Liu Ji.
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When they use these official terms, their writings following the CCP’s party line are the 
most true and sincere among Chinese IR scholars. Personal advisors can sometimes 
express their disapproval against the current policy as they are entitled to point out what 
the CCP has done wrong and then offer constructive suggestions. They are allowed to 
criticize the CCP as they are regarded as ziji ren (one of us). Personal advisers can see all
1 ^ 7secret government and military documents. Therefore in the Popperian physical world 
they enjoy most freedom, yet they are the most sincere in terms of inner world due to 
their high-level identification with the central authority.
Institutional advisors who do not have close personal relationships with party leaders 
have to accommodate the formalised language. After the decline o f the Old Left, they 
constitute the main force of the so-called Neo-conservatives in post-1989 China.159 As 
opposed to other groups of IR scholars, they represent the more pragmatic force in 
Chinese nationalism, rather concerned with political stability.
Because they seek only policy adjustments, their views are easily accepted by CCP 
leaders. They typically do not exert their influence through pressure in the public domain 
and therefore they are able to interact with policymakers through internal discussions and 
private exchange of views. 160In Jiang Zemin’s era, they were involved in the debate over 
and drafting of many major policy initiatives.161 Some overseas Chinese are also regarded 
as members of this community. Penn State’s Liu Kang is said to have political ties with
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top party leaders through the recommendation of his CASS friends.
In terms of inner world they are quite true and sincere, though less than personal advisers, 
yet they do not often use the CCP’s foreign policy terms very appropriately. In their 
articles they always refer to the official terms to show their loyalty for the CCP’s 
leadership, yet most institutional advisors need not justify their argument following the 
party line as they have to study practical issues assigned by the party and bureaucracies 
and provide policy proposals. CASS undertakes the task of providing advisory services 
for CCP leaders on many issues, particularly at times of crisis.163 For example in July 
1999, just a week after the government declared Falun Gong to be an “evil cult,” scholars
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in the CASS “were given marching orders to defeat Falun Gong.5,164In this scenario they 
can remark in passing the formalised language and then put it aside. For the central party 
and several bureaucracies, what institutional advisors should contribute most urgently is 
practical solutions for foreign policy-making problems rather than to toe the party line.
Official intellectuals are the majority of scholars specializing in IR studies who mainly 
work with universities. Overall, official intellectuals have less of an impact on policy­
making than research institutes, due to the fact that they tend to focus more on pure 
theory rather than on practical social and economic issues.165 Conventional wisdom is 
that the party exercises its strict control over them by the power to allot funds needed to 
pursue most forms of education, teaching, research and writing.166
In the 1990s there was an overhaul of the Chinese higher education system which greatly 
affected official intellectuals’ approach to the party line. A key initiative in the reform of 
the state higher education system has been the gradual introduction of a multi-funding 
model for higher education. Funding for education now emanates from a variety of 
sources including: Student fees; Central, provincial and municipal Government sources; 
Fee for service training programs conducted for State Owned Enterprises; As above for 
private companies and Joint Ventures; Grants particularly from overseas Chinese but also 
from local businesses; Aid funding; Attraction of fee paying overseas students; and 
Commercial activities such as university businesses. For many key universities, central
1ARgovernment support now represents only one-third of their budgets. This helps them to
gain more financial independence from the CCP.
Thanks to their newly gained relative financial independence, in inner world they are 
much less true and sincere than personal and institutional advisers, yet in terms of 
physical world, they use more frequently the CCP’s foreign policy terms. In terms of 
nationalism, the party line to which they still give at least lip service constrains their 
writings. Sensitive topics must be addressed correctly and carefully.169 However, they can 
more freely express concerns with the part of traditional values in Chinese nationalism 
and with social stability in China. If they do not agree with the party line, they have three
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techniques: avoid, divert the focus of or twist the party’s formalised language. They 
could simply avoid sensitive things as much as possible and then shy away from 
offending the party line. They could seemingly follow the formalised language yet focus 
on the subjects or ideas they prefer. They could also consult the party line yet twist the 
terms to the advantage of their own opinions. This method is more and more in the 
groove in the late 1990s. If they agree with the party line, they repeat and reify it from 
different perspectives.
170Liberals in China are a minority and play little part in China’s foreign policy -making.
In general, liberals’ situation has improved in Jiang Zemin’s era, yet their repression
remains an important problem.171 Under Jiang, intellectuals who worked within the
system were included in the decision-making process. However, the CCP did not set up a
framework in the public domain for intellectuals to participate in the government
decision-making process. This means that there is little chance for liberals to influence
China’s policy-making. Due to their distance from the power centre, they are among the
groups that have benefited least from China’s reform. Hamrin once said that they had to
1 7*1pay economic cost due to their lesser interest in the CCP’s party line. The NATO 
bombing of the Chinese embassy put Chinese liberals on the defensive and some liberals 
have even been accused by their colleagues of being traitors to the Chinese nation.174 It is 
very hard for them to publish their research and they rely heavily on internet to make 
their opinions known. In their writing, they normally ignore official phraseology. The 
party always watches the liberals and occasionally puts right what liberals criticize.
However, one should bear in mind that many Chinese liberals are also very nationalistic, 
convinced that the US fears the emergence of a prosperous and stable China and will do
1 7^anything in its power to “hold China down.” Some of them still mentally maintain their
ties with the CCP. Many famous liberals used to work within the system and collaborate 
with the CCP. For instance, Hu Jiwei once agreed that the party secretary should decide 
to prohibit publication of critical issues, as he thinks it “not a bad thing” to withhold
1 n/:
them. It is hard for them entirely to cut their ties with the party’s thought processes.
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Defensive Response to US China Policy
This thesis opts for the case of China’s nationalist response to the US China policy during 
1989-2000 in order to illustrate the new nationalism in Chinese foreign policy. In the 
main, there are in the US two schools with regard to the American foreign policy toward
1 77China. The first is called engagement, either constructive (comprehensive) 
engagement, or conditional engagement, which stands for maintaining contacts with
17X 170China and accommodating China’s rise one way or another; the second containment, 
which calls for isolating China as the US did toward the Soviet Union during the cold
1 OA
war. Scholars like Oksenberg, Economy, Nye, Ross, Shambaugh, Lampton, Gregor, 
Anderson, Shinn and Khalilzad belong to the former; others like Zalamea, Bernstein, 
Munro, Gertz, Terrill, Thornton and Mosher the latter. Generally speaking, the US 
administrations since 1989 have carried out engagement rather than containment policy 
toward China.181
• Constructive Engagement
The term “engagement” is defined by explaining that the US pursues a policy of
t OA
engagement because “it does not wish to isolate or remain isolated from China.” It
highlights the positive role of economic interdependence, common security concerns and
international socialization in China-US relations. The objective of constructive
engagement is to make the most of the continuing contact and China’s inclusion in the
international community in order to influence its internal policies. To some extent, the
adoption of constructive engagement in US foreign policy is based not on the validity and
strength of the argument for engagement, but rather simply on an assessment that
containment would not be effective. Shambaugh, for one, argues that there is no real
1alternative to engaging China.
Constructive engagement is now and again criticized by some scholars and politicians, 
largely due to its ambiguity and falling short of people's expectations. It fails to let China 
comply with all US requirements, particularly in security and political areas.
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• Conditional Engagement
Scholars like Shinn, Gregor, Anderson and Khalilzad argue for conditional engagement. 
They prefer a clear, moderate, rules-based, essentially empirical strategy toward China. 
They argue that the US government should make it clear to the Chinese that the US 
welcomes the rise of China, that the US encourages economic integration and political 
cooperation with China, while maintaining a strong military presence in East Asia as a 
fallback. A defining character o f this school is their tough stance toward China in terms 
of military issues, advocating Taiwan’s protection.
On can see clearly this toughness from the work published by James Shinn and some 
other scholars: Weaving the Net, Conditional Engagement with China.184 They set ten 
principles for China, mainly focused on security issues.185 There are four principles for 
national integrity: no unilateral use of offensive military force, peaceful resolution of 
territorial disputes, respect for national sovereignty and freedom of navigation. The 
disputes over Taiwan and the South China Sea are likely to be the severest test of these 
principles. There are three for military issues, namely, moderation in military buildup, 
transparency of military forces, and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
They are largely aiming at the future development of the PLA.
Generally speaking, conditional engagement has indeed taken a harsher stance toward 
China than constructive engagement. Gregor even calls for recognition that China is a
1 fiApotential threat to the US though not at the moment. Gregor therefore warns the US to 
be cautious and argues that the US should always be “in control.” Scholars like him 
strongly believe that America ought to adopt a clear and tough posture regarding the 
future status of Taiwan. Facing the uncertain development of China, it serves US interests 
to maintain Taiwan's status quo.187
• Containment
1 RftThe containment theory is supported by few scholars and politicians in the US. 
Scholars like Zalamea, Bernstein and Munro, Gertz, Terrill, Thornton and Mosher belong
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to this group. Bernstein and Munro are regarded as two main proponents for this
18Q *policy. They argue that China is preparing itself to become the dominant power in 
Asia, in place of America. This action would run counter to two key American interests: 
preventing any single country from dominating the Asian continent, and maintaining 
American superiority throughout the world. Gertz has gone even further than Bernstein 
and Munro and forecast a comprehensive confrontation between China and the US in The 
China Threat.190 He argues that China has a master plan to increase her stature and 
influence in the world. The first phase of this plan will concentrate on getting the U.S. out 
of Asia. Terrill follows Gertz and warns of a comprehensive confrontation with China as 
a new empire in East Asia.191 He believes, due to Chinese cultural superiority, China will 
never be socialized into the international community, playing a positive role.
From their observations, scholars in this school believe that the economically successful
China has the potential to become more powerful and thus dangerous to US interests. The
fear is that technological prowess will bolster Chinese nationalism. Therefore some
scholars begin to attack the core of engagement policy, namely economic integration.
Thornton criticized the US policy toward China during the past three decades for being
instrumental in the growth of Chinese power.192 He contends that China cannot be a
strategic partner with the US and that continued American economic engagement will
help China realize what he characterizes as its hegemonic ambitions. In the eyes of these
1scholars, it would be much better to "do whatever it can to slow down China's rise."
• China’s response
So how to interpret China’s response to the US China policy? Realists like Gertz 
advocating containment see a China resolutely pursuing its power at the expense of the 
US;194 liberals like Lampton see a China gradually integrating into the international 
community through economic means;195 social theorists like Johnston see a China 
learning to become a responsible major power;196 psychological/cultural theorists like
1 q *7
Saunders and Shambaugh see a China misperceiving US polices. Their theories well 
explain China’s response respectively in security, economic, normative and perception 
areas, yet fail to comprehend China’s US policy in a general picture. Their explanations
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are strong in specific areas yet weak in others, and overall find China’s policy self- 
conflicting.
The author suggests one can understand China’s foreign policy better from a nationalist 
perspective and argues that China’s response to the US is overall defensive: military 
balancing, economic integration, political buffering, cultural incorporation and 
reorientation, which can be shown from the CCP’s nationalist views of the US and 
Chinese IR scholars’ interpretations of them. This way one can see a general and 
effective picture of Chinese foreign policy rather than a self-conflicting one.
Nationalist interpretation will also help to explain better the nature of the
engagement/containment debate. Though scholars in both engagement and containment
schools debate the right policy choice toward China, they agree on the US role in the
bilateral relationship: US in control. They both dismiss equal status between China and
the US, assuming the stereotype teacher-student relationship between the two countries.
Even scholars in the engagement school try to “teach” Chinese how to handle China’s
territorial issues, which is entirely unacceptable to most Chinese. In 2003 David Lai
noted that both engagement and containment policy schools seek to change China into
108the image of the US rather than communicate with China on an equal basis. In his 
view, this patronizing and paternalistic approach will cause the US China policy to fail. 
The author agrees with him and will demonstrate this in the main body of this thesis.
Methodology: Analysis of Formalised Language
The CCP’s party line is like a haystack and by no means concise. To get to grips with the 
core of the party line, the author focuses on the party’s official terms i.e. formalised 
language that has always been repeated in official documents. Therefore the CCP’s party 
line will be conflated into formalised language and thus be analysed.199
The author opts for formalised language analysis to interrogate the main intentions that 
drive Chinese foreign policy and Chinese IR scholars’ consensus and disparities over 
nationalist foreign policies. Formalised language discussed in this thesis is different from
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that advocated by Bertrand Russell in the first place and then developed by Church and 
Carnap.200 Rather it is in line with critical hermeneutics represented by Habermas.201 It 
means a set of selected terms in ordinary language. Ordinary language philosophy,
909represented by philosophers Austin and Ryle, rejects the view championed by Russell 
that philosophical problems should be addressed in a formalised language akin to 
mathematics.
There is an important parameter to describe ordinary languages. This is the degree to 
which the language embedding the concept or concepts is formalised. A language is 
formal or formalised if  the rules of manipulation of objects that one deals with depend 
only on the “form” and not on their “human meanings”. The “form” here means simply 
the material carrier of the concept, i.e. a linguistic object, and can be regarded as 
Popperian physical world. The “human meaning” is the response to the object in the 
human brain. While “forms” are subjected to examination and manipulation, i.e. are 
objective, “human meanings” are subjective and could be different according to different 
people’s interpretation.
Formalised language is a language impoverished with a restricted code in which options 
of language qualities such as vocabulary, style, syntax trope etc. are much more limited
9A1
than ordinary language. Wang Jisi calls it “code word”. As a political language, it can 
be shown to include only a selection of the many different kinds of statements, 
propositions and incantations.204
This method is applicable, as propaganda in China is noteworthy for its seeming 
uniformity in language and there exists in China a political lexicon that defines and
9 n r
restricts political discourse. This has a lot to do with how formulations are adopted as 
lines or guiding principles (fangzhen) and with the process of disseminating the
90 f \orthodoxy. Schoenhals argues that this formation of strictly defined official language is
907the strongest means of political control in China. The government issues official lists 
of scientific formulations of phrases that imply a tight connection between the signifier
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and the signified. Through these lists, form and content become one. Political loyalties 
are measured by the extent to which these terms are followed.209
Methodology: Comparative Analysis
The author agrees with Harding that Chinese IR scholars differ over a number of
910issues. The question is how and to what extent they differ on the new nationalism in 
Chinese foreign policy. Bearing this in mind, the author employs comparative studies to 
analyse the Chinese writings. The main methodology of this thesis is thus comparative 
studies.
In general, this approach compares specimens or cases that are similar in some respects 
yet differ in others. The aim is to find out why the objects are different: to reveal the 
general underlying dynamics that allow and generate such a variation; why the objects 
are similar and to what extent they are similar: to demonstrate the attributes that different 
objects share. This thesis has two sets of comparisons. The first set aims to compare 
different groups of Chinese IR scholars’ understandings of a set of CCP foreign policy 
terms, in terms o f truth, sincerity and appropriateness. Truth refers to true reflection of 
the CCP leadership thinking, appropriateness refers to applying the CCP’s terms to the 
appropriate situation, and sincerity refers to sincere intention behind the writings of 
Chinese scholars. The second set intends to compare these groups’ response over 
security, political, cultural and economic issues to the CCP’s formalised language. In this 
way the author tries to display different agendas of different groups of Chinese IR 
scholars in terms of nationalism and different intensity of nationalism among them as 
well as that over different issues in the same group.
(see the table as follows)
'v Truth
Sincerity
Appropriatmes5~~-«»_\.
Personal
Advisers
Institutional
Advisers
Official
Intellectuals
Liberals
Security
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Politics
Culture
Economy
Sources
This thesis intends to explore the dynamics of Chinese foreign policy during 1989-2000. 
As it is well known that one can hardly come by internal documents from the Chinese 
government, we do not know clearly what happens in the black box of the highest level 
foreign policy-making in China. In this scenario, the author largely resorts instead to 
open sources. Given the authoritarian nature of the Chinese regime, the strict censorship 
carried out by the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP and the Bureau of Press 
and Publication, it is extremely hard for those ideas to be published that are not permitted 
by the CCP. Nevertheless, it is also true that behind rhetoric always lie perceptions that
• *711have policy implications. From these sources the author will demonstrate the 
disparities and diversities of Chinese nationalism.
The sources of this thesis are mainly from 4 areas. The first is a full range of Chinese 
books, journals, periodicals, newspapers, websites, speeches and newsletters relating to 
the topic. Most books to which the author refers have been published since 1989. As for 
periodicals, Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), Guoji wenti 
yanjiu (International Studies), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics), 
Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management) are the main academic source. Given the 
increasing significance of academic websites on the internet, the author also draws on 
some well-known internet sources like www.daiivuan.com, www.hexinnet.com etc..
The author has collected roughly 50 articles/papers for analysis for each of the 4 issues. 
Most pieces are focused discussions on a single argument concerning one issue but there 
might be cases that a paper/article covers two or more issues. In this scenario, the author 
puts the piece into an issue chapter according to the work’s primary argument.
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As for the party line, I choose two books as its official texts: one is Deng Xiaoping
919wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol3) , the other is an internal document 
with limited distribution in China, Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao 
(Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Thought)213, which covers not only 
Deng Xiaoping's but also Jiang Zemin's foreign policy thinking. The former is surely the 
canon of Chinese foreign policy in Deng’s era, the latter represents a new starting point. 
The latter is prefaced by Jiang Zemin and Qian Qichen, edited by the CCP Small Leading 
Group of Foreign Affairs, promoted by the CCP's Propaganda Department and published 
by Shijie shishi chubanshe (World Affairs Press), the press owned by the Department of 
Foreign Affairs. It is widely considered as the most authoritative official document of 
Chinese foreign policy in Jiang’s era. The author chooses those most frequently repeated 
terms -  or memes -  in Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan and Introduction to Deng Xiaoping’s 
Foreign Policy Thought to summarise the CCP’s foreign policies.
The second source is my formal and informal interviews, face to face or by phone, with a 
number of distinguished Chinese scholars such as Liang Shoude, Feng Tejun, Wang Jisi, 
Wang Yizhou, Song Xinning, Chu Shulong and Yan Xuetong. Given the unique political 
culture in China, where some scholars might not say what they really think, which would 
discount to a certain degree the credibility of the interviews, I treat them with discretion 
and regard them as a supportive means. The third source is a variety of English books and 
papers in relation to Nationalism, Chinese foreign policy and US-China relations I have 
used at the LSE library.
In addition to these three, I use some of my lecture notes taken at Renmin University 
when I was a student in China. After consulting some scholars, including Chu Shulong, 
now a famous researcher at Qinghua University and then a lecturer at Renmin University, 
I am permitted to apply their unpublished ideas to my thesis.
Structure of Thesis
This chapter discusses issues with regard to basic questions and arguments, theoretical 
perspectives, definitions of key concepts and methodology of the study. Chapters II, III,
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IV, V focus on the case of China’s response to the US engagement, analyse respectively 
Chinese nationalistic views on the US approach to China in respect of security, political, 
cultural and economic issues. The author tries to explain through comparative studies 
how Chinese IR scholars, under the guidance of the CCP, respond to America’s China 
policy, how they individually interpret the official text, particularly the CCP’s formalised 
language, in their own way and the convergence and difference of their views. The last 
chapter sums up my findings, discusses possible implications and provides some 
concluding remarks.
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Chapter II China's Arguments on America: Security Issues
From this chapter onwards, I will begin to interpret, in the context presented in the 
introduction and based on the theoretical discussion I have made and the Chinese texts I 
have collected. Chapter II is on security issues arising out of US-China relations. I have 
collected over 50 articles and I concentrate on the Chinese writings on China threat 
(focusing on the security aspect), US-Japan security co-operation and the Taiwan issue, 
for the purpose of demonstrating nationalism in Chinese security policy and particularly 
the thin consensus reached among Chinese IR scholars over the CCP’s formalized 
language as well as the tension among various groups.
China’s security strategy between 1949 and the early 1980s showed considerable 
continuity, notwithstanding some dramatic international and domestic developments. 
Territorial control and great power status are the main themes in which one can find some 
strands of nationalism. During the period of 1949-1957, the Chinese security agenda was 
preoccupied with the safety of its territory. The military alliance with the Soviet Union 
was regarded as major security guarantees. A quick economic recovery was considered a 
security matter but it was second in priority to the country’s responsibility in Korea.1 
“First and most important, after more than a century of conflict and occupation China 
wanted to preserve its territorial integrity. Second, recovery of the lost territories of 
Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet was a prime objective.” There is a consistency in the CCP’s 
US policy. Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin have all looked at the US as 
their “archenemy.” The root cause of the CCP leaders’ animosity toward the US lies in 
their cardinal interests to maintain national integrity in order to maintain and boost the 
legitimacy of the CCP’s one-party rule and their judgment that the US stands in China’s 
way to reunite with Taiwan.
It does not follow that because Chinese security strategy has for long largely focused on 
territorial issues that it is static. Since the end of the Cold War, China has greatly changed 
its security concepts in line with the new domestic and international situation. In 
September 2001, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai 
referred to the concept in a speech on China's national defence. He stated that China
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“advocates a new security concept with mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and co­
ordination at the core and stands for the promotion of multilateral security and security 
cooperation”.4 Obviously China has moved on toward a more co-operative approach of 
security. In the West, this new concept of security has been regarded as a direct Chinese 
reaction to policies and actions by the US that the CCP perceived as threatening.5
Five changes have occurred in the new Chinese security approach.6Firstly, emphasis on 
military security has been shifted to a more comprehensive package. During the Cold 
War, the Chinese understanding of security was almost entirely centred on military 
security. After the end of the Cold War, the role of economic factors has been heavily
n
stressed. Secondly, China has begun to move away from the concept of “Zero Game”
o
and accepted the concept of mutual security. Thirdly, since the end of the Cold War, 
China has gradually accepted the concept of multilateral security dialogue and co­
operation. Fourthly, China has recently led the establishment of confidence-building 
measures (CBMs) in the Asia-Pacific area.9 Fifthly, Chinese traditional military thinking 
stressed non-transparency, yet China has now gradually accepted the concept of 
transparency since the early 1990s. China has published white papers on both arms 
control and defence and Chinese PLA Navy and US Navy warships have exchanged port 
calls.10
Nevertheless, what has not changed in the post-Cold War era is the Chinese 
determination that China’s territorial issues should be controlled by Chinese and not 
interfered with by outside force. CCP leaders “are not reluctant to use rhetorical threats or 
demonstrations of military force” in order to intimidate and deter those sensitive areas 
like Taiwan, the South China Sea, and Hong Kong.11 In this way China aims to 
demonstrate its absolute authority over its citizens and territories as a sovereign state. In 
this scenario, some scholars deem that it is hard to say that China has reduced other
19countries’ worry that China might challenge the regional military status quo.
To make sure of China’s absolute sovereignty over territory, CCP leaders are not afraid
to balance the US military force in East Asia. They still take a deeply rooted hard
realpolitik worldview that China needs “military operational power” to make the country
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further stronger.13 To counter the US influence in Taiwan, China has insisted that it will 
not be dictated to by the US on who it can do business with and will decide whether to 
sell weapons or military technologies to countries like Iran, Pakistan and Libya according 
to its own national interests.14 This has led to some very serious conflicts with the US 
regarding ballistic missiles and nuclear technologies.15
Some US scholars have noted growing anti-Americanism, nationalism and irredentism in 
China16 and observed an attitude that US power was a threat to China’s quest for national 
reunification, evidence of the difficulty of integrating China into the international 
community. These scholars call for checking rising Chinese power through an effective 
security arrangement in East Asia. The Chinese response is that security has thus become 
the paramount objective of Chinese nationalism.17 A wave of nationalism swept the 
Chinese intellectual class prompted by the fear of disintegration.18 Observing US China 
policy, CCP leaders believe that the US is building a ring of encirclement around China 
that goes from Japan and Korea to China's northeast down around China's eastern and 
southeastern seaboards through Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, 
Australia and up to China’s western frontier with India and Pakistan. CCP leaders are 
determined to keep China’s territorial integrity, to reunify Taiwan yet fear that the US 
and Japan will block their plan through military encirclement.
CCP leaders claim that China’s nationalism can be traced solely to the high-handed, 
insensitive or downright malign acts of the US.19 In the last few of years, a number of 
outbreaks of anti-Americanism in China have given voice to nationalist sentiments. In 
May 1999, when the US force bombed the Belgrade Chinese embassy, the Chinese 
government supported massive anti-American riots erupting throughout 
China.20Furthermore, in April 2002, when an American EP-3 surveillance plane and a 
Chinese fighter plane collided near the south China coast, CCP leaders blamed US 
aggressiveness. With apparent support from the party, Chinese internet chat rooms
threatened to “‘teach the United States a lesson’ in ‘World War III.’”21 The new Chinese
22nationalism compels the US and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region to act vigilantly.
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On the other hand, many Americans blame the CCP’s external-oriented strategies for the 
new Chinese nationalism. They do not believe it is domestic-oriented. They claim, as 
nationalist sentiments and desires are moulded into a comprehensive grand national 
strategy, the Chinese leadership seeks to assure the Chinese people that China will rise to 
great power status by shaping the conduct of the international system rather than just
9^responding to its conditions. In their eyes, this will cement further the legitimacy of 
CCP’s rule as it accommodates the desire of Chinese nationalists: to restore China’s 
dominance in East Asia. China’s economic growth has given CCP leaders more 
capabilities to affect the region, which gave rise to apprehension among its neighbours. In 
the early 1990s Southeast Asian countries began privately to view China as a threat.24
This has alerted some Western scholars who do not believe China has "no further 
territorial demands" other than Taiwan. Mosher points out that China has always been an
o r
expansionist power. In their view, the Chinese challenge to the current international 
order is inevitable. Liberal theorists argue that China will be successfully enmeshed by 
the West in the current international system through economic interdependence, yet 
realists do not agree. The latter argue that it is true that China has now woven into the 
world economy, yet “the effects of economic interdependence will also be
9 Aunpredictable.” It does not naturally reduce tension in international relations. When 
assessing the emerging international order, Waltz points out that economic competition is 
often as keen as military competition.27 Samuel Huntington concurs and says that the 
principal conflicts of interests involving the US and the major powers are likely to be
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over economic issues. Many realists thus consider that economic interdependence 
benefits emerging powers in terms of relative power gains and hence might lead to new 
conflicts over economic and security issues. Given China’s authoritarian regime and its 
rapid economic growth, many Western scholars are quick to suggest that there is an 
impending power transition in favour of China and that is likely to generate disorder in 
the current international system.29
The point to make here is that so far the CCP’s security policies seem to be focused on
territorial sovereignty. The main objective is effectively to monopolize power, ensuring
that the authority of the Chinese government over its territory is not limited by these
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outside. Unlike people in the West, CCP leaders regard recovery of Taiwan and Diaoyu 
Islands and firm control of Tibet and Xinjiang as China’s domestic issues. Covered by 
Westphalian ideas of absolute sovereignty, Chinese leaders believe that they can do 
anything they regard as right rather than being dictated to by foreign powers.
Currently, CCP leaders intend to create regional security conditions that provide the 
opportunity to increase domestically the relative capabilities of the Chinese to achieve 
national reunification; in so doing work to prevent the US from usurping China’s rise and 
hence to boost the party’s legitimacy. This is the main reason why CCP leaders on many 
occasions proclaimed in public that their focus in the reform year was economic 
development though they strove hard to improve dramatically the PLA’s strength and 
prepare for an invasion of Taiwan. They know well national reunification cannot be 
achieved until Chinese economic and military power are strong enough.
To achieve national reunification, China views military power as the primary guarantor 
of “'comprehensive security,” while viewing and embracing multilateral diplomatic 
efforts as partial and conditional. CCP leaders choose to take a low profile before China 
gains enough economic and military capabilities. This point seems to explain why China 
does not back down from its territorial claims over islands in the South China Sea while 
asserting that disputes concerning territorial issues might be set aside rather than settled 
in multilateral institutions as there is much more to be obtained in terms of relative 
capabilities by keeping the sovereignty question undecided.
CCP leaders deftly take advantage of the nationalist sentiments and link the party’s fate 
with China’s territorial agenda, in order to help ensure the stability of one-party rule, 
diverting attention from domestic concerns. Diverting the Chinese attention to security 
problems and the US threat in particular can easily lead to nationalist sentiments among 
the Chinese people. The CCP counts on this and uses it to buttress its legitimacy yet is 
afraid that this might turn the battery against itself: they continue to take the party’s 
traditional way to control by guiding the people with formalized language. The Chinese 
elite need to use the party’s credo to justify their arguments and even social status, though 
their political intentions might at times have come second to demonstrating their fervour
52
and of enjoying a feeling of powerful presence or “public happiness,” as one can see from
'j i
how the Red Guards followed Mao’s words during the Cultural Revolution.
It is on security issues that all Chinese IR scholars reach a narrow consensus in 
nationalism. Most of them agree with the CCP that China needs to take measures to 
balance US power over Taiwan. Different groups of Chinese IR scholars have different 
priorities among Chinese policies. Nevertheless, they all put security issues as their 
number one concern.
2.1 Chinese Military Threat 
Theory of Chinese Military Threat in the West
On balance, China has remained self-constrained despite its sustained economic growth. 
Between 1978 and 1992, there were no militarised incidents between the US and China. 
Once in 1994 and twice in 2001, the US and China had militarised disputes regarding US 
reconnaissance of Chinese territories. In 2000, the Chinese also conducted further tests 
of their ICBMs in protest at the possibility of future US sales of advanced weaponry to 
Taiwan. Between 1978 and 1992, there were three militarised disputes between China 
and Taiwan, which were regarded as instigated equally by both sides. The levels of 
violence only included two raids and a threat to blockade.
None the less, whether China will take a co-operative or assertive strategy vis-a-vis the 
existing international system with its rising power has been a controversial issue since the 
mid-1990s.34Though China’s domestic and foreign environments will certainly 
experience plenty of changes by the year 2020, many Americans predict that China will 
nevertheless become a multi-dimensional regional competitor by that time. Many began 
to doubt China’s declaration that “China will never impose any military threat to other
r
countries.” In a public opinion poll taken in the spring of 1998, Americans feared a 
nuclear attack from China more than from any other sovereign state and second only to 
nuclear attack from terrorists. During the presidential campaign, George W. Bush 
claimed that Clinton’s characterization of China as a “strategic partner” should be 
replaced by “strategic competitor.”
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Therefore, some US scholars recommend the policy of engagement and hope it can meet 
the possible changes that will happen in China in future. In this strategy, America would 
continue its co-operative economic and security activities in order to encourage China to 
continue to be integrated into the international community. Other scholars not belonging 
to the engagement school interpret China's growing strength in a different way and warn 
the Americans against a strong, defiant and bellicose power, with a number of them 
advocating containment policy toward China. Taking account of the mounting 
nationalism among the Chinese elite and the assertiveness of the PLA against the 
Taiwanese regime, this is understandable, standing in the Americans' shoes. Between 
these two camps comes a middle-of-the-road approach proposed by the RAND 
Corporation. It is a policy of congagement, a combination of engagement and 
containment.37
The rise of China threat is closely related to this controversy. In August 1990, a Japanese 
professor wrote an article describing China as a potential adversary in security due to its 
economic strength and sustained development. In 1993, Hungtington published an 
article in which he argued that the fundamental source of conflict in the post-Cold War
TOera will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic, but rather cultural. His 
conclusion is that the primary adversaries of Western civilization are Islam and 
Confucianism, which might join hands to challenge Western values and power. Richard 
Bernstein and Ross H. Munro published in 1997 a controversial book The Coming 
Conflict with China, which argues China would certainly soon become America's 
formidable rival.40 Hailed by the New York Times as one of the most notable books of 
that year in America, not surprisingly, it has been translated into Japanese, German and 
French, as well as some separate Chinese versions. The CCP has surely noticed the 
explosive impact of this book and regarded its authors as the main advocates of China 
Threat theory. In 2000 Gertz argued that the PLA modernization in recent years, 
supported by a thriving economy and a parade of modem weapons purchased from 
Russia and others, has generated a rising China with a virulent or aggressive 
disposition 41
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The new Chinese nationalism has contributed to the rise of Chinese military threat theory. 
Advocates of the “China threat” theory often argue that China’s Spratly policy is driven 
by a nationalist ambition to restore hegemonic power in East Asia. This link is also 
suggested by Valencia when he says that the CCP’s approach to the South China Sea is 
“the result of a rising tide of nationalism that seems to be replacing socialism as the 
preferred societal glue.”42 Segal also stressed this point when stating: “the Chinese 
regime copes with the internal consequences of reform by taking a tough stand on 
nationalist issues, hence Beijing’s active and vigorous pursuit of claims in the South 
China Sea.”43
There are some Western scholars that do not think it is wise to suggest a Chinese military 
threat theory.44 Roy argues that it must be recognized that China faces immense domestic 
challenges on the road to dominate East Asia.45 These include rising crime and civil 
disorder, discontent among peasants who remain in the fields, a wave of uncontrolled 
migration of other peasants into the cities, widespread corruption among officials, 
separatist pressures in Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, and regionalism in the other 
provinces. Kim argues that China is a paper tiger.46 In his view, the post-1989 
government is paralysed by mega-crisis, multiple and interlocking crises of authority, 
identity, motivation and ideology. These have converged at a time when the CCP is 
facing challenges from ethno nationalistic movements of non-Han minority peoples in the 
strategic borderlands of Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia. In his view, China is a weak, if 
not yet disintegrating state, and it is premature to proclaim a China security threat. 
Yahuda agrees with him.47 He deems that, in its foreign relations, as well as in its 
domestic affairs, it is true to say that, despite the enormous progress that has been made, 
many deep-seated problems remain and, for the time being, the region and the wider 
world have more to fear from a China that can act as a “spoiler” than from any 
dominance that a still relatively weak China could possibly hope to provide. Gordon 
Chang even warns in his book, The Coming Collapse o f  China, that one should turn more 
attention to a more realistic “China Threat” -  the threat of collapse -  than any Chinese 
effort at military transformation or military breakthrough capabilities.
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Party Line
CCP leaders stress the fact that Chinese foreign policy in security is domestic-concerned 
and thus peaceful. They claim that there are two outstanding characteristics in China’s 
current foreign policy: peace and independence.49 Those who “deny” it are regarded by 
the CCP as conspiracy-driven. The official media condemns the “China Threat Theory” 
as an elaborate and sinister deception. A Beijing Review article even claims the theory 
was invented in Japan.50
A strong sense of insecurity among CCP leaders is widespread and deep-rooted. 
Oksenberg states: CCP leaders “believe that foreign leaders tend to be reluctant to 
welcome China's rise in world affairs and would prefer to delay or obstruct its progress. 
They fear that many in the outside world would prefer to divide China if  given the 
opportunity...”51 The CCP proclaims that China does not threaten any nation but rather is 
threatened by other countries. Deng Xiaoping said: “China did not invade other countries 
and posed no threat to them, but other countries threatened China.” He also said: “China 
cannot be a threat to the United States and the United States should not consider China as 
a threatening rival. We have never done anything to harm the United States.” In Chapter 
III of Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao (Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's 
Foreign Policy Thought),54 there are 2 sections on security issues. To refute the China 
threat theory, it proclaims: “China is against hegemonism and also strictly restrains itself 
from becoming a hegemon...and we will not seek hegemonic status.”55 It also says: “ 
Afterwards, Comrade Deng Xiaoping told time and again friends in the third world that 
China would not seek hegemony, nor seek to do it forever in the future while becoming 
developed.”56 It says in section 10 of this chapter: “ It is of profound historical 
background that China is a power to maintain world peace and stability. The Chinese
c j
cultural tradition highlights all along he wei gui (peace is highly valued).” This point
has been echoed by the Ministry of National Defence in its 1998 National Defence White
Paper that declares “the defensive nature of China’s national defence policy also springs
from the country’s historical and cultural traditions. China is a country with 5,000 years
of civilization and a peace-loving tradition. Ancient Chinese thinkers advocated
‘associating with benevolent gentlemen and befriending good neighbours’, which shows
that throughout history the Chinese people have longed for peace in the world and for
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relations of friendship with the people of other countries. Deng Xiaoping waijiao 
sixiang xuexi gangyao (Introduction to Deng Xiaoping’s Foreign Policy Thought) goes on 
to say: “ China is a power to maintain world peace and stability, as China has never 
sought hegemony, has never got the ambition to expand its strength, and entirely carries 
out defensive national defence policy. The Chinese military spending has all along been 
kept at a rather low level, and neither has China established military bases nor sent a 
single soldier in a foreign country.”59 It continues to say: “As the largest developing 
country in the world, China does not now threaten any country. When China becomes 
stronger in the future, it will not threaten world peace, but rather further improve the 
strength to maintain world peace.”60
The official formulations are zhongguo bu qinlue bieren, dui renhe guojia dou bu 
goucheng weixie, que shou dao waiguo de weixie (China did not invade other countries 
and posed no threat to them, but other countries threatened China), bu cheng ba (not seek 
hegemony), he wei gui (peace is highly valued), weihu shijie heping yu wending de 
liliang (a power to maintain world peace and stability), fangyu xing guofang zhengce 
(defensive national defence policy), junfei jiao di (military spending at a rather low 
level), bu dui renhe guojia goucheng weixie (China does not threaten any country).
Zhongguo bu qinlue bieren, dui renhe guojia dou bu goucheng weixie, que shou dao 
waiguo de weixie (China did not invade other countries and posed no threat to them, but 
other countries threatened China) as said by Deng Xiaoping means China is the victim of 
the threat from other countries and not vice versa. Cheng ba (seek hegemony) means 
playing the tyrant by power or force,61 Bu cheng ba (not seek hegemony) means China 
would not go this way. Fangyu xing guofang zhengce (defensive national defence policy) 
means defensive national defence policy, which stresses two points: firstly, China does 
and will not adopt aggressive international behaviour; secondly, China has the right to 
build up a strong fortress to protect its territory.
Personal Advisers
Facing the Chinese military threat theory in the world, most Chinese IR scholars have
made their responses. Personal advisers argue that Chinese military threat theory is a
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malicious conspiracy conceived by the West and maintain that China should not be afraid 
of it and should take courage to protect its overseas interests. They have a great sense of 
insecurity and call for a more powerful Chinese army. They begin to suggest that China 
must make “systematic preparations” against the invasive war and military attacks
f\7unleashed by the US under any pretext. They believe that what matters most is not so 
much the growth of Chinese capability as how CCP leaders use its new military 
strength.63
Personal advisers take advantage of the patronizing character of the US China policy and 
depict the US as hostile. Wang Daohan follows the term bu cheng ba (not seek 
hegemony) and says: “There are currently a number of people in the world... who spread 
China threat theory, deeming that Mainland China would become a threat to Asia and 
even the whole world...This is a theory with evil motives. Due to China’s national 
situation and the fact that Mainland China has socialist system, it is not likely that China 
will threat the interests of other states.”64 This is exactly in line with what the Chinese 
Premier Li Peng stated, “The China Threat Theory is not an objective view. It was spread 
by anti-China forces in Western countries with ulterior motives to contain China.”65 
Wang claims that there is an anti-China theory held in the West and he uses the phrase 
“evil motives” to show how truly and sincerely he follows the party line. In some sense it 
was not appropriate for him to make such a speech as he was in North America at that 
time. However, he did say so without any reservation, so the most persuasive explanation 
is his strong sense of insecurity.
Liu Ji deems that China is not at all aggressive, due to the unique Chinese culture, and 
there has been an anti-China scheme in the West since the end of the Cold War which 
threatens China’s integrity. He says: “The time-honoured and unique cultural tradition of 
China is a force for [national] integration; it includes an ardent spirit of nationalism... As 
soon as foreign invasions occur, however, the nation will surely unite. China never 
initiates aggression....Yet China is inclined to powerful passive resistance to 
aggression...Therefore, this nation is sensitive to international currents of anti­
communism and hegemonic politics, and, when confronted with such sentiments, is
prone to respond with a narrow kind of nationalism.”66 Following the term bu cheng ba
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(not seek hegemony), he also says: “China is a peace-loving country and this has been 
proven over thousands of years. China is a good-hearted nation... In modem times, China 
was humiliated once and again, and hence it especially cherishes world peace and 
friendship...This is the reason why China has openly announced that it will never seek 
hegemony. In conclusion, from any meaning and any angle, China cannot form a threat to
fi7any nation.” He attributes this character to the nature of socialism.
Liu Ji has for long urged CCP leaders to increase rapidly China’s military power due to 
the current international environment to China’s disadvantage. He particularly points out 
US hostility against China. In his opinion, several generations of Americans grew up 
confronting definite enemies. Therefore, there is a sense of loss after the Cold War - a 
loss of direction in policies and in many aspects of work. Yet some long for the past and 
continue to think in accordance with Cold War logic. In so doing, China naturally comes
/ o
up when they seek a new enemy.
Liu Ji publicly defended Chinese new nationalism during his 1997 US visit. It is quite 
unusual as he was in this visit treated as more than just an academic but rather a 
messenger of Jiang Zemin himself. Plus, most academics and politicians in the West 
regard the Chinese new nationalism as negative in the process of China’s modernization. 
Liu Ji’s arguments strongly stress the peace-loving nature of the Chinese people. He uses 
emotional phrases like “never”, “proven over thousands of years,” “a good-hearted 
nation,” “especially cherishes world peace and friendship” to display his high 
identification of the CCP’s terms like he wei gui (peace is highly valued), weihu shijie 
heping yu wending de liliang (a power to maintain world peace and stability). He also 
literally follows the CCP’s point that China does not seek hegemony (bu cheng ba). He 
believes that Chinese are “inclined to powerful passive resistance to aggression”, and 
uses the phrase “from any meaning and any angle” to strengthen his view that “China 
cannot form a threat to any nation.” Nevertheless, he tries to justify China’s move to 
increase its military power dramatically by hinting that some Americans treat China as an 
“enemy,” so apparently it is the US rather than China that should be blamed for Chinese 
military build-up.
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He Xin’s stance on Chinese military threat theory is more aggressive than Wang and Liu. 
While denying the theory, he argues that China has been “blocked” by the West in terms 
of international space and China should not duck the issue of China’s overseas interests, 
as he is worried about the sustainability of China’s economic growth.69 He points out that 
domestic needs require overseas economic expansion which should be protected by 
stronger military capabilities. In his view, China is facing up to enormous population 
pressure, resources and environment crises which make China need to seek for overseas 
development for future survival. He claims that even increasing investment in resources 
and environment would deplete China’s limited domestic capital and squeeze limited 
resources. Nevertheless, he asserts, countries such as the US “block China expanding 
overseas, block China using one way or another the world capitalist environment and
7flexpanding its economic scale.”
In his opinion the Chinese should rely on a strong central authority backed by a world 
class army to promote nationalism.71 He Xin strongly recommends a more forceful 
security policy in accordance with China’s rising power and resultant overseas interest 
needs. However, he also claims that China is not a threat to the world but rather a weihu 
shijie hepingyu wending de liliang (a power to maintain the world peace and stability). In 
his opinion the expansion of China’s power is and will be peaceful (heping).
Currently in East Asia, the power pattern is that China is a major continental power and 
the US the world’s most powerful maritime power,72 which does not favour China’s 
further development. He Xin’s opinion has reaffirmed the CCP’s acknowledgement that, 
given the large population and industrial centres of China’s East coast and recalling the 
experiences of the Opium War, it is better for the PLA to have barriers at sea than 
ashore.73 From He’s writings and speech one can see that he truly and sincerely follows 
the CCP’s party line on the Chinese military threat theory. He is one of the staunchest 
advocates for an invincible Chinese army to ensure China’s security.
Institutional Advisers
Institutional advisers are not “freewheeling scholars” giving their personal views.74 They
have to follow the direction of the CCP and defend on the world stage China’s stance on
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Chinese military threat theory. They are more satisfied with the status quo than personal 
advisers and not so eager to see a heavily armed China. Following the CCP’s term bu 
cheng ba (not seek hegemony) institutional advisers proclaim that China is a peace- 
loving country by nature and China is not a threat to anybody, yet few of them use as 
many emotional and strong words as personal advisers to show their nationalist 
sentiments and loyalty to the party.
Institutional advisers confine their writings to the framework of the CCP’s guideline. 
Following the term bu cheng ba (not seek hegemony), Li Jijun, a veteran IR scholar 
working with the Academy of Military Sciences, claims that the building block of ancient 
Chinese strategic culture is “harmony between heaven and human beings”. Apparently 
Johnston will not agree with him on this point, as he concludes that China’s traditional 
strategic culture was a “product of superior military preparations, the application of
nc
violence, and the destruction of the adversary.” Li takes different views and contends 
that the content of Chinese strategic culture can be summarized in short as “peace, 
defence, national unity and being aware of but not like war.” This is his interpretation 
of formalized terms like he wei gui (peace is highly valued), dui renhe guojia dou bu 
goucheng weixie (no threat to any country), weihu shijie heping yu wending de liliang 
and bu chengba (a power to maintain world peace and stability).
Another institutional adviser, Yan Xuetong, agrees with Li on this, and he calls it 
“oriental pacifism”.77 Fairbank mainly held a similar idea as to Chinese strategic culture, 
as he thought that the Chinese mode of production in its feudal history produced a 
holistic way of strategic thinking. The holistic approach to national security has been 
characteristic of Chinese strategists since Sun Tzu who have placed relatively less 
emphasis on purely military considerations than on political, economic, psychological or
'70
moral aspects of inter-state relations and conflict. Institutional advisers have happily 
accepted Fairbank’s theory. They deem that the Chinese culture is mainly based on 
agriculture rather than commerce, so it has little compelling drive to access overseas 
markets, and accordingly little tradition of war for expansion, apart from some wars 
punishment of neighbouring countries that dare to challenge the dominant status of
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Chinese rule. One can see that this view apparently runs counter to He Xin’s proposal 
that China should give more attention to its overseas interests.
Most institutional advisers believe that, given the nature of “oriental pacifism”, Chinese 
security policy in the past was largely defensive. Peng Guangqian says that, though there 
are millions of wars in China’s 5,000 years' history, they were scarcely overseas 
invasions. The core of Chinese strategic culture is seeking harmony among nations and
7Qunity of the whole country. He Xin appreciates Chinese past glory when it expanded its 
territory during the Han and Tang dynasties, whereas institutional advisers focus their 
interpretations of Chinese history more on periods when China struggled to maintain its 
integrity. From Peng’s perspective, the history of war in ancient China was mainly one 
for national unity and against any invasions from foreign enemies and most Chinese 
strategic thinkers, o f whom Sun Tse is the most well-known in the West, prefer prudence 
in war rather than aggression.
Peng repeats the CCP’s formulation fangyu xing guofang zhengce (defensive national 
defence policy) and says that the focal point of Chinese national security is surely rather 
more defensive than offensive. Peng maintains that the most persuasive example to show 
the peaceful nature and domestic orientation of Chinese security policy, in his opinion, is 
Zheng He’s famous overseas voyage to South-East Asia, India and East Africa during the 
Ming dynasty. Peng claims that Zheng He had a chance to colonize the areas where he 
had set foot, yet he refused to do so, following the emperor’s direction to demonstrate 
China's great power and glory without force, which is clearly in striking contrast with the 
cruel colonialism of the West. Thus, his conclusion is that most Chinese rulers had in 
tradition “little ambition” to conquer overseas territories, but rather focused on national
SOdefence due to China’s non-war strategic culture. When he uses words like “little 
ambition” rather than “no ambition” he has shown less nationalistic sentiments than 
personal advisers’ “never.”
Apart from justifying the CCP’s formulations such as he wei gui (peace is highly valued),
bu cheng ba (not seek hegemony) and dui renhe guojia dou bu goucheng weixie (no
threat to any country), through historical studies, institutional advisers hold that
62
communist China has certainly inherited the traditional peaceful and domestic-oriented 
security policy. Li Jijun argues that one of the main points of Mao Zedong’s military 
thoughts is positive defence, which has completely guaranteed China’s peaceful foreign 
policy, despite the fact that President Jiang Zemin indicated in 2000 that the PLA was
O 1
seeking a greater capability. Li says that, since the founding of New China, the nature 
of China's military strategy has not been changed at all, and has always remained
O '}
defensive, no matter how the world situation revolves.
Peng Guangqian agrees with Li about the peaceful security policy proclaimed by the 
communist China. He claims that, China’s national defence has always aimed to counter 
foreign invasion, safeguard Chinese national unity and security, as well as defend China’s 
sovereignty of its land, sea and air. Peng admits that New China got involved with 8 
military actions though out of self-defence. On this point, he is much more objective 
than personal advisers’ emotional and nationalist positions.
Some institutional advisers claim that the enormous resources of China also contribute to 
its peaceful foreign policy, which is indeed a very weak argument and obviously clashes 
with He Xin’s view. In fact, China will become a country that spares no pains to gain 
resources from every comer of the world, due to its rapid economic expansion and 
extremely low efficiency in utilizing natural resources. For instance, China needs to 
import one-third of its oil. In 2004 the Argansk-Daqing pipeline project failed to come to 
pass due to Russia’s strategic consideration.84 Chinese leaders were furious and very 
worried about the country’s energy supply.
However, institutional advisers just bury their heads in the sand. According to their 
writings, China is and will continue to be a country free from lack of resources for good. 
Institutional advisers know that hunting for scarce resources is an important factor 
leading to a country’s aggressiveness, yet think this argument could only turn the fire of 
some Chinese scholars against themselves. They turn a blind eye to the tough reality 
China is facing and claim that China, unlike Western European countries, is so big that it 
possesses nearly all varieties of strategic resources for a self-developed national
Of
economy. Therefore, China can depend on itself to become a superpower. From this one
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can understand how inappropriately institutional advisers follow at times the party line 
and how insincere their arguments are to some degree.
As for China's defence expenditure, institutional advisers try to justify the CCP’s 
formulations such as junfei jiao di (military spending at a rather low level) and fangyu 
xing guangfang (defensive national defence policy) that Chinese military spending has 
always been kept at a low level. An important way to see if  China is a military threat is to 
assess if it has the capability to threaten other nations. There have been numerous studies 
about the PLA. In the West, some see that China's priority and grand strategy is to
o/r
develop the economy and to transform China into a great power in 50 to 100 years. 
Much of the increase in China's military spending in recent years has been largely driven
on
by China's need to reunify Taiwan.
Personal advisers seldom use figures to back up their arguments yet institutional advisers 
rely on figures and facts to support theirs. They try to be more “objective” than personal 
advisers. They claim that China's defence policy is always defensive and that Chinese 
military construction's focal point is safeguarding China's sovereign land, air and sea 
(Taiwan is surely the focal point). In this scenario, they claim that China does not need to 
raise apace the budget for its military forces, regardless of the fact that the PLA’s
oo
capabilities are growing fast.
Many Western scholars stress the aggressiveness of PLA from the point of view of
OQ
China's continuously increasing defence budget. Peng does not agree with his Western 
counterparts. He has asserted that, compared with Western countries and even some 
developing countries, China's defence budget is actually quite small. He quotes the 
statistics of IISS and points out the fact that, in 1994, China's per capita defence 
expenditure was only $5.3, the 87th in the world.90 Li Jijun agrees with him and argues in 
favour of the Chinese position.91
Peng Guangqian tries to prove the westerners wrong in the case of the so-called “grey
zone”. He argues that it is true that Chinese military forces are supported by off-budget
capital such as arms sales and agricultural sideline production income, yet, compared
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with the total amount, it is very small. Peng cites SIPRI's statistics and points out that in 
1993, China exported arms worth $420 million, only 4% of that of America and 9% of
Q1}
Russia. The fact that Peng does not use first-hand figures but rather secondary ones 
from the West shows the non-transparency of Chinese defence expenditure and reduces 
the credibility of his argument. His support for the CCP’s security policy terms is thus not 
appropriate.
Though institutional advisers do not call on the Chinese government to switch too many 
resources to military force-building as personal advisers advocate, they do regard the US 
as a threat to China’s national security. Wang Jisi and Yan Xuetong clearly warn the 
Chinese people to guard against the US.94
Some institutional advisers have examined varieties of opinion in the West on Chinese 
military threat theory and doubt those scholars’ motive. Wang Jisi believes that this 
theory intends to provide an excuse for America's containment policy toward China.95 
Wang argues that the Clinton administration's China policy was in reality a combination 
of containment and engagement. He regards only as propaganda the Clinton 
administration's official proclamation that his policy toward China is indeed constructive 
engagement. In his opinion, the Clinton administration was going to break ground for 
containment policy toward China yet had not enough capability and willpower to do so. 
America is surely inclined to put pressure on China, contain China's power growth and 
thwart China's rise on the world stage, yet, due to its fierce economic competition with 
Japan and Europe, the US has to maintain the existing communication channel and play 
along with China against its will. On the whole, his analysis of the duality o f the Clinton 
administration's China policy has been accepted by other institutional advisers.
Therefore, in light of Wang's logic, for China there are two Americas: one is real, one
purely diplomatic. The real America, from the very end of the Cold War in the early
1990s, pursued its own “selfish strategic interests”96 and spared no pains to keep its
hegemonic status in the world. Throughout the 1990s, the engagement policy toward
China promoted by the Clinton administration, adopts a rather obscuire strategy,
proclaiming no direct target. Nevertheless, Wang thinks that, while paying lip-service to
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friendship with China, many Americans treat China as the “potential threat” to the 
American hegemony in the 21st century. The US government does not say so in public, as 
it is wise enough not to go to the length of creating an enemy while America still has 
plenty of time to prevent it from happening. In his writings Wang uses words like “selfish 
strategic interests” rather than “evil motives”, “potential threat” rather than “enemy” etc., 
and tries to justify in an academic rather than an emotional way the CCP’s formalized 
language like shoudao waiguo de weixie (other countries threatened China) and “China 
cannot be a threat to the United States, and the United States should not consider China 
as a threatening rival.”
Through his examination, Wang Jisi contends, obviously China and America have “not
q  n
got a solid building block” for their bilateral security relations. Shortly after the end of 
the Cold War, the US national security strategy had no specific target, like a lonely hero
no
who takes pains to find his rival. Nevertheless, over time some Americans began to 
realize that, among many potential threats, China would undoubtedly stand out as a fierce 
challenger. In Wang’s eyes, the US perception lies in the fact that the two countries have 
virtually clashing national strategies. With the steady gearing up of China's economic 
power, political influence and defence capability, many Americans would “unwittingly” 
treat China as a rival rather than a partner in the mid-21st century. Wang’s conclusion is 
that, a stable bilateral relationship between China and America would either be written in 
water at times or simply become a wild wish. Deng Xiaoping said that China “cannot be” 
a threat to the US and the US “should not” consider China as a threatening rival, yet 
Wang’s realist views actually admit there is a possibility that China might threaten the 
US due to a clash of national interests.
Official Intellectuals
The approaches of official intellectuals toward the US over China threat theory are more
conciliatory. Their opinion is that, as long as China’s national integrity can be maintained
there is no need to fear the threat from the US. They argue that China should not provoke
the US with military aggressiveness so long as the US does not severely challenge
China’s core security interests over territorial issues, particularly in Taiwan. Therefore
they show less interest in a rush for military build-up than personal and institutional
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advisers though they also believe China needs military enhancement to defend its 
security. Their basic idea is that, though security is China’s top concern in a hostile post­
communist world, China’s security environment is not as bad as personal and 
institutional advisers have described, and thus it is not wise for the Chinese government 
to put too many resources in the PLA.
Official intellectuals follow the party’s terms like he wei gui (peace is highly valued), bu 
cheng ba (not seek hegemony), weihu shijie heping yu wending de liliang (a power to 
maintain world peace and stability) and dui renhe guojia dou bu goucheng weixie (no 
threat to any country), in order to pacify the US and try to explain away China’s 
increased military power. They believe that it is not necessary to sour the US-China 
relationship through aggressive security policy until the Chinese nation is united into 
oneness and China is strong and confident enough to overpower the US. They deem that 
overseas expansion will give the US excuse to take preventive measures to intercept 
China’s rise. Therefore their views are more based on interest calculation than the CCP’s
i • 99party line.
Therefore, official intellectuals try to convince the Americans that China is still 
confronted with plenty of domestic problems, has no ambition to compete with the US 
for dominance in East Asia and that China needs a peaceful and stable international 
environment to safeguard territorial sovereignty, to further improve national cohesion 
among the Chinese people and to maintain a stable domestic environment in which 
people’s welfare can be improved. They claim that seeking the stability of the world 
community and East Asia in particular is in line with China’s domestic needs. In the case 
of Taiwan, they believe that it is definitely in the Mainland’s interests to reunify it as 
early as possible, yet it is not worth attacking the island and getting involved in a war 
with the US which China is not confident to win.
To pacify the Americans, Qin Yaqing, a professor at the College of Foreign Affairs,
following he wei gui (peace is highly valued) and bu cheng ba (not seek hegemony),
claims that China is willing to take its responsibility and try to keep the stability of
international order and international system, for the sake of its own sustainable
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development.100 Following bu cheng ba (not seek hegemony), Luo Yuanzheng contends 
that China’s need for economic development has required that it would not put scarce 
resources into overseas expansion and offensive war, resulting in neglecting many of its 
domestic projects that need more attention. He says that it would take a long time for 
China to eventually arise, so, at least in the near future, there would be little chance for 
China to wage a war.101 His view apparently clashes with He Xin’s argument that China 
should now expand its overseas interests and Yan Xuetong’s argument that China should 
be ready to take Taiwan by force.
To reduce the apprehension among CCP leaders about the China threat theory in the
West, most official intellectuals ascribe the emergence o f China threat theory to IR
theories arising out of US academia, so they try to divert the CCP’s attention from the US
government to US scholars. This approach surely discounts the sincerity of their
arguments following the CCP’s party line, because when Deng Xiaoping said “dui renhe
guojia dou bu goucheng weixie (no threat to any country) ” and “shoudao bieren de wexie
(other countries threatened China)”, he was talking about governments rather than
academics. This position is also distant from Yan Xuetong’s view that China threat
theory is linked with the US government. Yang Guangbin, a scholar at Renmin
102University, believes that the China threat theory originated from Western IR theories. 
From his research he has found that the hegemonic stability theory, balance of power 
theory and geopolitics theory in realism are, in terms of Sino-American relations, all 
pessimistic about China’s rise; the democratic peace theory in liberalism regards China as 
a potential threat; multilateralists do not think Chinese behaviour to defend the integrity 
of its national security and territory is justified; economic interdependence theory is the 
only one that is optimistic about Sino-American relations yet most conservatives do not 
agree. His conclusion is that it is not suitable to apply Western IR theories to Chinese 
reality. He says: “The history of Western international relations is largely a history of 
expansion and competition for hegemony. It is hard for people living in this environment 
and with those theories arising out of this history to understand why a stronger China 
would not expand its power. As such, the theory of China threat emerges. We have to
I A-l
doubt the possibility that one could apply Western IR theories to analyse China.” His
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writing might lead people to perceive that it is the academics rather than its government 
that should be blamed, which is obviously a long way from the CCP’s position.
Liberals
Liberals are basically not bound by the CCP’s formalized language, yet it does not follow 
that they are not nationalistic. John Derbyshire once met up with He Qinglian, one of the 
most liberal intellectuals in China, famous for her relentless criticisms of Chinese 
government policy. Her book, The Pitfalls o f  Modernization, has been translated by 
Lawrence Sullivan and brought her fame in the West. Derbyshire says that things went 
well until they discussed China’s territorial issues. He was told, “Xinjiang had been under 
Chinese influence for thousands of years. It was now an inalienable part of the 
motherland. The same for Tibet, which my article mentioned en passant. How would 
Americans feel if  Hawaii suddenly demanded independence?”104 According to He 
Qinglian, China has been threatened by the separatists supported by the West. “Qinglian 
had a copy of my article and said it was disgraceful for me to use the phrase ‘Chinese 
Imperialism’. China had been a victim of imperialism! How could China herself even 
think of practising imperialism? Disgraceful!”105 He Qinglian’s view is indeed in line 
with the CCP’s terms like zhongguo bu qinlue bieren, dui renhe guojia dou bu goucheng 
weixie, que shou dao waiguo de weixie (China did not invade other countries and posed 
no threat to them, but other countries threatened China), bu cheng ba (not seek 
hegemony) and fangyu xing guofaang zhengce (defensive national defence policy).
From liberals’ writings and speeches one can understand that there is indeed a big market 
for nationalism in China though it is initiated by the CCP. Even liberals believe that, 
“Given recent US-led attempts to...split China by some Western countries, China needs 
more than ever to unite and promote patriotism... The more patriotism is promoted, the 
faster China can develop; and the more closely the Chinese people are united, the more 
likely attempts to contain China will fail.”106 In their eyes, the new Chinese nationalism 
is an indispensable way for the Chinese people to hold their nation together, protect their 
identity and advance their interests in a turbulent modem world.
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Conclusion
One can see from this section that Chinese IR scholars try to stress the fact that Chinese 
military build-up aims to protect domestic agendas. CCP leaders worry about the 
spreading of Chinese military threat theory, as it stands in China’s way of realizing full 
national unity and modernization. They even fear that if the China Threat Theory gains 
more influence, the US will become so alarmed that Washington will decide to attack
1CY1China in order to thwart China’s rise and to preserve US hegemony. It is the reason
1AO
why scholars like Bernstein and Munro are bombarded without mercy by the CCP.
Following the party, most Chinese IR scholars claim that China is not a threat to world 
peace and China has been threatened by the US.109 Obviously, it is over territorial issues 
and particularly the Taiwan problem that Chinese IR scholars feel the US threat the most. 
In this sense Stephen Levine is right to say that nationalism has become the most 
prominent informal ideology in today’s China.110 Nevertheless, regarding Chinese 
military threat theory, on which there exists a strong nationalist consensus among 
Chinese IR scholars, one can still note apparent ruptures.
Chinese IR scholars have examined both history and current affairs and try to prove,
under the guidance of the nationalist party line, that China has always been a peace-
loving country. Generally speaking, China’s words toward the US were modest and
conservative in the 1980s,111 yet it did not remain so in the 1990s, particularly over
China’s security. From the perspective of personal and institutional advisers, the reason
Chinese military threat theory becomes out of the blue all the rage in the West is rather
obvious, as some politicians and intellectuals in America, for the purpose of maintaining
the American hegemony for good, conspire to target China as their enemy and prevent
China’s rise in the 21st century. Personal advisers call on CCP leaders to build up a
formidable PLA to confront the US, institutional advisers are rather cautious and official
intellectuals are apparently less interested in this appeal. Official intellectuals take a
rather conciliatory approach to the debate on the China threat theory and try to pacify
both the Americans and CCP leaders. They do not maintain that there is a consistent
policy in the US government to treat China as a future enemy though they agree there are
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hostile voices among US academics. Liberals are also concerned with China’s territorial 
integrity yet they pay little attention to the CCP’s party line.
2.2 Taiwan Issue
In this section, the author will show how Chinese IR scholars respond to the CCP’s 
formalized language on the Taiwan issue. To the CCP, concerns over Taiwan are related 
to the issue of regime legitimacy. With communist ideology being seriously eroded by 
the newly emerging market economy, the call of Chinese nationalism under the glory of 
complete unification and nationalist revival readily replaced the ideology’s dominant
119role. As a result, it reinforced the influence of nationalism on the CCP's Taiwan policy. 
Many Chinese elites do not care about the decline of the uniform ideology, yet they do 
worry about the independence of Taiwan. The CCP is wise enough to take advantage of 
this apprehension among the Chinese elite and try to rally the population behind the 
party.
The CCP’s policy on Taiwan has been closely tied to its interpretation of the domestic 
and international situation in the post-cold war era.113 The party knows it rules a turbulent 
society in a hostile world. To maintain its one-party rule in the post-Communist era, the 
CCP skilfully takes the role of the guardian of Chinese territorial integrity and puts the 
Taiwan issue as the highest priority in Chinese security policy. In some sense, it is fair to 
say the Taiwan problem has convinced Chinese elites of the rightness of nationalism.
Kane identified several fundamental principles that guide Chinese domestic policy. These 
principles focus on a robust approach to sovereignty, a determination to strengthen the 
ruling party and a continuing commitment to ideological distinctiveness.114 CCP leaders 
understand the importance of US-China relations and have tried hard to improve them,115 
yet Chinese US policy is subject to these domestic principles. As the US protection of 
Taiwan has challenged Chinese sovereignty and thus the legitimacy o f the party, it 
becomes the biggest obstacle in the bilateral relationship. CCP leaders have thus decided
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on promoting nationalism to oppose the US “intervention in the internal affairs” of 
China."6
To date, the nationalist position toward the US over Taiwan has indeed been useful in 
helping the CCP regarding national cohesion, yet in the long run it will generate other
117problems. Externally, it will produce a “security dilemma” between the US and China. 
This dilemma is in large measure a function of the Taiwan question.118 CCP leaders 
cannot forsake military solutions, Taiwanese are prone to de jure independence instead of 
satisfaction with de facto independence and US primacists view the world in power 
transition terms. Domestically, it will raise public expectation on Taiwan and limit the 
leadership’s flexibility in policy-making. The party has been perceived to be capable of 
defending China’s core security principles and territorial integrity, which makes it 
difficult for the CCP to back down when necessary.119 High public expectation has its 
psychological impact on Chinese policymakers as well. It could drive CCP leaders to 
make irrational strategic decisions in ways difficult for Western scholars and politicians 
to anticipate.120
No Chinese leader, communist or liberal, can afford to be cast as Us hi zuiren (a person 
condemned by history) for taking action that would permanently split the nation; such an 
appellation would be a lethal blow to any Chinese leader attempting to establish himself
191domestically. Out of fear of Taiwanese independence, the CCP has consistently 
refused to pledge not to use force against Taiwan despite pressure from the US. Jiang 
Zemin stated in December 1992 that the “PRC will adopt resolute measures if Taiwan
199declares Taiwan’s independence.” The pursuit of independence would, the CCP 
claims, involve the risk of war.
Evolvement of Taiwan Problem
The Taiwan problem has always been one of the focal points of Sino-American 
relationships during 1989-2000. The Chinese territorial claim to Taiwan is largely based 
on its imperial history. Anderson deemed it bizarre that liberals (nationalists as well) like 
Sun Yat-sen also made “absurd claims to territories in various parts of South-east Asia
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and Central Asia”, including Taiwan, based on territorial conquests of dynastic rulers,
1
and “both the KMT and the CCP later took over this inheritance” at various times.
Due to the US involvement, the PLA could not entirely clear away KMT troops in 
China’s territory. Chiang Kai Shek fled to Taiwan at the close of 4 years' civil war, yet 
managed to stand firm against all the odds with the US assistance. After the outbreak of 
the Korean War, the stalemate across the Taiwan Straits was fixed in the context of the 
Cold War. The Mainland and Taiwan belonged to opposite groups, the East and West, 
until the great debate between the Soviet Union and China was inch by inch brought to 
the surface.
The US and China made agreements in 1972, 1978 and 1982. At the time of the Shanghai 
Communique in 1972, both the KMT and the CCP claimed that they represented China. 
Therefore the US acknowledged in the Communique that both sides of the Taiwan Straits 
claimed that Taiwan was part of China and that the US did not contest that view. In the 
normalization of relations between China and the US, negotiated in 1978, the US 
terminated formal official relations with Taiwan and replaced those with the Mainland. In 
1982 the US announced its commitment gradually to reduce weapons sales to Taiwan. 
With relationship with the US amicable and relationship with the Soviet Union improving 
in the late 1980s, China did not believe war was inevitable any longer.124
Nevertheless, after the Soviet bloc in Europe unexpectedly collapsed, Taiwan became a 
flashpoint for China and the US. With its amazingly continuous and strong economic 
growth, China was getting more confident of its capability to take over Taiwan by fair 
means or even foul. However, the CCP claims that China could not move much closer to 
its aim to unify Taiwan on account of the US backup for the Taiwanese regime.
On the other hand, Taiwan’s internal situation has greatly changed since Li Denghui
1 ' y c
became the president. Taiwan was for long under the KMT’s authoritarian control. In
1991 Taiwan terminated the “period of mobilization against communist rebellion”,
marking an end to the aim of retaking the Mainland by force. This move indicated a
1fundamental shift in Taiwan’s policy toward China. The Taiwanese authority claimed
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to represent only the people of Taiwan. Once democracy took root in Taiwan after 1987, 
the “local” people gained more power relative to the “mainlanders,” the 15 percent of the 
population that had fled the Mainland in the late 1940s. Many local people had less 
interest in the Mainland and Li Denghui tried in the 1990s to lay the basis for increasing
177independence by stressing local culture. The movement for Taiwan’s independence has
1^0
been encouraged by Li and eventually led to an administration controlled by the pro­
independence Democratic Progressive Party. Therefore the tension across the Taiwan 
Straits has been in ascendance and in turn Chinese nationalism has been running high.
In 1995 Li Denghui was granted a visa by the US to conduct a “private” visit to his alma 
mater, Cornell University. Although this was billed as a private visit, the US Congress 
had voted 396-0 in the House and 97-1 in the Senate calling on the US President to admit
190Lee. The CCP’s reaction was intense. During July 1995, the PLA ostentatiously tested
i insix different types of guided missiles in the waters around Taiwan. It aimed to terrify
Taiwan away from any thoughts of independence. In the following years, the military
exercises conducted adjacent to Taiwan were also designed to deter Taiwan from taking
111steps moving toward independence.
The developing crisis in the Taiwan Straits dramatically influenced Chinese perception of 
the US. They blame the US for the political change in Taiwan. A public opinion poll 
conducted in 1995 found that 87.1% of respondents believed that the US was the country
119“least friendly” to China. It is no surprise at all that China Can Say No was published
111that year, selling perhaps two million copies.
However, this is not the end of the story. Democratisation contributed to a growing sense 
among some Taiwanese that there were large and widening differences between the 
Mainland and Taiwan.134 This sense was encouraged by deliberate government efforts, 
from the mid-1990s on, to create an independent Taiwanese identity through the 
promotion of local history and culture. The leadership in the 1990s and today, now under 
a pro-independence President, Chen Shuibian, tried to transform a growing awareness of 
different-ness into a growing awareness of separate-ness from an entity called China. The
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effort culminated in 2001 in a statement by President Chen that China and Taiwan were 
two states on different sides of the Straits.
The rise of identity politics in Taiwan has contributed to the CCP’s worry about the 
permanent separation of Taiwan and even the formal declaration of independence by 
Chen. The response to the Taiwanese challenge is military build-up designed to deter 
Taiwanese from supporting independence and stepped-up diplomatic efforts to isolate 
Taiwan internationally. These behaviours, in turn, have contributed to arguments in the
t o r
US that China is indeed a revisionist state.
Taiwan in US Engagement Policy
Taiwan’s argument for independence is not stronger than the Mainland’s territorial claim. 
UN documents on decolonisation and national liberation in the 1960s were clear that they 
recognized the right of oppressed peoples to determine their future, but also protected 
newly independent states from further dismemberment.136 That is, the right to self- 
determination has generally been extended only to those peoples who are subject to alien 
rule and who have few opportunities to participate meaningfully in their own
1 *17governance. International practice and international law does not recognize the absolute 
right of any social, political or ethnic group to sovereign independence.
The Taiwan problem between China and the US is not about the international norms of 
national self-determination. US foreign policy practice has always been ambivalent over 
self-determination of a people. During the Cold War, the US ended up defending French 
colonialism in Vietnam in the 1950s. The US does not support Quebec independence and 
intervened against Serbia’s suppression of the Kosovar population but did not support 
Kosovo independence. It clearly does not officially recognize the right to national self- 
determination and sovereign statehood for Native Americans.
To the US, Taiwan occupies the key position in its engagement policy toward China, as
how CCP leaders deal with the Taiwan problem is regarded as the paramount test of
whether China will challenge US dominance. Some US scholars and decision-makers
regard peaceful reunification as the bottom line that China should not cross, otherwise
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bilateral relations would probably go off the track. Many US scholars and politicians 
believe that the Taiwan issue could lead to the expanding of more grandiose “revisionist” 
interests in China and the appearance of more authoritative evidence of a renegade China, 
as the Chinese defence of its territorial integrity in an era of long-range high-tech 
precision strike means that the military operational perimeter has to expand outward and 
includes pre-emption.139
In the framework of engagement, the US has committed itself to defend Taiwan. While, 
officially, US policy has been agnostic as to whether Taiwan and China unity or not as 
long as it is done peacefully and with the approval of the Taiwanese people, its policy has 
now evolved to the point where Taiwan is regarded almost as the functional equivalent of 
a “major non-NATO ally”. 140 US hawks like Kagan and Wolfowitz have already begun 
to compare China’s rise with the rise of other revisionist states such as fascist Japan and 
Wilhelmine Germany.141 Moderatists like James Shinn contend that striking the Taiwan 
regime by force would be a blatant violation.142
In the eyes of the CCP, engagement is supposed to accommodate rather than thwart 
China's rise. Nevertheless, the US is applying such international principles as James 
Shinn has suggested to Taiwan, which is not a sovereign state, and meddles in China's 
internal affairs. CCP leaders are especially concerned that the US will provide Taiwan 
with theatre missile defence (TMD) that will encourage pro-independence forces and re­
establish the U.S.-Taiwan defence treaty on a de facto basis.143 The understanding of 
CCP leaders is that what the Americans are doing is absolutely opposite to what they 
have claimed. They claim that China will not rise in real sense until the whole country is 
reunited.
Party Line
Top CCP leaders put the Taiwan problem at the core of the new Chinese nationalism and
regard the US as the biggest obstacle in China’s reunification with the island. As long as
China’s international identity is defined in terms of a nationalistic view of modem
Chinese history in which Taiwan was ceded to Japan, a realpolitik perspective will
prevail.144 Deng Xiaoping surely belonged to thinkers of realpolitik. He believed that the
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reunification of Taiwan is one of the most important components of China’s resurrection 
and it is indeed an issue concerning Chinese national sentiments. Deng in 1984 made it 
clear to the Americans that China had changed its views on global strategy due mainly to 
the change in the U.S. attitude toward Taiwan.145 Due to his influence, the Chinese 
realpolitik tendencies are infinitely preferable to the messianic versions of Chinese 
nationalism that might come to the fore if the US regards China as an enemy.146
Deng himself employed strongly emotional nationalistic words in his discourse over the 
Taiwan issue. Deng said: “Our compatriots on the Mainland, those in Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Macao and the overseas Chinese, are all descendants of the Chinese people. 
We should all strive to reunify our motherland and revitalize our nation.”147 “First of all, 
it (Taiwan Issue) is a national question, a question of national sentiments.”148 “The 
reunification of the country has long been the aspiration of all the Chinese people... Ever 
since the Opium War, reunification has been the common desire not just of one political 
party or group but of the whole Chinese nation, including the people in Taiwan.”149
Deng demonstrated his anger over the US involvement in Taiwan. “The question of 
Taiwan is the main obstacle to better relations between China and the United States and it 
might even develop into a crisis between the two nations... There is a group of people in 
the United States today who, carrying on the Dulles doctrine’, regard Taiwan as a US 
aircraft carrier or as a territory within the US sphere of influence.”150
The book Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao (Introduction to Deng 
Xiaoping’s Foreign Policy Thought) says: “ The nature of Taiwan Relations Act is to 
continue to regard Taiwan as the unsinkable aircraft carrier of the US, intending to keep 
to some extent the US-Taiwan security co-operation another way through means like 
selling weapons to Taiwan, to continue to interfere in China’s domestic affairs and make 
the US-Taiwan relations a sort of official sense.”151 It goes on to say: “It is Taiwan 
Relations Act that has caused the crisis of the Sino-US relationship.”152 It also says: 
“ ...the Taiwan problem is the most sensitive and most prominent one of political 
principle. If it is not dealt in a proper way, it will become an explosive problem. With
regard to such bitter fruit as the Taiwan problem, the Chinese people can not and will not
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tswallow it up.” If need be, in view of the fact that the basis for the country’s peaceful 
reunification is seriously imperilled by the US, China will have to enhance its capability 
to defend its sovereignty and security by military means.154
CCP leaders have no ambition beyond its current border. According to the party line, 
Taiwan is within its border and a historical loss waiting to be recovered. There is good 
evidence that military modernization programs, training exercises and doctrinal 
innovation in the PLA, particularly since 1996, are largely aimed at dealing with the 
Taiwan issue.155 However, the party line has also shown the CCP’s obvious intolerance 
over the US interference in the Taiwan problem. CCP leaders concluded that the US was 
bent on using its unchallenged post-Cold War political and military strength to contain 
China with rejuvenated military alliances.156 The Taiwan Strait crises of the mid-1990s 
confirmed uneasiness on both sides of the Pacific. In this scenario, CCP leaders decided 
to balance the US power in East Asia. Chinese General Xiong Guangkai sternly warned 
the US that in an age of nuclear weapons “Washington cares more about Los Angeles 
than about Taipei.”157
The author will explain 7 formalized terms here. Firstly, minzu qinggan wenti (a question
of national sentiments) demonstrates the CCP’s nationalist drive over its policy
concerning Taiwan. Secondly, meiguo buchen de hangkongmujian (the unsinkable
aircraft carrier of the US) means that the US considers Taiwan as a powerful and perilous
weapon against China, and “the US attempts to use the Taiwan card as leverage in
1bilateral dealings and a strategic check on an ascending China.” Thirdly, ganshe
zhongguo neizheng (interfere in China’s domestic affairs) means China’s approach to
Taiwan is that it is surely not an international issue and the US has no right at all to get
involved. Ganshe means “to interfere against somebody’s will” in Chinese dictionary159
and it tries to demonstrate China’s detestation of the US Taiwan policy. Fourthly,
zhenzheng zhaocheng zhong mei guanxi weiji de shi yu taiwan guanxi fa  (It is Taiwan
Relations Act that has caused the crisis of the Sino-US relationship) means that the basic
cause o f the crisis in the Sino-US relationship is the Taiwan Relations Act and US
involvement in China’s domestic affairs. Clearly, the CCP blames the US for the tension
between the two sides. Fifthly, zui mingan zui tuchu de zhengzhi yuanze wenti (the most
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sensitive and prominent political principle) means Taiwan issue is a principal one on 
which the CCP will not back down at all. Yuanze means in standard Chinese dictionary 
“that one’s words and behaviour should follow”,160 and this term shows that China will 
not bow down over the Taiwan issue before the US though China would compromise 
with regard to other issues. Sixthly, baozha xing wenti (an explosive problem) means 
Taiwan problem could completely destroy the relationship between China and the US. 
Baozha means in Chinese “explode all o f a sudden” 161 and this term shows the Chinese 
worry that the Taiwan problem might evolve out of control and lead to war out of the 
blue. Seventhly, tun bu xiaqu, buhui tun xiaqu (can not and will not swallow it up) 
declares in a crystal clear way that China will solve the Taiwan problem in its own way 
and China will balance the US power in East Asia.
Personal Advisers
Personal advisers closely follow these terms and particularly terms like minzu qinggan 
wenti (a question of national sentiments), meiguo buchen de hangkongmujian (the 
unsinkable aircraft carrier of the US) and baozha xing wenti (an explosive problem), tun 
bu xiaqu, buhui tun xiaqu (can not and will not swallow it up), and believing that it is the 
US conspiracy to disintegrate China and the US has a grand strategy to carry this plan. 
They firmly support the CCP’s decision to balance US power. Taiwan is regarded by 
those personal advisers as a chessman of the US to fulfil this grand strategy. They have 
noted the closer ties between the US and Taiwan. During the latter half of the Clinton 
administration, the US DoD pressed for closer military coordination with Taiwan for the
t AOpurpose of maintaining influence in Taiwan. Under the Bush administration, this 
coordination has been pushed not only by this consideration, hut also by concerns in the 
primacist wing of the Republican Party about the Chinese challenge to US power in East 
Asia.163
Wang Daohan has noted the US policy change and proclaimed that the Taiwan problem
is entirely China’s domestic issue and should not be meddled in by outsiders, whatever
the US domestic concerns. He says: “In modem Chinese history of over 100 years, the
Chinese people sought for the complete unity of their motherland, fought against foreign
forces’ schemes to separate and bully China, shedding their blood one after another, and
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eventually made the Chinese nation stand towering like a giant in the East of the 
world.”164 Here Wang is actually trying to justify a possible war across the Taiwan 
Straits, following the CCP’s terms tun bu xiaqu, buhui tun xiaqu (can not and will not 
swallow it up), baozha xing wenti (an explosive problem) and ganshe zhongguo neizheng 
(interfere in China’s domestic affairs). Wang Daohan warns the Taiwanese authority, 
“the problem across the Taiwan Straits will be ultimately solved by the Chinese on the 
two sides, and relying on external forces is like drinking poison to quench thirst.”165 He 
not surprisingly refers to the US as a poison in the relationship between Taiwan and the 
Mainland.
He Xin firmly believes that the US involvement in the Taiwan issue is a conspiracy. On 
US weapons sales to Taiwan, He Xin says: “Its objectives seem to include...2, to 
intensify the military competition between the two sides across the straits, to obstruct the 
process of the reunion of the two sides, and encourage the trend and strength of the 
Taiwanese independence movement. 3, to become prepared to use Taiwan as a main base 
to contain the Mainland China and exert the US influence in Asia Pacific.” 166 He predicts 
that the US will further infiltrate in and instigate rebellion against Mainland China, with 
Taiwan being the bridgehead. He even claims that US Taiwan policy is a part of its grand 
strategy to control the whole world. He says that the US objective in the world is very 
much explicit and has not changed for over one hundred years, which is to rule the whole 
world. In his view, the general principle of the US strategy on China has not changed 
over 50 years and has been entirely consistent, that is to contain and disintegrate China, 
though at times appeasing during fighting or at times fighting during appeasing.
He is not alone in making this judgment on the US strategy. It is said that the CCP’s 
assessments of US security strategy over the past decade suggest that China does not 
view Sino-American tensions as limited to the Taiwan issue. Rather, the dispute over 
Taiwan is symptomatic of a broader US strategy to contain China and undermine the 
CCP’s authority.167
Under this background, Liu Ji denounces the US involvement in the Taiwan issue,
advocates balancing the US military force in East Asia and warns the US of a possible
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bloody war. He says: ‘The Taiwan issue is entirely a Chinese internal affair, in the same 
way that no matter what happens in Hawaii or California is an internal affair of the 
United States. Therefore, the United States should not itself involve in the Taiwan issue. 
Not to become involved in the Taiwan issue is the most intelligent approach considering 
American national interests.”168169 Liu Ji tries hard to establish a nationalistic and positive 
image of the CCP: “The Chinese Communist Party and Chinese people have been 
entirely firm patriots, the proof is a history written in blood. Do not have any illusions on 
this issue. I think Americans understand this very well: American ancestors waged the
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famous Civil War to maintain integrity when the South attempted independence.” 
Similar to Wang and He, Liu Ji employs many emotional words, for instance, a history 
written in blood, to display his high identification with the CCP’s party line, particularly 
the term tun bu xiaqu, buhui tun xiaqu (can not and will not swallow it up) and baozha 
xing wenti (an explosive problem).
Institutional Advisers
Institutional advisers have always clung to the CCP’s formalized language such as minzu
qinggan wenti (a question of national sentiments), tun bu xiaqu, buhui tun xiaqu (can not
and will not swallow it up) and ganshe zhongguo neizheng (interfere in China’s domestic
affairs), insisted and proclaimed in public that the Taiwan issue is China's domestic affair
and accordingly shall not fall into the hands of external forces like the US. They
understand that this issue would become more complicated if  countries like the US
became directly involved. Therefore they also claim it right to balance US power in
Taiwan. However, these scholars are fully aware of the US role in relation to the
confrontation and sometimes brinkmanship of war across the Taiwan Straits. These
scholars claim that the Taiwan problem certainly grew out of the US intervention in the
first place, since the consistent existence of the Taiwanese regime surely relies on
enormous US support and Taiwan's long-time defiance against the Mainland is closely
bound up with its strong ties with America in politics, economy, military and intelligence
affairs. More importantly, they assert that the Taiwanese independence movement in
reality took shape in the US, got stronger and more aggressive and pro-active with the
support of some US interest groups. In short, like those Americans who believe that “the
‘problem’ is China, and the ‘solution’ lies in US policy,”172 institutional advisers blame
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the US for this hot potato in China's agenda to rise up in the 21st century. Though they 
claim the US conspiracy in their writings, they seldom regard it as a part of the US grand 
strategy to dominate the world, and they seldom remind Americans of a bloody war, 
keeping a distance from the term baozha xing wenti (an explosive problem), unlike 
personal advisers.
They point their fingers at the US for the origin of the current dilemma. Most institutional 
advisers claim that the PLA could have occupied Taiwan if  the US Seventh Fleet had not 
appeared at the Taiwan Straits in 1950. They proclaim that it is the US that prevented 
China from unifying Taiwan, to fulfil gloriously the plan of the first generation leaders of 
the CCP.173
A famous IR scholar from Shanghai International Studies Institute, Yang Jiemian, is 
inclined to think that it arises from the need of anti-communist strategy that the US 
eventually chose to support Taiwan. He argues that the US always regards communist 
regimes as its most dangerous enemies. Yang Jiemian says: “The US administration 
decided to prop up the KMT authority retreating to Taiwan, due to the Cold War and 
containing communism...America's intervention directly gave rise to the Taiwan issue 
and the lingering problems henceforth."174
Some other institutional advisers believe that geopolitics also play a great role in the US 
final decision to draw a line with the CCP and assist the KMT regime in Taiwan to 
survive with economic, financial, political and military means. Su Ge, working with IIS 
(Institute of International Studies), holds that the two documents handed in by Dulles and 
MacArthur respectively to the Truman administration which analysed the then East Asian 
situation from the perspective of strategy, were of great importance in helping Truman
1 7^make up his mind to send out the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits. According to Su
Ge, Dulles argued that Taiwan was certainly one of the most ideal areas to counter the
looming Soviet expansion in East Asia; MacArthur argued that Taiwan was one o f the
most important links in the US line of defence extending from Aleutian Islands to the
Philippines. In his view, the US decision to send the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits
was not at all a response to the Korean War. He says: “In fact, before the Korean War
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broke out, America’s policy-making group had been hatching a plot to separate Taiwan 
and sever China.”176
Su Ge’s analysis has been supported by some Western scholars’ research. Robert Ross
111applied geopolitics to his study of the US-China relationship. He deems that although
the US is a global superpower, it is not the regional hegemon in East Asia. China 
dominates continental Asia and the US is pre-eminent in maritime East Asia.
t no
Nevertheless, the Chinese control of Taiwan will change the balance.
At the close of the Korean War, compared with the enormous resources the CCP could 
gain by its strength, Taiwan was definitely much weaker and at an obvious disadvantage 
to its rival. Most institutional advisers even think that Taiwan could not stand a good 
chance of maintaining its stability and getting rich without US generous and long-term 
assistance. Yang Jiemian stresses that the close relationship between Taiwan and
1 TOAmerica was of great importance to both sides. From his point of view, protecting and 
strengthening Taiwan is, of course, in line with America’s strategic interests while, for 
Taiwan, close ties with America has the most important bearing on its survival.
Institutional scholars claim that Taiwan’s economic development heavily relies upon US 
capital, technology and market access. Their argument is based on the history they 
present. The Taiwanese authority had around $1.4 billion economic assistance from the 
US, which provided a solid foundation for Taiwan's economic take-off in the early 1960s. 
During 1952-1988, US capital accounted for 60% of Taiwan's foreign investment.
According to these scholars, while US economic assistance paved the way for Taiwan to 
become fortunately one of the four tigers in East Asia, US military assistance provided 
Taiwan’s most basic need i.e. a secure international environment against heavy odds. To 
the CCP, the close military relationship between Taiwan and the US is the stickiest issue 
in the Sino-American relationship. Yang Jiemian says:" The Taiwan issue is the most 
important and sensitive core of the Sino-American relationship, while military relations 
between America and Taiwan is the most important and sensitive one in the Taiwan
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1ROissue." One could see that his view is surely in line with the CCP’s term zui mingan zui 
tuchu de zhengzhi yuanze wenti (the most sensitive and prominent political principle).
1979 was a turning point for Sino-American relations, during which the US established 
formal diplomatic relations with China but passed the Taiwan Relations Act in its 
Congress, despite China's stem protest. Institutional advisers follow the CCP’s 
formalized language like zhenzheng zhaocheng zhong mei guanxi weiji de shi yu taiwan 
guanxi fa  (It is Taiwan Relations Act that has caused the crisis of the Sino-US 
relationship). Taiwan Relations Act certainly strengthened their minds that the US new 
China policy originated from consideration of tactics rather than a wholehearted 
reconciliation. They claim that the Americans well reserved their room to manoeuvre in
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China's domestic affairs thereafter.
Institutional advisers became more concerned about military relations existing between 
Taiwan and the US after the end of the Cold War. In the mid-1980s, as no major wars 
were anticipated, the PLA was directed to prepare for local, limited wars on China's
1 89periphery. After the independence movement in Taiwan became rampant, things began
to change. Since the mid-1990s China has been dramatically turned into the world factory
packing in enormous foreign investment. Chinese military forces have in consequence
greatly improved their striking capability as the central government is able to put more
funds into the PLA's modernization and procure more sophisticated weapons from 
18^Russia. With the unity of the whole country once again at the top of the CCP’s agenda, 
institutional advisers assert it appropriate that the PLA start to prepare for a major war 
with the US and Taiwan.
Institutional advisers claim that the US has unceasingly geared up its weapons sales to 
Taiwan since the 1990s, which severely threatens China’s security. They assert that 
Taiwan has become the No. 2 buyer in the world weapons market, only second to Saudi 
Arabia. The US is the main source of Taiwan's military equipment, accounting for 95% 
of its procurement as a whole.
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Institutional advisers have seen the Chinese deterrent strategy against Taiwan threatened 
by US ballistic missile defence (BMD) technologies. With national missile defence 
(NMD) on the operational horizon, institutional advisers specializing in security call on
184CCP leaders to take more aggressive measures in nuclear doctrine and strategy. The 
rationale behind a combination of US TMD systems that could protect Taiwan coupled 
with a US NMD programme is that this “layered defence system” could be a credible
t o r
counter to a Chinese nuclear threat. Thus institutional advisers accuse the US of using 
double standards regarding the Taiwan issue.186
Institutional advisers claim that these are good evidence that the US tries to obstruct 
China’s reunification with Taiwan, observing the Taiwan Relations Act. “It obliges the 
United States to deter Beijing from militarily intimidating or invading Taiwan, to provide 
defensive arms for Taiwan's self-defence needs...”187 Taking account of these facts, 
institutional advisers seem disappointed with the force of the legal framework established 
between the US and China since 1972. Chu Shulong says that the 8.17 communique has
too
so far turned out to be little more than a scrap of paper.
During the 1990s, many more institutional advisers began to feel fairly confident with 
China's economic rise. Due to the humiliation exerted by the West in the past and China's 
now resolute determination to rise up in the 21st century, institutional advisers are 
constantly beset by the apprehension that the US would somehow thwart this process 
with its pre-emptive forces. For some of them, Taiwan could become America's wildest 
card to play against China because of its strategic significance. If Taiwan became 
independent, in the view of many Chinese scholars, America would without doubt 
quickly embrace it into TMD arrangement as a sovereign state. China would in this 
scenario become more threatened than at present, which could in consequence put 
China's future stability at risk. It is due to this consideration that Yang Jiemian regards an
1 RQindependent Taiwan as a dagger stuck into China's heart.
It is suggested that the Taiwanese independence movement is more related to its internal
ethnic politics. The major cleavages in Taiwan’s political culture fall along ethnic lines,
that is, mainlanders, Hoklo Taiwanese, Hakka Taiwanese, and, to a smaller extent,
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Malayo-Polynesian aborigines.190 However, institutional advisers contend that the 
Americans have fostered the Taiwanese Independent Movement as a conspiracy to 
contain China. The main evidence is that most of the forerunners of the Taiwanese 
Independence Movement were at large in the US and beyond the reach of the then KMT 
authority. They note the fact that many key Taiwanese Independence Movement 
organizations have indeed been based in the US for quite a long time. The DPP could not 
come into power until these organizations were allowed to return and hence provided 
crucial support for its rise.191
To institutional advisers, the US sympathy toward Li Denghui equals its official support 
for the Taiwanese Independence Movement. Nevertheless they differ over the driving 
force behind the support. Guo Zhengyuan contends that the Clinton administration’s 
good-will gesture toward Li meant in some sense the US strategic adjustment in East 
Asia after the end of the Cold War. Taiwan falls perfectly into a part of this plan. Guo 
says that the US Taiwan policy change aims in a great measure to check China’s power 
increase and thereby reduces if not avoids the possibility to get directly involved with a
1 QJ
military clash across the Taiwan Straits. Su Ge mainly blames the US Congress for Li 
Denghui’s Cornell visit and the tension between the Mainland and Taiwan thereafter. Su 
Ge argues that it is the pressure from Congress that forced President Clinton to allow Li
1Q3Denghui's visa application.
Official Intellectuals
Generally speaking, official intellectuals follow the CCP’s formalized language on the
US role in the Taiwan problem and support the CCP’s policy to balance US power in
Taiwan, yet they prefer peaceful reunification with Taiwan and are more balanced toward
the US than personal and institutional advisers. They try to blame Taiwan for the tension
between China and the US and some even dare to point out the faults on the Chinese side.
The case of Taiwan involves both international and domestic issues for all three
sides. 194The DDP believes that it is Taiwan’s right to announce independence while the
KMT does not agree. The CCP feels that China alone is entitled to be involved in its
resolution, as Taiwan is regarded as an integral part of China. Because Taiwan has strong
lobbies in Washington, the Taiwan issue is also a matter of domestic concern in the US.
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Official intellectuals have paid more attention to domestic issues than personal and 
institutional advisers, even including faults committed domestically.
Some official intellectuals blame the KMT authority for the origin of the Taiwan 
problem.195 They have noted that it is Taiwan that takes the initiative to ally with the US 
in military affairs. Some official intellectuals contend that, in the first place, the 
Taiwanese authority was in truth much more eager to establish bilateral military relations, 
one way or another, than the US. One could say it is quite understandable, as it is anyway 
about survival for Taiwan and a military blueprint for the US.
Official intellectuals have witnessed more aggressive international behaviour from 
Taiwan. They are alarmed by Taiwan’s diplomatic efforts to gain more influence in the 
international community. Apart from Li Denghui’s visit to Cornell University in 1995, 
these efforts included Li Denghui’s nine-day diplomatic tour in early 1994 to Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Thailand; his May 1994 visit to Nicaragua, Costa Rica, South Africa 
and Swaziland; and his April 1995 private visit to the United Arab Emirates and Jordan; 
and Premier Lien Chan’s June 1994 secret visit to Mexico after an official visit to Central 
America. The Taiwanese international behaviour is so aggressive that Nye and Freeman 
advocated that the US discourage actions by Taipei that might leave China with little 
choice but to resort to arms.196
In Sino-US relationships, the US Congress often takes a conservative line. It opposed the 
1996 CTBT treaty, whose final form was in large measure a function o f hard US-China 
bargaining. To begin with, conservatives in Congress rejected the notion that the US and 
China had any shared interest in dealing with global warming as a global problem. 
Conservatives also opposed the ABM treaty and any restraint on ballistic missile defence, 
setting up a major conflict of interest with China, whose nuclear deterrent benefited from 
the US-Russian agreement. Official intellectuals stress the negative role played by 
Congress more than personal and institutional advisers.
Zhao Baoxu from Beijing University tries to highlight the influence of the Taiwanese
lobby on US China policy. The US has enormous economic interests in Taiwan, which
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have been used by the Taiwanese to their advantage. It is suggested that the Mainland has 
dealt in a formal and poor manner with administration officials in the US executive, yet 
Taiwan has dealt in a far more sophisticated and nuanced manner, more with the
I  Q 'T
Congress than with the executive. Zhao points out that Taiwan’s approach has been 
impressively successful. For instance, in the early 1990s, Secretary of Defence William 
Perry began a revival of the military relationship with China, but it quickly ground to a
1 Qfthalt in the US Congress due to the Taiwanese lobby.
Zhao says that Taiwan has spent enormous funds in lobbying US politicians since the 
KMT forces retreated to the island. The Taiwanese authority invited US politicians to 
travel to the island, to have holidays there, to sponsor their research on Taiwan as well. 
For instance, James Lilley was sponsored by Taiwan’s fund when he was working with 
the American Enterprise Institute as a resident fellow. He also says that the Lobbying 
Company of Cassidy played a crucial role in Li Denghui’s Cornell visit. He tries to 
demonstrate that the Taiwanese authority has always desperately asked for US help, and 
Taiwan should be blamed for the tension of US-China relations more than the US.199 This 
position is far from the CCP’s party line.
Some official intellectuals boldly point out faults on the Chinese side as to the origin of 
the Taiwan problem. They have certainly noticed the Truman administration’s initial 
hesitation to defend Chiang Kaishek by force. Yu Xiaohui points out that, to prevent the 
CCP from leaning entirely on the Soviet side, the Americans sent goodwill signals to 
Mao and Zhou, in order to test the water and examine the possibility that the two 
countries could somehow manage to co-exist in peace if  not become friends. On Jan. 5, 
1950, President Truman made a public statement and reiterated that Taiwan was an 
inseparable part of China. Unfortunately, Truman's olive branch did not succeed as 
expected, as Mao abruptly refused his offer to establish good relations between the two 
giants. Yu believes that it is due to Mao and Zhou’s wrong decision that the CCP missed 
an opportunity to establish a stable relationship with the US.200
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Li Yihu from Beijing University argues for peaceful reunification with Taiwan. He 
believes that the stalemate across the Taiwan Straits lies in the Chinese thinking style and 
claims that peaceful resolution will be possible if  the CCP is more flexible.
Mainland China resolutely clings to its “one China” policy, yet Taiwan tries to develop a 
“two Chinas” policy within its current legal framework. It seems to him: ‘This antithesis 
has been shown in the fields of policy and practice, but the origin behind it lies more in 
the clash of the two sides in thinking and conceptions, so the political stalemate across
901the Taiwan Straits is due to the conflict or even clash of thinking and conceptions.” He 
then calls for CCP leaders to contemplate compromise on the “one China” policy. 
Official intellectuals like Li have noted the huge price that the Mainland has paid. In 
recent years, China has banned mainland Chinese from participating in any international 
security discussions that include Taiwanese, as CCP leaders rule that even informal 
international discussions of security issues with people from Taiwan in the room would
909amount to a tacit recognition of Taiwan as a separate political entity. Official 
intellectuals like Li believe that in this way China has missed many opportunities to allay 
fear and suspicion on the Taiwanese side.
One can see from this that official intellectuals show more willingness in peaceful
90Treunification with Taiwan. Actually this position may be acceptable to the US. China 
seeks to establish extensive and intensive linkages with states that have overlapping and 
common interests.204 Nevertheless, due to China’s inflexibility over Taiwan’s 
involvement in international institutions, China’s effort to build up common ground with 
the US has been greatly discounted. Lack of flexibility has also led to misperception of 
the US policy over Taiwan. In 1998 Clinton suggested China should give Taiwan more 
international space though he adopted the “three Nos” toward Taiwan—no support for 
Taiwan independence, no support for a two-China policy, no support for Taiwan’s 
membership in international organizations on the basis of statehood, yet China perceived
90Sa strengthening of US-Taiwan ties.
Some official intellectuals like Jia Qingguo and Zhao Baoxu try to emphasize that the
influence of the US in the Taiwan issue is actually in decline as the US increasingly
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needs China over time. Somehow they hint that the US role could become less and less 
important. Therefore they claim peaceful reunification will be more achievable. In fact, 
they maintain that the US role in the Taiwan problem is not at all as important as the CCP 
has claimed. Jia says: “With the rise of China’s comprehensive national power and 
international influence, the importance of Mainland China and Taiwan upon the US will 
demonstrate a bigger and bigger gap and the US would less and less sacrifice its relations 
with the Mainland China for Taiwan.”206
Zhao agrees with Jia and is confident of peaceful resolution. He claims that time is on the 
side of peaceful reunification, as China’s giant market and its co-operation on all 
international issues becomes more and more indispensable, whereas Taiwan’s important
00'7status in the US strategy will gradually become weakened. Due to China’s growing 
market, they believe that China can take advantage of the US pluralist politics, as US 
national leaders are influenced by an always divided policy advisory, checked by a 
divided government between President and Congress. Official intellectuals thus claim 
that measures relying on economic interdependence will avoid a major war between 
China and the US.
Their liberalist approach highlighting economic interdependence between China and the 
US is apparently distant from the CCP’s party line, particularly terms like baozha xing 
wenti (an explosive problem) and meiguo buchen de hangkongmujian (the unsinkable 
aircraft carrier of the US). They are more confident of peaceful reunification than 
personal and institutional advisers. Though they have not challenged the CCP’s political 
terms, they do not follow them as sincerely as personal advisers. Over the possible war 
across the Straits, they normally just avoid it or remark in passing and divert to another 
topic in their writings.
Liberals
Liberals are concerned with the reunification with Taiwan as well. Nationalism has
emerged as a leading ideological current behind China’s drive toward modernization and
even liberals are involved.209 Chinese liberals strive to achieve democracy in China, yet
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they agree with the CCP’s nationalistic position over Taiwan. They are not willing to 
sacrifice China’s territorial integrity for their political ideal. This nationalistic desire for
9 i nterritorial reunification is simply “poorly understood” in the US.
The US policies toward Taiwan have appeared to Chinese liberals as an effort to weaken 
their nation. Fundamental to the modem Chinese worldview and identity is the belief that 
Taiwan should be returned to China rather than exist as an independent country. Liberals, 
including exiled Chinese democratic activists, stand by this view. For instance, Wei 
Jingsheng, who spent years in jail for criticizing the CCP, stated at a press conference on
911his arrival in the US, “Taiwan is a territory that belongs to China.” Therefore liberals’ 
views are unsurprisingly in line with the CCP’s term minzu qinggan wenti (a question of 
national sentiments), despite the fact that they are against the CCP’s one-party rule.
In 2004, two famous liberals, Wang Dan and Wang Juntao, were accused by the Chinese 
media as collaborators with the pro-independence DPP. They were furious and moved 
heaven and earth to clear their name. The CCP’s intention was to link overseas Chinese 
dissidents with Taiwan's pro-independence activists in order to reduce the dissidents'
919influence at home and liberals dare not offend Chinese nationalist sentiments. 
Therefore their discourse cannot cut loose from nationalist flavour.
Conclusion
From the discussion in this section one can see, due to the Taiwan problem, that there are 
indeed strong nationalist sentiments among Chinese IR scholars that the US is anti- 
Chinese and a threat to the survival of China. The Chinese elite proclaim that the Taiwan 
issue is an entirely Chinese domestic problem and they are against any US interference. 
They deem it necessary to balance US military force in East Asia due to the Taiwan 
problem. The message of the Chinese elite is clear: when they feel that China’s territorial
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integrity is threatened by the US, they will fight.
Almost all Chinese IR scholars identify with the term minzu ganqing wenti (a question of
national sentiments), yet they have different approaches to tun bu xiaqu, buhui tun xiaqu
(can not and will not swallow it up) and baozha xing wenti (can not and will not swallow
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it up). Personal advisers think that the Taiwan problem will improve the CCP’s image as 
defender of Chinese sovereignty. They claim that Taiwan is standing in China’s way to 
become a great power, a long-time ambition, and the US is the staunchest backup for this 
island. In the eyes of personal and institutional advisers, in this scenario, it is utterly 
hypocritical for the Americans to label their China policy engagement, to openly 
announce that the US has no intention to hinder China's rise in the world. Most Chinese 
IR scholars from these two groups believe that what the Americans say does not hold 
water and that they just want to pay lip-service to China, covering their unhealthy if  not 
evil motive to dismember China.
The logic o f these IR scholars is thus: Taiwan's defiance against the Chinese central 
government, not least the Taiwanese Independence Movement, would limit, constrain, 
delay or even destroy China's agenda to rise in the 21st century. They believe that the US 
is virtually the only factor that China could not overcome to reunify Taiwan by fair 
means or foul, so it is, unlike what the Americans say in public, in reality carrying on its 
policy to contain rather than accommodate conditionally China's power accretion. 
Therefore, the US engagement policy is regarded quite naturally by personal and 
institutional advisers as a sort of containment. Personal and institutional advisers will not 
think of a powerful China in a real sense with the question of Taiwan still hanging over it.
One can see in this section that personal and institutional advisers closely follow the 
CCP’s formalized language. Where they differ is that personal advisers are more 
concerned with the interests of the CCP yet institutional advisers more with the interests 
of the nation and personal advisers have demonstrated more nationalist sentiments with 
their war warnings against the US.
Official intellectuals prefer peaceful reunification and have hinted that the dilemma of the 
Taiwan problem was actually caused by the CCP and the Taiwanese authority. If they 
dare to go a bit further from their present stance, they would suggest the CCP should re­
examine their One-China-and -Two-Systems policy. Their approach is more balanced 
and not as warlike as personal and institutional advisers. Official intellectuals have
occasionally twisted the party terms, particularly baozha xing wenti (can not and will not
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swallow it up), into a soft line. Liberals have different political agendas for China from 
scholars from other groups, yet they are also against Taiwan’s independence. It is on the 
Taiwan problem that they have displayed strong consensus with IR scholars from other 
groups.
2.3 US-Japan Security Alliance
In the 1990s, the CCP tried to generate a substantial victim complex and crisis 
consciousness over China’s sovereign integrity among the Chinese elite. Many CCP 
leaders insist that China needs a “strong government” to inspire the people with 
nationalism that will serve as a bulwark against outside threats.214 The CCP intended to 
draw on a sense of insecurity to suppress public demands for radical political reform 
and has increasingly emphasized its hundred-year history of national humiliation and
0 1 fkterritorial loss. It has encouraged the Chinese elite to focus on the suffering that China 
endured in modem history when Chinese territorial sovereignty was encroached upon by 
foreign powers and Japanese jingoism in particular. Appealing to the sense of China 
having been victimized by foreign aggressors in the past centres on Japan, the most 
important foreign aggressor in modem Chinese history.217 Chinese are not convinced by 
Katzenstein’s argument that Japan has evolved to a non-threatening and peace-loving 
state.218
21 Q
In the post-cold war era, Japan-US security alliance has adjusted its direction, yet not 
weakened, as some Chinese expected. In East Asia, the debate about the utility of US
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bilateral alliances and the presence of US forces is still on-going. The US has been 
strongly encouraging Japan to take on more military responsibility in Asia-Pacific area,
9 9 1
in the framework of the Japan-US security alliance. CCP leaders have become 
increasingly suspicious that a key motivation behind efforts by the US and Japan to
9 9 9
reinvigorate the Security Treaty is a desire to counter the rise of Chinese power. 
Therefore this security co-operation becomes the target of Chinese nationalism.
This section aims to examine Chinese IR scholars' interpretation of the CCP’s
formulations on the Japan-US security co-operation in a new era. I will firstly discuss the
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Japan-US security alliance from the perspective of US engagement, the content of the 
Japan-US security co-operation in the new era and China-Japan relations over this topic, 
and then present the official guidelines and Chinese IR scholars’ interpretations.
Japan-US Security Alliance in US Engagement
Many US scholars and policy-makers, including many in the engagement school, believe 
that economic engagement alone cannot guarantee China’s compliance with the 
international regime. Thus, security engagement is put forward by them to complement
993economic approach. From the US perspective, it is a fallback to protect vital US 
interests where engagement fails to do so. To achieve this goal, the US has built up a 
solid military foundation in conjunction with its Asian allies. Countries like Australia, 
Singapore, and South Korea are all included in the new US military arrangement,224 yet
9 9^
Japan plays the most important role.
In the Cold War strategic environment, the US deemed a military presence in Japan
9 9 /
essential. After the Cold War ended, the Japan-US security co-operation has been well 
maintained. It now takes on the challenge to discourage Chinese military adventurism by 
making the cost of such reckless activities unacceptably high to hard-liners in China. It is 
surely not directed at China alone, but also designed to bind Japan tightly to a bilateral 
security scheme and allow East Asian countries to put faith in America's balancing role in
997East Asia. By remaining a formidable force in Japan, the US will look serious and fully
9 9 0
committed in its effort to integrate China into the international community. This will 
overall add credit to the US engagement policy, in the eyes of East Asian countries other 
than China.229
Americans are basically at a loss as to how to reassure China that engagement is not
930subterfuge or strategic deception. So it is not surprising that a hedging strategy is 
viewed by the Chinese elite as more sinister and less driven by uncertainty about Chinese 
power than its proponents in the US and Japan claim. If the US and Japan use force to 
meddle in China’s sovereignty and internal affairs like Taiwan, China will certainly fight 
a war against aggression, thus leading to a major war against the US and Japan.231
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Japan’s domestic change has been conducive to the US engagement policy toward China 
in the post-cold war era. Japan witnessed many changes in security policy during the 
1990s. During the Gulf War, Japan faced bitter international criticism for not doing more 
than paying some US $13 billion to support the multilateral forces. Under the Shinfichi 
Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya Murayama administration, the Socialist Party abandoned its 
long-cherished policy of unarmed neutrality and adopted the policy of maintaining firmly 
the US-Japan Security Treaty. Under the Hashimoto administration, the “Japan-U.S. 
Joint Declaration on Security—Alliance for the 21st Century” was issued by the leaders 
of the two countries in April 1996. Under the Obuchi administration, the Diet passed the 
Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in situations in 
Areas Surrounding Japan in May 1999.
During the period of change, the turning point of US engagement policy was in February 
1995 when the Clinton administration released a report on the US East Asian security 
strategy. The report, known as the “Nye Initiative," announced that the Clinton 
administration would maintain its military presence in the Western Pacific at the level of 
about 100,000 for the foreseeable future. The key point of the Nye effort relevant to U.S.- 
China relations is “to leave open the possibility that Japan would use its military forces to 
assist the United States in the event o f American defence of Taiwan in the aftermath of a 
Chinese attack on the island-nation.” It was a tangible manifestation of a US initiative 
toward Japan motivated in part to alter policy thinking in China.
To some extent, the Nye Initiative locked China’s perception of the US engagement 
policy and US- Japan security alliance in the new era. The Japanese suggested that the 
Japan-US security alliance should be strengthened, as it is “a hedge against unforeseen 
circumstances and events, including the future rise of a clear-cut enemy”. However, 
the Chinese response is apparently suspicion. In the wake of the Cold War, CCP leaders 
expected that the US would have to scale down its military deployments in the region.234 
This judgment seemed to be right at least in the early 1990s. By the end of 1992, US 
forces had withdrawn from South-east Asia. Nevertheless, CCP leaders doubted that US 
forces would reduce their presence in East Asia. The Nye Initiative confirmed their
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perception that US phasing out of this region would not be the case and the Japan-US 
Security Alliance is now regarded as a threat to China’s security.
Japan-US Security Cooperation in New Era
In a time that saw the growth of distrust between China on the one hand and the US and 
Japan on the other, it is no surprise that the Clinton-Hashimoto declaration on April 16, 
1996, aroused strong concern among CCP leaders. It claims China was not an issue for 
those involved in the discussions. However, CCP leaders were suspicious that the 
alliance was in practice anti-Chinese. When they saw the draft, they drew the conclusion 
that it was a strategic arrangement designed to counter Chinese power. In their eyes, it 
meant that Americans had made up their minds to continuously buttress Japanese military 
forces, despite a wide range of disputes arising out of the bilateral trade relationship.
The Japan-US Declaration on Security covers in detail 5 practical issues, and the third 
one is widely viewed as targeting China. In CCP leaders’ view, the third issue of the new 
agreement is the most controversial. It is with regard to the expansion of the defending 
area that Japan-US security co-operation should operate. The Japan-US Security 
Cooperation Guidance, signed by the two countries in Nov. 1978, stipulates that the 
arrangement would include Japan, the Korean Peninsula and the Philippines. 
Nevertheless, the new agreement aims to include the adjacent area, which in the eyes of 
CCP leaders means to cover the Taiwan Straits. This rhetorical revision not surprisingly 
inflamed them and they accused the US of constructing an explicit anti-Chinese US- 
Japan alliance, as they believed that it aims to protect Taiwan if  there is a war across the 
straits.237
Some Japanese scholars argue in defence of the agreement that the adjacent area means in 
truth the sea lane for Japanese oil transportation particularly those channels in South-East 
Asia, and also the sea lane in the Indian Ocean. If there emerged conflicts in these areas, 
Japan would be responsible to provide necessary logistic assistance for the US army in 
battle. Nevertheless, CCP leaders are still alarmed that the Japan-US security co- 
operation would in fact include the Taiwan Straits. PLA leaders are even more certain 
of this.239
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China-Japan Relations
China-Japan relationship has always been troublesome. A typical case was the 
controversy over the war-time history between Japan and China. In the 1994 APEC 
summit meeting, Jiang Zemin had a meeting with Murayama and delivered a clear 
warning to Japan: “Militarism sometimes comes to the surface inside Japan,” and “Japan 
must reflect on its history and it is important that you educate your youth on this.”240 
Japan has been accused of whitewashing its past crime in textbooks. Japanese politicians 
have been accused of jingoism due to their visits to the Yasukuni Shrine where the “Class 
A” war criminals such as Tojo Hideki are enshrined and deified.
With China’s rise in economic and military force, there appears growing mutual distrust 
between Japan and China.241 The two sides even engage in war with each other in 
business, with nationalist flavour.242 Japan is currently seeking a permanent seat on the 
UN Security Council. China is very cautious about this move. With the government’s 
acquiescence, more than 22 million Chinese signed an on-line petition opposing Japan's 
bid since March 23 2005.
The Japanese response to China is tit for tat. The new edition of a social studies textbook 
for Japanese middle schools states the Diaoyu Islands, over which both China and Japan 
claim sovereignty, are a part of Japan's inherent territory historically and under 
international law. Japan has felt uneasy about China’s military development. In October 
1994, Japanese Defence Agency chief Tokuichiro Tamazawa told US Defence Secretary 
William Perry that Japan is “anxious about [an increase in] the transparency” of China’s 
defence budget.243 While China is planning to acquire more sophisticated weapons from 
the EU to establish its military advantage over Taiwan, Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary, 
Hiroyuki Hosoda, said on March 25 2005 that the lifting of the EU arms embargo on 
China would be a “big problem” for regional stability, which angered CCP leaders.
The CCP supports the victim complex among the Chinese elite, trying to overpower the
Japanese side in the bilateral relationship. A victimization discourse has occupied a key
position in Chinese nationalism.244 CCP leaders claim the Chinese were victims of
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Japanese jingoism in modem history and say only nationalism can offer China a haven 
from falling to the hands of Japanese imperialists again.245 Now the US tries to encourage 
Japan to boost its military capabilities in the framework of Japan-US security co­
operation, it has become the target of the new Chinese nationalism on a par with Japan.
Party Line
Due to the fact that the Japan-US security cooperation is built on a solid foundation, CCP 
leaders know there is little hope for them to dismpt it. The most accurate way of 
describing the CCP’s preferences about the US-Japan alliance is that it returns to its pre- 
1996 form and function, not that it disappears entirely.246 CCP leaders usually are careful 
to say that they oppose the strengthening or reinforcement of the US-Japan alliance, not 
the alliance’s existence per se.247
Nevertheless, the point to make here is, more importantly, the CCP entails an “external 
threat” linked with Japan that bullied China in modem history, so that the party can 
readily incite victim complex and national crisis consciousness among the Chinese elite 
when necessary. This is the main reason why the CCP uses tough rhetoric toward Japan 
and the US-Japan security alliance though it understands, at least partly, the balancing 
role of the US in East Asia.
In public the CCP claims that it does not appreciate the US as a balancing power in East 
Asia through Japan-US security co-operation. The party claims that the Japan-US 
military alliance is a pre-emptive arrangement aiming to contain China, a conspiracy 
designed by the US to weaken China. The CCP is said to be highly wary of the alleged 
raging jingoism in Japan and deny the positive role of the US in constraining Japanese 
aggressiveness, but rather, believe that the Americans are encouraging Japan to seek a 
more pro-active military role in East Asia if  not the world.
The official guidelines call on the Chinese people to guard against the reviving jingoism 
in Japan and appeals to historical lessons to be learnt from bilateral relations. Article 9 of 
the post-war Japanese Constitution states Japan renounces war as a sovereign right of the
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nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. Despite
94Rthis fundamental legal constraint, CCP leaders do not trust the Japanese government.
Deng Xiaoping thus said: “ ...it is the possibility that a handful of people in Japan...may 
revive militarism there — that is what the Chinese are concerned about.”249 Deng also 
tried to remind people of what the Chinese people had suffered from Japanese jingoism in 
the past and the territorial dispute centred on the Diaoyu Islands: “At various times Japan 
occupied many parts of our country; for 50 years it occupied Taiwan...In 1937 it 
launched a full-scale war that lasted for eight years...Japan inflicted untold damage upon 
China...If we were to settle historical accounts, it would be Japan that would owe China 
the most. Since Japan was defeated, China recovered all the places that had been 
occupied. The only outstanding issue is Senkaku Shoto [Diaoyu islands]...”
Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao (Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's Foreign 
Policy Thought) contributes in chapter 4 a section, Work to Develop Good Sino-Japanese 
Relations Generation after Generation, to the official position on the Sino-Japanese 
relationship. It starts with the importance of the bilateral relationship and then says: 
“ ...the main objective to stress history is learn historical lessons and make sure that past 
experiences, if  not forgotten, become a guide for the future.” It also says: “ ...on the 
alert against the tendency of a handful of Japanese to revive jingoism.” To the CCP, 
the integration of a fully rearmed Japan into the US global alliance network would be a
253worst-case scenario.
The three main formulations riben dui zhongguo de shanghai wufa guliang (Japan had 
inflicted untold damage upon China), qian shi bu wang hou shi zhi shi (past experiences, 
if  not forgotten, become a guide for the future), and jingti junguo zhuyi fu  huo (on the 
alert against the tendency that a handful of Japanese want to revive jingoism) aim to 
encourage victim complex and crisis consciousness among the Chinese people. Qian shi 
bu wang hou shi zhi shi (past experiences, if  not forgotten, become a guide for the future) 
means in Chinese “to remember past experiences and lessons might become the reference 
for future behaviour.”254 Jingti means keeping alert against the danger that could
r or/:
happen. Fuhuo means that something dead gains life again. Jingti junguo zhuyi
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fuhuo (on the alert against the tendency that a handful of Japanese want to revive 
jingoism) tries to remind the Chinese people of China’s modem history of humiliation 
and calls on them to face the danger around.
Personal Advisers
Personal advisers’ views on Japan-US security co-operation are ambiguous and 
inconsistent, yet the main theme is clear: never trust both the US and Japan as they are 
the origin of Chinese security problems. To personal advisers the 1996 US-Japanese 
security agreements appear to have broadened Japan’s strategic role in East Asia and to 
have provided US strategic support for Japanese politicians wishing to strike a military 
posture in the region less deferential to China than in the past. He Xin even warns of a 
possible war between China on the one side and the US and Japan on the other.
Wang Daohan appreciates Japanese economic achievement yet is on guard against its 
current security strategy to keep China at bay. His secretary, Zhang Nianchi, is often 
regarded as his mouthpiece. Zhang once said that the most obvious feeling of the 
Japanese to Chinese re-unification is fear and its the basic reason why Japan is glad to
o
collaborate with the US in security against China. Wang Daohan is also famous in 
China for his abomination of Japanese arrogance. His view has long been in line with the 
term riben dui zhongguo de sunhai wufa guliang (Japan had inflicted untold damage 
upon China). When he was the mayor of Shanghai in 1982, he intended in the first place 
to invite Japanese corporations to help Shanghai establish its motor industry, yet was 
furious when Japanese partners refused to do so due to their negative judgment of the 
Chinese market. Wang then turned to a German corporation and tried hard to make the 
joint venture a big success in China. He said: “their (Japanese) attitude greatly hurt my 
national pride, so I told my associates to arrange my visit to Germany as soon as 
possible.”259
As Ross observes, it is inevitable that the US and Japan will stand together against China
because it is the only regional power likely to challenge the security status quo in East
260Asia. However, shortly after the Tiananmen incident, He Xin made a judgment that
Japan could be used as China’s partner fighting against the US hegemony due to the
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disputes between Japan and the US over trade issues, regardless of the fact that Japan 
would not challenge the US security dominance. Though He Xin has always firmly 
believed that Japan’s strategy toward China is not friendly at all and it seeks to 
disintegrate China as well, he believes that China could break down the Western sanction 
on China through an olive branch offered to Japan. Nevertheless, at the end of last 
century, there was a twist in his thought. He warned the Chinese authority that there 
would be possibly a war between Japan and China in the near future. In fact, his 
inconsistent views on Japan demonstrate that the CCP’s approach to Japan is largely 
pragmatic and there has rarely been a clear and reasonable Japan policy in China. The 
CCP’s Japan policy has been mainly based on contingency.
He Xin strongly believes that the Japanese strategy towards China is “divide and rule.” 
He says: “ I must point out that Japan, as with the US and other Western powers, is 
waiting for this situation to arise. Its ultimate objective is, first, to disintegrate China, and 
then incorporate selectively and gradually the pieces after the disintegration into a new 
world system, as an economic and political dependant.” However, He Xin also deems 
that China can take advantage of the clash between Japan and the US. He says: “ The 
reason why the US pays particular attention to Chinese affairs is to keep alert and guard 
against the alliance between China and Japan, to constrain the rise of Japan and Western 
Pacific economic powers, apart from the tendency that China would potentially become a 
modem industrial power. Nevertheless, under the current situation where the world will 
face earthquake-like change, the Japanese and Chinese governments should, if  they are 
wise enough, understand that they both face the US strategic threat and share a common 
lot.” He even says: “In fact, the US almost undoubtedly will focus on Japan as the next 
strategic target after solving the China problem. The US would probably mount a global 
movement to comprehensively squeeze, compress and restrain Japanese economic 
expansion.”263
Nevertheless, in late 1998 he claimed that Japan and China could engage in another war
and called on the CCP to become aware of the danger. He says: “Due to the Japanese
despising Chinese military technologies and the enormous Japanese potential in the areas
of military and high technologies, it is not impossible that Japan becomes
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comprehensively militarised and jingoistized in high technologies. Japan has prepared 
this strategy in its society’s ideology and public opinion. In Japanese high-level political 
and economic circles (particularly financial capitalists), there are deeply rooted right 
wing forces that have been paving the way for this. There is a great possibility that Japan 
and China would be at war in the future.” 264 Obviously he follows the term jingti junguo 
zhuyi fuhuo (on the alert against the tendency that a handful of Japanese want to revive 
jingoism).
Personal advisers worry that Japan blocks China’s rise. To counter the Japan-US 
security alliance, He Xin deems that it is applicable for China to collaborate with 
Russia. CCP leaders took his advice and established a regional security organization in 
conjunction with Russia. In 1996, China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan 
established the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO). A sixth member, Uzbekistan, 
joined the group afterwards. The original Shanghai Five was established “for the express 
purpose of: working out extant border disputes peacefully...co-ordinating and co­
operating about cross-border security due to the terrorist, separatist and criminal activities 
that had been plaguing each other in the border areas.” However, in the US it is widely 
believed that this organization aims to counter the US influence in Central Asia.
Institutional Advisers
The low level of contact between China and Japan after 1945 is a factor contributing to
Chinese perception of Japan. Lack of understanding of Japanese domestic politics
leads institutional advisers to perceive a militant Japan. Nevertheless, the decisive factor
is the CCP’s nationalistic guidance and agitation. Institutional advisers have followed the
CCP’s formulation jingti junguo zhuyi fuhuo (on the alert against the tendency that a
handful of Japanese want to revive jingoism) and greatly denounced the Japanese
jingoism and the US support for its revival. It is said that, facing the rise of China, in the
eyes of political leaders in the ROK and Russia rising Chinese power is not as much of a
concern in their security policies as it is for Japan and the US, even though in material
structural terms they ought to be more worried about China’s power gain, which
underscores the problems with a neo-realist explanation for regional responses to Chinese
power. Institutional scholars claim that the reason is understandable: the US and Japan
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do not accept China’s power increase. These specialists have noted recent changes in 
Japanese attitudes toward China and judged that China appeared likely to meet even more 
opposition and gain less support from Japan as it sought to expand its influence in world
97ftaffairs. They claim that there is a conspiracy to contain China behind the Japan-US 
security cooperation, and the US is trying hard to incite Japanese jingoism. Nevertheless, 
few of them predict a war between China and Japan as personal advisers do.
Many institutional advisers assert Americans have a secret plan to weaken if  not divide 
and control China. Wang Jincun says that Japan-US security cooperation is a part of this
971conspiracy. Wang is not alone among institutional advisers to take this rhetoric. After 
NATO bombed the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999, popular nationalism ran so 
high that many college students took to the streets again, which was certainly unusual 
since 1989. From the CCP’s perspective, the US was entirely guilty if not evil to do this, 
whatever motive it harboured.
It is against this background that, at the end of last century, institutional advisers began to 
promote a big conspiracy that was said to be forged by the US against China and other 
continental countries. Wang Jincun contends that waging a war against Yugoslavia is 
certainly the breakthrough and test field for the strategy of the US global military 
invasion. With hegemonism in mind, Americans find out that there are potential 
competitive rivals if  not enemies, so the US authority tries to trade on its present 
economic, technological and military advantages to annihilate all the potential threats in 
embryo.
Wang says that it is with this in mind that the US has established its global military 
invasion strategy. It seems to Wang that the objective is mainly some continental 
countries like Russia, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, not least China, the only 
communist power with enormous economic and military capabilities. Targeting these 
countries, the US takes in the west front the policy of NATO expansion to East and South 
Europe; and in the east front, the US has finished its strategic encirclement of China and 
North Korea, through measures such as revising Japan-America security co-operation,
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defining the new guidance, gearing up its military capacities in East Asia and South-East 
Asia, and constructing TMD projects in conjunction with Japan and South Korea.
Some institutional advisers claim that TMD is a crucial part of this project. Institutional 
advisers show their worries that the plan of TMD will be a major step toward deployment 
of a ballistic missile defence system to defend continental America, which will nullify 
China’s nuclear deterrent capability. They “stressed that US sales of TMD systems to 
Taiwan would cause serious and unprecedented disruptions in Sino-American
973relations.’” They note that containment against China that centred on TMD has begun 
to take place. Chen Chao says: “Following that (Japan-US Security Treaty), the US has 
promoted so-called TMD to Japan and South Korea...Specialists think that the objective 
of TMD is in fact China. America is also planning to include Taiwan into TMD...The 
situation mentioned above shows that the strategic arrangement of American
” 974encirclement and containment against China is carrying on as planned
With the conspiracy theory in minds, institutional advisers assert that the US is obviously 
trying to boost Japanese forces in order to check the rise of China, in its own favour. 
From the Chinese side, the best situation for its security is that the US would begin to 
reduce its military forces in East Asia yet Japan would continue to keep its peaceful 
constitution forced upon them by General MacArthur. Between a formidable yet stable 
force of America and a militant and aggressive Japan, undoubtedly the CCP would prefer 
the former. What worries institutional advisers most is that a number of US IR scholars 
and even its political leaders begin to consider cutting down its spending on military 
forces in Japan and in the same breath encouraging Japan to take on more security 
responsibility. The last thing CCP leaders want to see is this scenario. They prefer to see
9 7 c
Japan as a lame duck economic power in East Asia.
Gu Qingsheng’s view is quite representative of the understanding of institutional advisers
of so called “US incitement.” In China Can Say No, a book written by some journalists
closely related to CASS, he contributes an article called Americans Teaching Japanese
Yes or No, which shows people his apprehension that the Americans would be trying
hard to encourage jingoism which wrought immeasurable suffering on people in China in
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the past. Gu Qingsheng maintains that many Japanese are still hesitant to abandon their 
present constitution and rely heavily if not completely on its SDF for Japan’s security. 
Under present circumstances, the US policy is beyond dispute the most decisive. If the 
US carries its policy in the Cold War toward Japan and continues to keep the ghost at 
bay, Japan would still be a peaceful and constructive force in East Asia; if  vice versa, 
Japan would surely turn out to be the greatest threat to regional stability, not least China’s 
peripheral security. Institutional advisers claim that, for better or for worse, the US holds 
the key to the issue of war and peace with China. They claim that Chinese largely watch 
what the US would do to China and make their responses and adjustments accordingly.
onnIt is the same case in Japan’s US policy. Therefore the US should be mainly blamed 
for the worsening of security environment in East Asia.
In this article, Gu refers to an academic discussion among three people: a US scholar, 
Morse, a Japanese journalist and a Japanese professor. The American Morse is portrayed 
as an evil instructor who intends to whip up the distrust of Japanese against China. Morse 
wants the Japanese to clearly understand that the target of Japan-US security and defence 
cooperation should be China. In his view, Taiwan is of more significance to Japan than 
the US, as far as their national interests are concerned. He argues that, if Japan continues 
to rely exclusively on the US for security, sooner or later, the economic and security 
system in East Asia would fall apart and hence put Japan’s national interests at massive 
risk. Therefore, Morse encourages the Japanese to expand their military forces.
Morse comes out with a quite unusual argument that the Americans do not 
wholeheartedly respect Japan since it is not a normal country in terms of international 
law. He contends that Americans pay tribute to a country’s strength, independence and 
accountability rather than full obedience. Gu regards Morse’s argument as a sheer evil 
incitement against China. To Gu, it does not make any sense to say that the US respects 
China but not Japan because China is a powerful rival that competes allegedly with the 
US for dominance in East Asia and Japan has succumbed to US foreign policy. Gu says: 
“This sort of American-style education aims without doubt to incite the Japanese, who 
need America’s protection and vie with Americans for interests as well, to clearly
understand that America could get rid of this ally and contain Japan with its rival China.
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Nevertheless, what is more in their minds seems to let Japan strengthen its national
97Rdefence, learn defence economy model from America."
Is it necessary for the Americans to be so on their guard against China? Institutional 
advisers like Yan Xuetong proclaim the US security alert against China unreasonable. 
Yan highly appreciates China’s positive role as a balancing power to counter the 
dominance of Japan-US security alliance in East Asia and argues that China is not a 
threat to regional stability. In his view, the current asymmetric system in the Asia- 
Pacific is dominated by the US-Japan alliance. The rise of China will help restore a 
balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region and reduce the dangers inherent in the 
domination of just one power.
Official Intellectuals
In terms of nationalist sentiments toward the US-Japan security alliance, official 
intellectuals and personal and institutional advisers are in the same league, yet official 
intellectuals’ views are much more balanced than those o f personal and institutional 
advisers. They keep a distance from the CCP’s term qian shi buwang hou shi zhi shi (past 
experiences, if not forgotten, become a guide for the future) and do not pay as close 
attention to the crimes committed by the Japanese in the past as official and institutional 
advisers. They twist the term junguo zhuyi fuhuo (the tendency that a handful of Japanese 
want to revive jingoism) into something like the Japanese aspiration for more 
international responsibilities. Due to this approach, official scholars like Shi Yinhong 
who argue for a softer line toward Japan have been accused by a number of institutional 
advisers as “traitors”.
Official intellectuals accept the CCP’s official line that Japan-US security co-operation 
targets China. Zhang Dalin says that, after the end of the Cold War, the target o f the
9R0Japan-US security regime has dramatically changed. It used to be the Soviet Union, but 
now changes to the regional risk in East Asia, in the main against China and North Korea. 
Yet they deem it understandable from the perspective of geopolitical theories.
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Many official intellectuals are interested in Nicholas Spykman, who saw three great 
centres of world power: the Atlantic coastal regions of North America, Europe and the 
Far-Eastern coastland of Eurasia. They hold that Spykman's theory remarkably suits US 
geopolitical interests, a crucial guidance to counter any great power arising out of 
Eurasia. From their perspective, Kennan can to some extent be regarded as a follower of 
Spykman. Kennan believed in the necessity of a tight containment of the Eurasian power 
from the peripheral area. Most official intellectuals claim that the US victory in the Cold 
War is virtually the success of this peripheral area theory championed by Spykman and 
Kennan.
From their perspective, the practice of the peripheral area theory has not come to an end 
yet. Official intellectuals argue that, though the Soviet Union collapsed, the US could not 
yet fulfil its ambition to control the whole world, since another continental power, 
namely, China, is growing stronger and stronger as the result of its cheap and high- 
quality labour force in the world market. In their opinion, in this scenario, it is indeed 
natural for China to be tightly surrounded by the US. These official intellectuals claim 
that the Americans are getting unsurprisingly worried about the coming challenge from 
China in the Asia-Pacific region, and China does indeed challenge the US dominance in 
Asia-Pacific region.
They also note that geopolitics play an important role in the Japanese perception of 
China. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, strategic thinkers in the Japanese 
government focused more on China’s rising power as the key regional security concern
no t
for Japan in the foreseeable future. Official intellectuals agree that Chinese control of 
Taiwan would alarm Japanese military planners, giving China a presence along Japan's
989shipping routes and abutting its Ryukyu Island chain. The PLA’s activities in South
9 0 0
China Sea adds to this concern.
They have noted the role of Japan’s domestic politics in Japan-US security alliance. They 
agree that “a vast majority of the Japanese people came to share the understanding that 
their country must take on a greater security responsibility in proportion to its economic
9 8 Apower”. Political and generational change in Japan has diluted the influence of older
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pro-China factions in the LDP and brought a younger generation into positions of 
political power that is alienated by China’s use of the history card to bash Japan. With 
a growing role for NGOs in Japan's civil society and its foreign relations, there are now 
more voices inside Japan critiquing China from a liberal perspective on human rights. 
With the new change in mind, official intellectuals agree with Rozman about the 
contradictions between those advocating a “predominantly engagement” strategy and 
those supporting a “predominantly containment” approach which sharpened during the 
1990s.286
Pang Zhongying, a scholar at Nankai University, acknowledges the change of Japan’s 
domestic politics in China-Japan relations. He says:“ ‘perfect timing’ of the global post- 
Cold War politics and the US super first class status in particular, ‘right place’ in East 
Asia where international pattern is under dramatic change, ‘right support’ from the new 
gradually rising nationalism among the Japanese make those who propose to do away 
with pacifism and establish a ‘normal country’ of strong military strength, well accepted
987in society.” Generation change in Japan gives birth to new perceptions of international 
relations. For instance, these young generation leaders take different approaches to 
Taiwan. Li Denghui, a traitor in the CCP’s eyes, is regarded as a grandfatherly wise man 
by many young Japanese politicians.288 Pang has also noted the Japanese perception 
change on regional security. He says: “The Korean peninsular problem has got worse in 
the last 5 years. In the era of mass media, Japanese nationals have ‘personally’ sensed 
‘security threat’ from a neighbouring country that has nuclear weapons and missile- 
striking capabilities and they might readily believe the right-wing policy proposal that
980Japan must ‘save itself in security’ (strike North Korea in pre-emption).”
Some official intellectuals even try to justify the Japan-US security co-operation to the 
advantage of China. East Asia is a region lacking international institutions. International 
institutional perspective is generally regarded as the product of neo-liberalism, combined 
with some elements of neo-realism. The international institutional perspective stresses 
formal and informal institutions formed between and among states to push forward co­
operation and further their mutual interest for survival.290 If one looks at East Asia from
this perspective, pessimism will prevail over East Asian security co-operation. Problems
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such as weakness of regional security mechanism, short history in international security 
co-operation, salient conflicting rather than common security interest, diverse culture and
901lack of any sense o f community etc contribute to regional instability. Some official 
intellectuals begin to appreciate the positive role of US-Japan security alliance as a 
regional institution in East Asia. They agree that the alliance has both restrained and
9Q9facilitated Japan’s defence capability and its regional security role. As long as the US 
presence is viewed as restraining Japan from pursuing an independent military capability,
90“^it will be seen as contributing to regional stability.
Following the international institutional perspective, Zhang Linhong from Beijing 
University and Han Yugui from Shandong Normal University believe that Japan-US 
security co-operation has two positive points. Firstly, they consider that it could prevent 
the proliferation of mass destructive weapons in Asia that would weaken China’s 
peripheral security. They deem that this is actually a common ground for China-US 
security interests.294 They also point out that Japan-US security co-operation is a useful 
instrument to keep Japanese jingoism at bay. They say that, while the core objective of 
the US in Asia Pacific after the end of the Cold War is to prevent the rising China from 
challenging US dominance, “the US could keep its influence on Japan, entangle it and 
guard against it becoming a dominant power on its own, through strengthening the 
security relationship between Japan and the US.”295 Their perception is that China need 
not view the Japan-US security alliance as inherently hostile to its interests. “Under some 
circumstances they can be considered useful or at least harmless.”296Some official 
intellectuals have noted that the Bush administration “has been careful to balance its 
strong pro-Japanese slant with reaffirmation of continued interest in closer mutually
907beneficial relations with China designed in part to sustain regional peace and stability.” 
Liberals
The Chinese image of the US and Japan has been in continual decline since the mid-
1990s. According to the Beijing Area Study, a randomly-sampled survey conducted by
the Research Centre on Contemporary China at Beijing University, the mean temperature
towards Japan on a 100-degree feeling thermometer has dropped to 36 degrees in 2001
from 51 degrees in 1998. The mean level of warlikeness on a 1-7-point peaceful-to-
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warlike scale attributed to the Japanese in 2001 was 4.2, to Americans 3.7 and to the 
Chinese people, 1.5. On certain issues relating to Japan, even Chinese liberals take a 
nationalist stance. They are not only against the CCP but also worry about the integrity of 
China’s sovereignty.
Shortly after the Sixteenth Party Congress in late 2002, a famous liberal, Ma Licheng, 
published an article advocating the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations.299 He argued 
that Chinese had not adequately recognized antimilitarist trends in Japan and suggested 
that China and Japan should embark on a more co-operative path. Ma has noted that an 
unhealthy anti-Japanese hatred is widespread in China. Ma proceeds to a broader critique 
of the popular nationalism that emerged in the 1990s. Ma’s solution is simple: “We need 
the generosity of a great and victorious nation and do not need to be excessively harsh 
with Japan.”300 Arguing that “the apology question has been resolved,” Ma urges both 
Chinese and Japanese to “overcome parochial views” and “look forward” in the bilateral 
relationship.301 His article stirred a great deal of interest in both China and Japan, but the 
CCP has not taken any important initiatives to improve the relationship. Ma was kicked 
out of his unit “People’s Daily”.
Nevertheless, even a liberal like him does not make any concessions to the Japanese over 
the Diaoyu Islands. In an interview by nan feng chuang, he maintained that “our 
government’s approach that China has a clear position and does not readily appeal to 
arms is right.” His opinion is that the Diaoyu Islands belongs to China yet the Chinese 
should settle this dispute with Japan through diplomacy rather than war.
Another famous liberal, Liu Xiaobo, has showed his anger over the CCP’s repression 
upon Chinese people’s rights to demonstrate their grievance over Japanese jingoism. He 
says: “ Over matters like damage claims from Japan, fighting against Japanese 
politicians’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, demanding the Japanese government’s formal 
apology for its crime committed in WWII...only in China that was most greatly harmed 
by the Japanese invasion has the spontaneous rights-defending protest movement in 
society against the Japanese government been given the cold shoulder and oppressed all 
along by the CCP authority.” He blames the CCP for not being nationalist enough.
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Conclusion
From this section one can see that, if  the CCP stresses the importance of China’s 
territorial integrity, its strategy to call for victim complex and crisis consciousness will be 
successful, yet not all Chinese IR scholars equally share the concerns about the 
strengthening of the US-Japan alliance. There is an ongoing debate among Chinese IR 
scholars about how worried China should be and what countermeasures are required to 
cope with adjustments in the alliance.304 Different groups of IR scholars defend China’s 
security in different degrees of nationalist tone. Once again one could see the different 
interpretation approaches of Chinese IR scholars to the CCP’s party line. On the Japan- 
US security co-operation, personal advisers’ views are the most radical and emotional yet 
ambiguous and inconsistent, which shows that the CCP has not found a clear strategy 
towards the Japan-US security alliance. Institutional advisers voice their support for the 
party line and denounce Japanese jingoism and the US conspiracy as well, though their 
views are not as emotional and radical as that of personal advisers. Official intellectuals 
try to address this issue in a balanced way from theoretical perspectives, are willing to 
understand the Japan-US security alliance from a Japanese perspective and even try to 
call on the Chinese to put history behind them and acknowledge Japan’s aspiration for 
more international responsibilities. To some degree they even appreciate the positive role 
of the US in checking Japanese jingoism. Liberals propose to regard Japan-China 
relations in a new way yet they are also firm defenders of China’s territory.
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Chinese foreign policy and how Chinese IR scholars treat the party line and interpret it in 
their own ways.
If there is a relatively strong consensus over security issues, that is not the case over 
political issues. Politics is essentially about power distribution and political values. Under 
the influence of nationalism, the CCP is sensitive to China’s political gain or loss i.e. 
power status change in the world. Increasing power status is regarded as beneficial to the 
CCP’s legitimacy though it is not as decisive as territorial control or economic 
achievement, therefore the CCP tries to stress that China is indeed a great power and has 
become or at least is becoming a “pole” in the post-cold war era. The CCP also tries to 
defend the current Chinese political system and values in order to maintain the 
righteousness and advantage of the communist rule. As the CCP is not at all confident o f 
its ruling status it tries to establish a buffer zone for China in international politics, so that 
its ruling status might continue to be protected in a stable international environment.
This research has found out that there are much stronger tensions about political issues 
among different groups of Chinese IR scholars and official intellectuals take views much 
more distant from the CCP’s party line over political issues than personal and 
institutional advisers.
3.1 Multi-polarity
The author will start with the CCP’s formalized language over multipolarity,1 a code 
word used by CCP leaders to show their national pride and crisis consciousness, and 
express their concerns about China’s power status in the world. Despite some arguments
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against the concept of “unipolarity”, some US scholars who take realist criteria for 
measurement conclude that the post-Cold War world is a US-dominated unipolar 
system. They believe that it is based on this superiority that the US can afford to engage 
China. In this scenario, they fail to note the domestic needs of the term multipolarity and 
claim this approach largely aims to undermine the US “unipolar moment.”4
Regarding the US engagement policy, the CCP is still on the defensive yet tries to portray 
an image of a state in control in the bilateral relationship. The term “multipolarity” well 
suits the party’s needs. In the framework of multipolarity, CCP leaders take the realist 
concept “balance of power” to demonstrate China’s capability to check the US as a 
responsible “great power” in the world5 and to firm up China’s national interests.6 
Following this term, they believe that adherence to sovereignty will protect the CCP’s 
vulnerable position from any external encroachment.
CCP leaders have stood for a multi-polar world for a long time. During the Cold War 
period, China allied with the US to check China’s then greatest threat the Soviet Union
n
and the strategic triangle approach worked well to the advantage of China. In the 1990s,
o
the CCP believed that four nations threatened China: Russia, India, Japan and the US. 
With both internal and external threats looming large, the CCP hoped the global pattern 
of power would gradually shift to a multipolar world in which the CCP would survive in 
a more comfortable international environment.9 The party tried to convince the Chinese 
people that “the world has been moving with a dizzying pace toward multipolarity.”10 
Nevertheless, CCP leaders themselves have not dwelled on self-deception. They point 
out, “The world . . .  is still full of contradictions. Hegemonism and power politics are the 
roots of instability in the world.”11
Some Western scholars fail to see the CCP’s real intention behind the term multi-polarity 
and remark that the Chinese elite are too materialist and narrowly state-centric, focusing 
on the tangible capabilities of polar states. In their eyes, CCP leaders fail to take into
19account the emerging normative structure of international politics and they are still far
1 ^from accepting a post-Cold War framework of globalisation.
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The external role of the term multipolarity is largely directed at the US as, in terms of 
external pressure, the US is still the largest concern of the CCP.14 Though the CCP 
understands that it is impossible for China to find an ally among great powers including 
Japan, EU, Russia and India, the party still hopes China can become their “partner” to 
reduce the US dominance in the framework of multipolarity. The party does not expect 
these powers to “balance” the US in conjunction with China, yet believes closer relations 
with these states help alleviate its tension with the US.
Most CCP leaders consider balance of power from two angles. Firstly, they regard it as a 
sort of strategic foreign policy, as Britain did in the 19 century toward Europe. 
However, history reveals that balance of power is more an ideal than a fact.16 In this vein 
it is suggested that CCP leaders have inherited the traditional Chinese way of preserving
17security by “pitting barbarian against barbarian”.
Secondly, they regard it as a relatively static situation in the short run, for instance, when
1 ftthey use this concept to describe the present world politics. In the eyes of CCP leaders, 
because the capabilities of nation states are all the while changing, if  one sees it from a 
long period the rise and fall of the great powers is quite natural. While a country is in the 
process of rise, its capabilities are steadily getting larger; therefore the other great powers 
have to tackle this phenomenon and adjust accordingly their own foreign policies in order 
to safeguard their own national interests. Considering China’s rapid economic growth, 
the CCP is aware of the danger of being balanced by other powers and tries hard to 
suppress the China threat theory.
Many Americans ignore the term multipolarity’s domestic appeal and stress its external 
orientation to the US. Some even exaggerate the danger of this approach taken by China. 
Even scholars who are considered “pro-engagement” point to the term multipolarity as 
indicative of a fundamental clash of interests with the US desire to preserve its global and 
regional pre-dominance.19 In 1998 the US DoD claimed that, although China has no plan 
to lead a faction or bloc of nations in directly challenging US power or its international
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oc\political activities, certain of its other policies are designed to achieve the same result. 
Americans believe that these policies aim to halt further expansion of US power in Asia 
as, it is suggested, in the CCP’s view, the strengthening of US power enables the US to 
influence world events in ways that are potentially harmful to China, including an 
enhanced US ability to intervene in China's internal affairs and prevent Taiwan's
91reunification with the mainland.
Party Line
In Deng’s opinion, the theory of a multi-polar world, on the one hand, can alert CCP 
members to keep united for survival given its world view that nation states exist in a 
world full of conflicts and struggle; on the other hand, can reduce the US dominance and 
give China more international political space. Deng tried to establish among the Chinese 
people an image of a secure and powerful China in a challenging world and virtually 
regarded the multi-polar world theory as a crucial international political instrument to
99achieve this end. Deng was confident of China’s role in a multi-polar world. His idea of
9*5
multi-polarity is based on rosy projections of Chinese economic and military growth. At 
the end of the Cold War, he said: “In the so-called multi-polar world, China too will be a 
pole. We should not belittle our own importance: one way or another, China will be 
counted as a pole.”24 For Deng, a state with superior cultural achievements is entitled to
9 ^esteem and influence in the world, which demonstrates his national pride. From what 
Deng said, one can surely know that he would not agree with Segal as to China’s world
9 f\status, and he was absolutely confident of China's great power status and uniqueness.
In chapter II of Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao (Introduction to Deng 
Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Thought), there is a section regarding the formulation “multi­
polarity.” It tries to highlight Deng Xiaoping's ideas on the change of the post-Cold War 
international system. “Comrade Deng Xiaoping held that, 'now the old pattern is
97changing, yet never comes to an end, the new pattern has not taken shape.'" This section 
goes on, proclaiming that multi-polarity is on the rise. "The progress and change of the 
post-Cold War world situation has fully justified comrade Deng Xiaoping's wise 
prediction that the world pattern will progress toward multi-polarity. Today, against the
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background of a variety of powers in the world splitting up and re-assembling, when 
international relations are still in deep adjustment, the trend of multi-polarity of the world 
has made new progress, either at the global and district level or in political and economic
9 o
fields...A variety of countries have admitted that the world multi-polarity is a trend." 
This judgment made by the CCP becomes overwhelmingly the fundamental guidance of 
Chinese IR scholars' research on the nature of the post-Cold War international system. 
This section analyses the strengths of the US, EU, Japan, Russia and the third world and 
China, and claims that the US hegemony surely stands in the world's way to achieve that. 
It is China's responsibility to reduce the US hegemony and help make multi-polarity take
9 Q
place in the world. In section two of chapter three, the CCP then calls on the Chinese 
people to fight against hegemonism, obviously targeting the US. In view of China’s 
strength, one can tell the exaggeration and strong nationalist pride behind it.
Deng’s judgment that China is surely one pole in the world set the keynote for the CCP’s 
party line on China’s world status. The ji in duo j i  hua (multi-polarization) means in 
Chinese “either of the extremities, north or south, of the earth, or either of the two 
terminals, positive and negative, of an electric cell or a magnet.”31 When the CCP uses 
the formulation duo j i  hua (multi-polarization), it tries to demonstrate a strong sense of 
national pride plus crisis consciousness and highlight four important ideas: firstly, China
T9is a great power on the world stage; secondly, China is facing a challenging world and 
national interests of world powers clashing among one another; thirdly, world powers 
differ in values; fourthly, the pattern is an objective that China should strive for, still 
developing.
The CCP claim that, to achieve duo j i  hua (multi-polarization), China should and has the 
capabilities to fight hegemonism. Taking advantage of Chinese experiences in the recent 
past, CCP leaders claim a hegemonic power is more likely to use its wealth and influence
TTfor its own interests than for public good. The term fight hegemonism has expressly 
displayed the duality of the party’s call for multipolarity, with China both as a state in an 
unsafe world and as a great power in international politics, though currently the latter 
overpowers the former.34
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Personal Advisers
How do Chinese IR scholars respond to this party line? Personal advisers identify with 
the duality o f the term of duo j i  hua (multi-polarization), yet their focus is on the danger 
from outside and the US in particular. They see a relative decline in US power and the 
rise of China, so that the world will be “multi-polar”, yet they believe China is still in a 
dangerous world, similar to the Warring States era. They call on the Chinese people 
boldly and wisely to defend China’s interests in the world.
He Xin views it as crucial to secure and boost China’s image as a great power in the 
world, but he seldom uses this term. He prefers the term “late Warring States period” in 
Chinese history when several powers brutally fought each other. This term can show 
China’s rising power, and in the meantime demonstrate personal advisers’ worry about 
the CCP’s capability to survive in a tough world, revealing their high identification of 
“fight hegemony”. He said in 2002: “Recently, there have emerged two strategic 
thoughts-Tianheng’and ‘hezong’-in contemporary international geopolitics, which is 
extremely similar to the international political situation displayed by the late Warring 
States period in China.”36 He also said in 1990: “It is worth noting that the general 
situation of the world after the dramatic change in the Soviet Union and East Europe is 
amazingly similar to the situation of the late Warring States period in ancient history, 
during which six powers clashed with one another while one power dominated, though 
there are great difference between them in nature and scale.” The dominant power was 
the despotic Qin Kingdom during the Warring States period and now it is the US in the 
world.
-jo
He Xin highlights the balance of power role in the multi-polarity proposition. 
Compared with institutional advisers and official intellectuals, he is more inclined to the 
“balancing” role of this approach, though he knows the difficulty of China finding an ally 
to balance the US. From his perspective, the main reason for this is that the present 
international environment leaves China little room to manoeuvre in favour of its national 
interests, though there are many other ways of dealing with a dominant power.
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Nevertheless, the US has plenty of choices for its global strategy.40 Western democracies 
form the core in world politics, the “great power society,” wherein members embrace 
democratic values, subscribe to liberal economic ethos and share an “in-group” 
mentality.41 China can neither influence effectively the US China policy from within nor 
check the US dominance with the support of international institutions.
Personal advisers’ judgment that China is in a hostile world drives them to take self- 
centred and “wise” measures to defend China’s national interests. They have highly 
militarized the party line of multi-polarity, which can be seen from their politicization of 
international affairs including economic issues. In the era of economic interdependence 
they stress economic “competition” in a multi-polar world. They believe that a wise way 
to fight the US hegemony is to gain more economic edge through economic 
competition.42 Wang Daohan prefers to use the term guoji jingzheng (international 
competition) to highlight Chinese crisis consciousness and highlight more conflict in a 
multi-polar world. He believes that “the world is moving toward the direction of multi­
polarity”.43 Obviously he follows the party line as to this matter, yet he points out, “in the 
meantime...the competition among nations has already switched more to competition of 
comprehensive national power based on economy and led by science and technology.”44 
In his view, the objective of nation states in economic competition is power-struggle- 
oriented.
In personal advisers’ opinion, economic expansion as an effective instrument to increase 
China’s power should be subject to China’s political needs. If need be economic benefits 
can be sacrificed to ensure political gains. They believe a small number of countries 
adopt hegemonism and they are not willing to see the rise of China. In Liu Ji’s view 
China should get ready for temporary economic setbacks due to political reasons. He 
claims that the struggle between China and these western countries would never come to 
an end.45 In other words, it is a long-term task for China to fight hegemony.
Because they analyse international affairs mainly from a political stance, it is not 
surprising that they find far more conflicts than co-operation in the international
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community. Much as China would like to completely step out of the shadow of Mao’s 
class struggle theory, it is still a one-party-system country and sticks to socialism with 
Chinese characteristics, clashing with liberal democracies in its political system.
For instance, in Liu Ji’s view, power struggle in the age of multi-polarity will produce 
more conflicts in international economic affairs. While discussing economic 
interdependence, personal advisers do not forget to remind CCP leaders of the danger 
from outside as they are worried that economic globalisation “could very well derail 
China’s quest for great power status.”46 Like Wang Daohan, Liu Ji regards economic 
growth as an effective weapon for power struggle in international politics.47
Institutional Advisers
Institutional advisors follow the party line and help raise China’s image as a great power, 
blame the US for China’s pursuit of multi-polarity and regard it as China’s self-defence. 
They take more practical approaches upon this formulation, as it is their responsibility to 
tell the central party, as a pole, exactly what China’s relationship with the US is in a 
multi-polar world and how to fight hegemonism. They claim that life under US 
hegemony will be neither peaceful nor liberal, as unchecked power will surely abuse its
4Xpower. Nevertheless, most of them do not come up with any aggressive measures to 
fight against US power on the world stage but rather advocate defending China on the 
domestic front.
Yan Xuetong is a scholar who focuses on power politics,49 and who defends the 
hegemony-anti-hegemony model in Sino-US relations in order to maintain China’s great 
power status. He claims that the US has been seeking hegemony ever since the end of the 
Cold War.50 In this scenario, countries like China and Russia have no choice other than 
taking measured policies to prevent a world dominated by the US.51 Yan deems that the 
task China is facing is extremely difficult as the US hegemony takes a new form i.e. 
institutional one that is different from historical hegemonies. “The foundation of 
institutional hegemony is strength plus international norms, therefore the US has been 
continuously promoting the establishment of new international norms after the Cold
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War.” Therefore, given China’s different political system from the West, Yan agrees 
that the CCP should be aware that the clash between China and the US hegemony is 
almost inevitable.
Then, under the US pressure, how to fight hegemonism? What institutional advisers 
advocate is largely domestic effort. They link this formulation with a concept in vogue 
called CNP (comprehensive national power,), which can be measured numerically in their 
eyes. They argue that China might improve their CNP as quickly and enormously as 
possible to boost multi-polarity in which China is a pole, different from personal 
advisers’ approach that calls for manoeuvre among great powers. When they talk about 
polarity, they think from the angle of politics in general. To them, a pole means a great 
power, either a nation state or a regional union like the EU, with global influence. This 
influence comes from the comprehensive national power, which is measurable, of these 
powers.
Institutional advisers use a basket of factors to study CNP, including economic, political, 
technological, cultural and social issues. Some institutional scholars have even designed a 
set of complicated mathematical formulae to calculate great powers' CNPs and ranked 
them in a list. Dong Xiuling's study indicated that China was number 8 in the world in 
1980 and number 6 in 1988 in terms of CNP.54 Institutional advisers also try to calculate 
mathematically the hierarchy of the world's future great powers. According to the 
forecast of Academy of Military Sciences, China's CNP by 2020 will grow equal to that 
of the US in a multi-polar structure.55
Some institutional advisers understand the vulnerability of China, yet they are still 
confident of China’s great power status, because they claim China can rely on its own 
“magic weapons” in Chinese RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) which actually stands 
on shakable ground. China's ancient statecraft urges the development and use of surprise 
"magic weapons" to win wars, a theory that institutional advisers are proud of today. 
Some authors' books “boldly predict the United States will lose its initial lead within a 
decade and then fall behind other nations in this RMA competition...Thus, the effect of
128
the RMA will reinforce the current ‘inevitable’ trend toward multipolarity and the end of 
America's superpower status.”56 This new move in China has alerted some Americans to 
propose keeping China weak.
Official Intellectuals
To most official intellectuals who work at universities, the formulation duo j i  hua (multi­
polarization) has become a cliche to follow. They are proud of China’s great power status
co
and claim any “continued US uni-pole status” should be challenged, yet in their writings 
they show less interest in China’s active role to “fight hegemony” than personal and 
institutional advisers. Rather, they are actually resigned to the fate that they believe is the 
CCP’s and put their faith in the power increase of Japan, EU and Russia and their 
conflicts with the US. Most official intellectuals claim that China will benefit from the 
situation resulted from the evolution of multi-polarity, though it does not mean support 
for the rise in the relative power of Japan or a more aggressive Russia.59
They mainly regard balance of power as a relatively static situation in a specific period. 
Due to the power expansion of other powers other than the US, most official intellectuals 
claim that multi-polarity is an objective trend that will happen in the future, though they 
agreed that it was not clear what the trends were in the evolution of multi-polarity.60
Though a majority of official intellectuals acknowledge the strength of the US economy, 
many of them still claim that the US is not as powerful as before, due to non-economic 
reasons. As late as 1998 and 1999 they continued to claim that the US power was in the 
midst of a downward trend.61 Though after 2000 a number of them began to admit the US 
preponderance in the short run, they continue to argue that the United States is likely 
decline over the long-term. In 2004, Yuan Ming, a scholar from Beijing University, 
points out that the US is still “facing unexpected difficulties and challenges.”
Official intellectuals are not as confident as Deng Xiaoping who strongly believed that 
China is a pole, but rather focus on one point of the CCP’s formulation duo j i  hua (multi­
polarization), namely that multi-polarity is still more a trend than reality. Deng
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Xiaoping’s judgment is not appreciated by other powers, as Japan, EU and Russia seem 
to have their own ideas about what the post-Cold War order should look like after the 
terrorist events of September 11, 2001.64Professor Chen Yue at Renmin University uses 
the term uyi chao duo qiang” (one superpower and several great powers) to describe the 
post-Cold War world pattern, “formed by the US as the only superpower and other 
powers, namely a world pattern with one pole and several powers.”65 His idea represents 
mainstream thinking among official intellectuals, which is generally in accordance with 
the party line yet has different focal points.
• Japan
Though CCP leaders have become increasingly worried about signs that the US may now 
be abetting Japanese remilitarization in order to limit rising Chinese power,66 most 
official intellectuals regard Japan as a pole that might balance the US hegemony, as they 
claim that it can exert a great influence all over the world with its formidable economic 
power and its potential military force. As far as Japan's wealth is concerned, a number 
of official intellectuals argue that the US economic advantage will always be challenged 
as Japan has in their eyes extraordinarily abundant capital. Despite Japan’s “lost decade” 
in the 1990s, official intellectuals also regard Japan as the economic leader in East Asia 
and a truly regional power in this sense.
In science and technology many official intellectuals do not think Japan is doing very 
well in fundamental research, yet they all acknowledge the achievement of Japan’s 
applied sciences. Zhan Shiliang says that the US retains superiority in high technology 
for a long time but is challenged severely by Japan in the fields of consumer electronics, 
communication, robot and computer hardware. This is about the future competitive forces 
of world powers, so the US is extremely concerned.69
From the perspective of these scholars, Japan has been striving hard to become a 
superpower since the early 1990s. Many official intellectuals always see the potential 
dispute, a display of the contradiction, between Japan and the US even during the Cold 
War. These scholars think that these two countries managed to cover their quarrels in
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politics and economy for the purpose of confronting their common enemy, the Soviet 
Union. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, as the second largest economy in the world 
Japan not only wants to become an economic power but a political giant as well. At least 
in public opinion, Japanese can now choose to say "No” to the US, when their national 
interests clash with each other.
In 1991 Xi Runchang wrote a paper representing the mainstream view of official 
intellectuals of Japan as a world power. He said:" For Japan, facing the collapse o f the 
bipolar world pattern, its strategic objective is to grasp the favourable chance, strive to
70become a great power and then exert its role in world politics as a pole." In the eyes of 
official intellectuals, Japan will surely become a real great power in time though this 
process is constrained by the evolvement of the contradiction between the US and Japan. 
According to Zhu Wenli at Beijing University, the US does not really want to see Japan 
as a pole. “When Japan was trapped in financial turbulence after the collapse of its bubble 
economy, the Clinton administration held on to the managed trade strategy, exerting both
71political and economic pressure to force the Japanese to accept trade quotas.”
In 2005 Japan began to seek a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. In the early 
1990s, some official intellectuals rightly predicted this move and noted Japan was 
determined to achieve its political ambition on the world stage. Xi Runchang noted that
77Japan had taken series of important measures in order to realize its political objectives. 
These include adjusting its foreign strategy in line with its political ambition, actively 
establishing Japan's image as a great power, trying to destroy the limitation of the 
Peaceful Constitution and sending troops overseas, in the hope that it could turn Japan 
into a military power. Official intellectuals claim these attempts exposed Japan's desire to 
become a world political power, which they believe will contribute to multi-polarity.
• European Union
Many official intellectuals regard Europe as a pole in the world that has contradiction 
with the US. Europe is the origin of modem civilization. The Industrial Revolution broke 
ground in Britain in the first place, and the French revolution greatly changed the world's
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economic and political systems. According to Hayek's view, Britain, France and 
Germany represent respectively great values of human beings, i.e. freedom, equality and 
collectivism. Chinese are very proud of their glorious history and claim China was the 
No. 1 power in the world for over 3,000 years.73 Nevertheless, in 1839 China lost the 
Opium War against Britain, a country with only one-tenth of its population and China 
begun its history of one hundred years' humiliation. To date it is still very difficult for 
Chinese intellectuals to shrug off this shadow from history. Very naturally, Chinese 
official intellectuals do not find it difficult to follow the CCP’s duo j i  hua (multi­
polarization) formulation and regard Europe as an important pole in today's world that is 
able to check the US hegemony.
Some official intellectuals highlight European countries' advancement in economy, 
culture, technology and education, though they point out that European countries are very 
small in terms of economic size in contrast with the US and Japan, and they can not 
compete with the US and Japan unless they are united into one body. Since the end of the 
Cold War, most official intellectuals on Europe studies have got more and more 
interested in European integration, which has become a fashion among them to the extent 
that studies on specific countries are considered out of date. The reason behind this trend 
is partly because they expect a united EU will gain more capability to limit US 
dominance. In the light of their opinion, the main driving force for the deepening process 
of European integration comes from the function of the contradiction in international 
politics. Europe's desire to become equal to the US and Japan is the display of this 
contradiction.
In the minds of official intellectuals, Europe always belongs to the second world that is 
opposite to the US hegemony in terms of contradiction. Through the analysis of 
contradiction, they are happy to see the development of the contradiction between the US 
and EU, which they believe helps maintain China’s great power status. Since China 
became a WTO member, EU has become more important than before, as it can provide 
both strategic and economic assistance to China. Therefore official intellectuals agree 
with Deng Xiaoping that China needs a united, powerful and growing Europe. 74
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On balance, official intellectuals hold that Europe plays a great role mainly in three areas 
in international politics. Firstly, it contributes to maintaining the peace and stability of 
Europe and its adjacent areas, such as North Africa and the Middle East. Though there 
has been no one voice, at least in so far as politics is concerned, in Europe toward these 
difficulties, EU does make a great effort to act up to its own opinions and try to solve 
European problems itself.
Secondly, they maintain that Europe is a key force to maintain the world's political and 
economic stability. European countries like France, Britain and Spain still have a strong 
impact on policies of their former colonies. Many official intellectuals acknowledge 
European countries’ positive role in maintaining stability in those countries.
More importantly, these scholars have noted that, during the Cold War, European 
countries tried to exert their influence in the world through functional rather than military 
means, which was totally different from both the Soviet Union and the US. While 
promoting detente between the East and West, European countries tried hard to avoid or 
at times oppose extreme actions. The European way was based on functionalism that 
focused on economic and social issues rather than politics alone. Many official 
intellectuals think this style originated from Europe's experience of its integration 
process. After World War II, most European countries used their resources to develop 
trade and economy rather than to construct formidable military forces as the Soviet Union 
and the US did. They were becoming more like trading states, very different from 
traditional political-military states. Official intellectuals claim the European way will 
greatly limit US aggressiveness in world affairs, which is apparently in China’s interests.
• Russia
Official intellectuals have noted deepened conflict between Russia and the US than 
between Japan and the US, which they believe will benefit China, though they deem 
Russia’s collaboration with China is half-hearted. They point out that, as the second 
largest nuclear power in the world and a regional power in the Eurasian continent, Russia
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is the most important country to check the US power in the world. They proclaim that, 
like China, Russia’s foreign policy has two important objectives, in a very long period, 
which are firstly to create a peaceful international environment for its transition period in 
economy and politics; secondly to maintain its social stability, resurrecting its glory and 
power of the old days. Russia is facing similar problems to China: how to safeguard the 
security of its extraordinarily vast territory, how to explore its remote and 
underdeveloped areas, how to help establish new rules for world politics and economy, 
how, together with other countries, to solve its mounting difficulties and obstacles to 
economic development.75 Most official intellectuals think that Russia’s determination to 
bring back the glory of the old days clash with US hegemony in many ways.
In the light of their analysis of contradiction in international politics, official intellectuals 
have noted Russia’s effort to help establish new rules for world politics and economy for 
the purpose of restraining the US. These scholars point out that it is in line with the 
Chinese call to establish a new world order. They argue that China should accommodate 
Russian policies to join the re-arrangement of regional and international powers, though 
not in an active way. They understand it is impossible for China and Russia to become 
allies, but agree that the Russians are in the Chinese league to accommodate multipolarity 
and reshape the world order in the 21st century.76
Many official intellectuals claim that consideration of national interests compels Russia 
to draw close to China. The evolvement of contradiction prevails over wishful human 
considerations. Some official intellectuals point out that, due to geo-political reasons, 
Russia has little choice but to fight the US hegemony. Li Yihu from Beijing University 
says: "America's nibbling at its non-traditional sphere of influence and strategic interests, 
namely, Eurasian continent, and particularly the eastern expansion of NATO led by 
America, are the main security and diplomatic issues Russia is facing. It has already 
driven Russia into a comer and it has to get to grips with this difficult problem as to geo­
politics, adjust in large scale the direction of its diplomatic strategy. With regard to 
America’s strategy to enter the inner part of the Eurasian continent, Russia has already 
taken strong counter-strategy. It has changed its direction of unrequited affection, lean on
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the West', as to its international strategy and foreign policy, and moved timely to the 
focus and policy pattern of 'lay-equal-stress-on-the-West-and-Easf as well as 'face-the- 
East.'"77 His analysis makes sense. To all intents and purposes, since the early 1990s 
Russia has tried to co-operate with China against US power through developing a 
partnership with China, though largely limited in the area of security.
Official intellectuals appreciate Russia’s role in restraining US behaviour; however, in 
their opinion, it is hard for Russia and China to collaborate to balance the US. As in their 
observation of the current international pattern, official intellectuals prefer to regard 
balance of power as a static situation in international relations rather than an effective 
policy for China. One can see this clearly from their approach to Russia. They are aware 
of the impotence of the Chinese and Russian joint challenge to the US, which discounts 
the validity of both China and Russia as two j i  (poles) in duo j i  hua (multi-polarization). 
Facing the US preponderance, they begin to realize the expectation on the part of other
7Qstates that any geopolitical challenge to the US is futile.
Russia is not trying as hard to construct anti-US alliances nor undermine US alliances 
globally or regionally as the Soviets were doing during the Cold War. Like China, Russia 
tries to balance the US internally, say, mobilizing economic and technological and human 
resource to translate into military/strategic power. Russia signed a treaty of friendship 
with China, a treaty that embodied some of the Chinese normative vision of international 
relations, i.e. multi-polarity and anti-hegemony: it would not be so much an alliance as a 
contingent collaboration. Russia has to rely on closer ties with Europe and the US to 
develop the Russian economy. Strategically, Russia’s most useful role in the Sino- 
Russian relationship is as a source of weapons for China, not a strategic partner for 
confronting and counterbalancing US power. The two countries try to collaborate more 
through upholding the international institutional status quo, say, strengthening the role of 
the UN, than through bilateral arrangements, lest the relationship between the two 
countries appears to be obviously against the US. Anyway, official intellectuals have 
noted that, regardless of Deng Xiaoping’s tough rhetoric, China is not doing a great deal
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to encourage the emergence of a united anti-US front.
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As one can see, most official intellectuals follow the CCP’s duo j i  hua (multi­
polarization) formulation and try to reify it in their research, despite their different focal 
points from Deng Xiaoping. Most of them, like Chen Yue, do not believe that China is a 
pole already and deem that multi-polarity is only a pattern to take shape in the future. 
However, we do have some official intellectuals who go even further. There is no way 
they can escape from the CCP’s formalized language in their writing, yet they have more 
often than not opinions in private against what they publish. Professor Song Xinning 
keeps at arm's length with the main stream and argues that if  China wants to enter the 
international community as a full member in the 21st century, it should desert the concept 
of pole and multi-polarity, because it means virtually conflict rather than peace and 
security, which would be right against the main tendency of current international
O 1
relations, at least of relations among big powers. Nevertheless, his voice has rung 
hollow to other Chinese IR scholars, not to mention the Chinese authorities, as he simply 
cannot get his idea across in public. What he does is to twist the formulation duo ji hua to 
another concept, duo yuan hua (multi-unit or plural), which aims to alleviate the degree 
of conflict embedded in duo j i  hua (multi-polarization). Shi Yinhong, a well-known 
scholar working at Renmin University, has all along taken this view. In a paper on 
nationalism he says: “It is due to this that international society, in which nation states 
have now widely gained political independence, is a plural society in terms of culture and 
will be so in the future.”83
Liberals
Chinese liberals have always been against the policy of multi-polarity. Cao Changqing 
constantly criticizes this policy. He once praised the Russian President Putin for his 
reluctance to take this approach. He praised the realist side of Putin’s leadership. He said: 
“It is this kind of realism that makes him choose to be pro-West and inclined to the US 
and NATO, to integrate into Europe and not seek ‘multi-polarity’ and counter the US and
OA
Western civilization.” Liu Xiaobo has gone even further and called multi-polarity a 
dirty policy. “(According to advocates of taoguang yanghui <hide one's capabilities and 
bide one's time> China) should make the most of the trend that the world is getting more
136
and more multi-polar, fully employ the diplomatic tactics of hezong lianheng (manoeuvre 
among different powers), support in the world any country that challenges the US, 
establish wide united front, whatever these countries’ regime, whatever their role in the 
world, whatever their attitudes toward China. As long as they defy the US, China should 
support them in an obvious or secret way...try to win over all powers that can check the 
US, in order to balance and then change the Bush administration’s current diplomatic
or
strategy of containing China.” In their eyes the CCP opts for the multi-polarity policy, 
intentionally aiming to check the US hegemony rather than due to domestic needs.
Conclusion
In the 1980s and 1990s the official Chinese foreign policy guidelines claimed that 
China’s power status in the world was rising and the world was heading towards multi­
polarity, a more stable world of balanced power among five or so major centres (US,
or
Russia, Europe, Japan and China). However, a growing number of Chinese IR scholars 
represented by official intellectuals have concluded that this transitional pattern is going 
to endure for a much longer period with the US remaining as the sole superpower.87 
Therefore, Western scholars like Ross deem, in terms of external orientation, that it is 
unclear what precisely one can infer about Chinese strategic goals from this multi-
oo
polarity discourse. Nevertheless, in terms of domestic needs it is clearer: to boost the 
CCP’s legitimacy, to highlight China’s difference in terms of political system and values, 
to raise national pride and crisis consciousness among Chinese people.
Except in the area of security, one could at best describe China’s balancing against the
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US hegemony as “hesitant, low-key and inconsistent.” The US wants to integrate China 
into the US-led international order through engagement. China is already integrated in 
many parts of the world community and is actively trying to break into the remaining 
areas. Nevertheless, China intends to do so with the CCP still in power, so it prefers to 
establish a buffer zone and protect the party’s interests first. CCP leaders will not be told 
to how to behave and engagement with China will be increasingly on equal terms.90
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Chinese IR scholars take different approaches to interpret the CCP’s duo j i  hua (multi­
polarization) formulation. Liberals are obviously against this policy. Personal advisers 
simply choose another term, “the late Warring Sates period”, to add more tension to the 
term multi-polarity and their discourse has shown more truth and sincerity in following 
the party line. Institutional scholars highlight structural conflict between China and the 
US, advocate to fight hegemony, and they use statistics as facts to defend China against 
danger from the US. Both personal and institutional advisers blame the US threat for 
China’s multi-polarity policy choice.
Official intellectuals publish the majority of IR papers and monographs, and they 
generally follow the CCP’s direction, yet most of them do not believe China is already a 
pole and they apply the Marxist theory of contradiction to international politics and 
maintain that multi-polarity is an objective process, one to come in the future. In addition, 
there are some official intellectuals who prefer to twist the formulation into “plural” and 
ease up the intensity of conflict. Official intellectuals are more content with the current 
international order, and are much less aggressive than those personal and institutional 
advisers regarding China’s US policies.
In terms of nationalism, personal advisers are surely the most radical, having a much 
stronger “sense of distinctiveness”91 than other groups, regarding the world as a loose 
collective in which nation states are at war with each other. For domestic reasons, CCP 
leaders need this sense of uniqueness in a dangerous world spreading among the Chinese 
people and, in fact, in terms of the external effect of China’s call for multi-polarization, 
even top CCP leaders admit that it is a bit “out of touch with reality.” Therefore it is fair 
to say China hopes to see a less dominant US and wants to establish itself as a great 
power. Balance of power is unable to guarantee China’s great power status and China 
knows it has to accommodate international norms, yet this is a long-term process. China 
needs time to adjust so it opts for political buffering, namely retaining the CCP’s rule yet 
reforming its policies in an incremental way.
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3.2 Peaceful Evolution
Under the pressure of international norms the CCP is taking political buffering in 
international politics. On the one hand it has shown some flexibility in political reform as 
demonstrated by the grassroots democracy through village elections; on the other hand, it 
still seeks to secure the ruling status of the party. This section aims to examine Chinese 
IR scholars' interpretation of the CCP’s formulation “peaceful evolution” responding to 
the impact of US engagement on China’s political system. The author will present both 
the official guidelines and those offered by Chinese IR scholars in this regard, and show 
the consensus and difference among different groups of Chinese IR scholars.
Peaceful Evolution and Democratic Peace
Peaceful evolution is closely related to domestic regime perspective in IR theory. This 
aims at explaining the interaction between domestic political institutions and foreign 
strategy and practice. Traditionally, liberal trans-nationalists often claimed that 
democracies are inherently more just than authoritarian states, therefore any change 
toward democracy, including peaceful evolution, was encouraged. Former US Secretary 
of State George Schultz told a 1983 State Department conference that the US should not 
overlook the personages and organizations in socialist countries who were seeking 
peaceful evolution as it is Americans’ duty to morally and strategically help them.94 After 
the end of the Cold War, the literature on democracy and foreign policy, especially the 
“democratic peace”, is expanding rapidly.95 It claims that although democratic regimes 
are nearly as violence-prone in their relations with authoritarian states as authoritarian 
states are towards each other, they are more peaceful between and among democratic 
states because such regimes possess cultural and institutional constraints against going to 
war between each other.96
Due to the new development of international norms in general and the idea of democratic 
peace in particular, CCP leaders are becoming more cautious toward the US. With the
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collapse of the Soviet Union, the common enemy of China and the US had gone. The 
difference in political systems began to be involved in the bilateral relationship, though 
not the decisive one. The US foreign policy has long been composed of two pillars: one is 
based on realistic assessment of national power and interests, the other from a desire to
07affirm liberal democracy, for which America stands. With the Cold War over, many 
Americans believe authoritarian regimes like China will capitulate eventually to the
Q O
forces of democratic change, and they deem it no longer necessary to support 
authoritarian countries that had allied with the US against the Soviets.
Under the influence of democratic peace theory, the discourse over China in the West has 
shifted from the 1980s. At that time there was little discussion in the US about whether 
China was or was not part of the “international community.” From the 1990s on, 
however, this has been the dominant discourse. Many of the harshest policy debates in 
the US have been over whether it is even possible to socialize a “dictatorial, nationalistic 
and dissatisfied” China within the international community." China is compelled to 
acknowledge that it does not share a collective identity with the West and has been 
apparently marginalized. Liberal democracies in the West have coalesced into a core, the 
so-called “great power society”. With common liberal values and democratic ethos, the 
core forms a separate liberal zone of moderation and peace. In the eyes of CCP leaders, 
international norms have acquired sufficient legitimacy and authority in international 
society that China can resist but can do little to alter and they are actually norms for the 
interests of the West. 100 Being excluded from the world core, the Chinese elite will be 
readily directed by CCP leaders at “outgroup” states i.e. Western countries.101
CCP leaders worry more about China’s regime stability than being excluded by the West 
from the “great power society”. CCP leaders have noted that Americans believe it is 
within their power “to tame the Chinese dragon and bring about a transition to peaceful
1 (Y)
relations in East Asia.” In their view, promoting democracy is a conspiracy to topple 
communist governments by non-military means.103 In the 1950s, the late US Secretary of 
State Dulles hoped that the third and fourth generation Chinese would peacefully turn 
China into a democratic country. CCP leaders hate this prediction and try hard to prevent
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it from happening.104 Their actions are reasonable as one can already see some signs of 
the result of peaceful evolution in the current Chinese society from the change in the 
Chinese way of life.105
From the US side, China’s democratisation is not as important as other critical issues, 
such as proliferation of mass destructive weapons, peace across the Taiwan Straits and 
respect for national sovereignty etc. Nevertheless, CCP leaders worry about the loss of 
their power and they cannot afford to ignore peaceful evolution. Therefore, they claim 
that the US is plotting to press for regime change in China without force, as happened in 
Taiwan. They support their claim with the American hegemonic decline theory and 
Joseph Nye's soft power argument. They opine that the US intended to destroy the 
socialist bloc with military forces during the Cold War. With the decline of US power, 
from their perspective, it is natural for the US to use its mass media, international 
organization, international law etc. to put pressure on China for the purpose of regime 
change.
Current Chinese Ideology
Peaceful evolution entails ideological change. One might argue that ideology no longer 
plays a great role in the US-China relationship. In practice, ideology is actually not an 
urgent task in US engagement policy toward China, though the Americans are quite 
willing to see a democratic China. The US cares more about Chinese external than its 
domestic behaviour. Nevertheless, as far as China's domestic politics is concerned, there 
is no great escape for ideology.
Firstly, as long as the CCP is still in control, it has to carry on political indoctrination on a 
daily basis to boost its legitimacy, because its nature is an ideological party with didactic 
function and not an elected one, as their counterparts in the West. Chinese foreign policy 
must serve the party’s domestic needs. It is suggested that beliefs about threats to visions 
of legitimate domestic order are the sources of co-operative and competitive foreign 
policies. Realpolitik policies will be adopted towards states that are believed to be the 
sources of threat to this legitimate domestic order.106 Due to CCP leaders’ belief that US
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democracy is a threat, anti-America ideology has always been a part of Chinese foreign 
policy discourse.
Secondly, China has traditionally been a civilization-state with strong cultural centrism 
and Chinese intellectuals often take on the job of ideological construction in order to keep 
stability of the whole country, sometimes at the expense of other nations' interests. For 
instance, the US is always targeted by Chinese, not due to China’s ambition to replace it 
as the hegemon of the world but rather due to China’s internal needs to unite the vast 
civilization-state. As security is the top priority in domestic policies, the PLA are
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encouraged to use ideological means to achieve unity.
The present official Chinese ideology is called in public “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” or “democracy with Chinese characteristics.” In some sense, Gerald 
Segal is right to say that the old ideology has already died, because the nature of the 
communist party has changed greatly if  not totally. Therefore, to renew official ideology 
and to build broad-based national support for the regime was a challenge to the post- 
Tiananmen leadership.109 Nevertheless, CCP leaders have successfully replaced the old 
ideology with a new one in such a tricky way that different people can interpret it in 
different ways for their own benefits. CCP leaders use the same discourse as before but 
change the connotation of the basic concepts and then apply them to reality in order to 
serve new practical aims. The old generation is satisfied because the old ideology has 
been retained at least in name. The younger generation is not bothered, because the new 
political education does not clash with their business-focused mind. More and more 
West-trained Chinese scholars treasure this harmony and some even appreciate what the 
party has done with the ideology, because they approve of evolution rather than 
revolution as far as China's future transition is concerned.110
Thus Chinese IR scholars can flexibly interpret the classic communism theory as long as 
they are in line with the party's nationalist approach. Now socialism with Chinese 
characteristics is powerful enough to accommodate the capitalist content, the reality 
already developed in China. CCP leaders are confident that they would eventually find
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the solution for Chinese reform, even though they have not reached an agreement on the 
bluieprint for this. Practice is more important than theories. Jiang Zemin points out, “ ...we 
should take Marxism as the guidance, practice is the only criterion to test the truth.”111 
CCP leaders are quite happy to learn all the advanced in America, including science and 
technology, business and administrative management, as well as legal system, but they 
are very reluctant to admit that they would like to accept the American political system 
and its values. To most CCP leaders, that means peaceful evolution, the loss of their
119“self-esteem”, the collapse of China itself. It's the main reason why they seem to be 
quite satisfied with the present ideology. As long as the old bottle is able to carry new 
waiter, so be it. Anyway, a broken bottle is no good for anybody.
How do CCP leaders put together all the contradictory elements o f the present ideology?
And, particularly, how do they incorporate capitalism into the current ideology? The
method they take here is to divide socialist system into two layers. The first is the
principle system that means public ownership, people's democratic dictatorship and
Marxism as the guideline for Chinese politics, economy and culture. The second is
practical system that means practical institutions of politics, economy and culture,
covering distribution of power, operation system, economic management etc. The former
stipulates the nature of Chinese society and should remain as it is. The latter is only a tool
for the former and could be changed from time to time, depending on different situations.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and East Europe, Jiang Zemin pointed out
that Communist leaders in East Europe and the Soviet Union failed to handle problems in
the second layer. He believed that China should draw several lessons from this and use a
11^strong practical system to support the principal system.
This distinction has broadened the latitude of China's reform and it is hence able to 
accommodate a market economy within the framework of present ideology as expected. 
It is in this context that China's economy and particularly private enterprises have 
developed at an amazing speed which ensured the success o f anti-peaceful evolution 
policies.
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Gerald Segal hit the mark that nationalism would play a increasingly important role in 
Chinese society in the 21st century; however, it will not replace the old ideology entirely 
but rather appear in the guise of familiar discourse. Nationalism, socialism and capitalism 
are united in “practice,” a typical Marxist concept. They are all covered by Deng 
Xiaoping’s Theory, “which combined Marxism with Chinese practice ”,114 or “Marxism 
without Marx”.115 CCP leaders proclaim that this theory has transcended varieties of 
theoretical debates, which are mostly considered as problems in China, between 
nationalism, socialism and liberalism, and therefore is more capable of guiding Chinese 
in further modernizing China and restoring China’s glory.
To all intents and purposes, Deng’s focus on “practice” is apparently pragmatism. One 
sees that, after 1992, on a number of international occasions, for Chinese, socialism 
simply means Chinese national interests rather than equality and public ownership, as it 
should be. The reason for this is understandable: China is now the only major socialist 
power in the world. Defending socialism is in some sense uniting Chinese elites and 
defending China. By using the phraseology of socialism CCP leaders “hope to keep the 
support of the party membership, government officials and working class, at the same 
time developing capitalism in China.”116
The CCP's official stance on the combination of socialism and nationalism provide CCP 
leaders a unique tool to imagine and strive for a united and powerful China. The party
117further legitimises its position as the representative of national interests. CCP leaders 
who spoke in Chinese nation’s name successfully demanded that Chinese citizens 
identify themselves with the nation and “subordinate other interests to those of the 
stECe.”118
Crisis Consciousness
The current ideology has practically supplied enough room for nationalism and 
particularly anti-peaceful evolution discourse. CCP leaders intend thus to cultivate strong 
criiis consciousness among the Chinese elite and persuade them to believe that the US 
engagement policy toward China is for certain peaceful evolution that is allegedly against
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China’s national interests. They claim that the policy advocates a "peaceful" rather than 
"warlike" policy, yet in fact it is still a hostile policy aiming to topple socialist China and 
encroach upon China’s political sovereignty and can be called ‘‘psychological 
warfare”.119 The party allowed the PLA “to increase hardness of realpolitik
190understandings” toward the US for the purpose of raising Chinese elites’ crisis 
awareness
This awareness is apparently strong in the official foreign policy guidelines and 
accordingly tough line toward the US as to ideology. David Campbell argues that the
191cohesion of ingroups depends on establishing the danger posed by outgroups. There are 
five factors that have further prompted nationalist policies: factional politics, leadership 
instability, foreign negotiations, external challenges and changes in global power
199balance. The former three are domestic factors and the latter two external-linked yet 
still domestic-concerned.
Factional politics has made it difficult for crisis discourse in the current Chinese foreign
19*>
policy to recede. To maintain their power, different political factions compete to play 
hard in ideological discourse. In terms of China’s domestic politics, there are two strong 
bases of assertive nationalism: the "leftist" ideological faction and components of the 
PLA. The two factions share ideological concern because both see chaos as the only 
alternative to “stability”, namely, undiluted authority for the CCP. Deng Xiaoping agreed 
with these two factions over the CCP’s ruling status.124 In this scenario other political 
factions have to follow suit, otherwise they might be wiped out of China’s political arena.
Deng’s alertness against US peaceful evolution drew heavily on the PLA’s nationalist 
sentiments. Shortly after the June 4 event, the PLA newspaper, Jiefangjun Bao, published 
a range of articles arguing for anti-peaceful evolution line and called on the Chinese
1 9 ^
people to “beware the Glint and Flash of Cold Steel in the 'Halo of peace'.” One article 
warned, "peaceful evolution" is even more vicious, wicked and more conducive to
19 f%infiltration and deception than other imperialist strategies aimed at socialist countries. 
One writer stressed the danger of "ideological and cultural infiltration...through economic
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1 7 7and trade contacts and cultural exchange." In Sept 2004, Jiefangjun Bao says, 
“Western hostile forces are not willing to see the rise of a powerful China, and they will
190
continue to carry out political plots of ‘westernisation’ and ‘disintegration’.” The PLA 
continues to view anti-peaceful evolution as vital in the process of “the great resurrection
170o f Chinese nation.”
According to the PLA, the definition of military threat includes jeopardy to 
“sovereignty,” different from American and Japanese definitions that allegedly omit this 
concern.130 Therefore, given the nature of peaceful evolution policy’s concern over 
China’s domestic politics, it is regarded as a kind of military threat. PLA academics 
believe that two factors determine military threat: “First...fundamental contradictions or 
interest conflicts, such as opposing social systems and ideologies as well as disputes in 
economic interests, territorial and ocean rights and interests which are the prerequisites 
for the rise of a threat.... Second...one side must be backed by powerful military strength, 
which is the condition for posing a threat.”131 Apparently anti-peaceful evolution should 
be a duty undertaken by the PLA.
Party line
The official guidelines vehemently denounce the US attempt to change China’s unique
1 37political identity, mixed and still being made. In the early 1990s, a wave of attacks 
targeted the West and the US in particular.133 Through the 1990s, a litany of alleged 
threats including “peaceful evolution” blamed perceived threats on “U.S. imperialism”.134 
Nevertheless CCP leaders also understand the significance of a stable China-US 
relationship and they do not want to provoke Americans to the extent that bilateral 
relations might be out of control. They point out that the bilateral relationship should be 
established on mutual benefits. In their eyes, the proper way for the two countries is not 
to interfere in each other’s internal affairs during political exchanges, and seek common 
ground while reserving differences in ideology.
Deng Xiaoping was always on guard against the Western intention to derail Socialism 
with Chinese characteristics. He said: “The Western imperialists are trying to make all
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socialist countries abandon the socialist road, to bring them in the end under the rule of
international monopoly capital and set them on the road to capitalism...Only socialism
can save China and only socialism can develop China.”135 “The Western countries are
staging a third world war without gunsmoke. By that I mean they want to bring about the
1peaceful evolution of socialist countries towards capitalism.” Deng Xiaoping waijiao 
sixiang xuexi gangyao (Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Thought) 
contributes one section, the future of socialism is still very bright, to the official position 
on socialist ideology. It starts with the new challenge to socialism in the world and then 
relates at length how socialism has made China great again. "During the last twenty 
years, China has made achievements attracting world attention, with earth-shaking 
change. Socialism with Chinese characteristics is thriving and growing vigorously. In no
1^ 7time China has risen, standing out among nations in the world." It goes on to claim that 
the Chinese people are confident of the future of socialism and then warn against 
peaceful evolution by Western countries. "Since last tens of years, the practice of the 
international class struggle has testified that, whatever the change of the world situation, 
Western countries have never given up the policy of peaceful evolution toward socialist
138countries..." It cites Deng Xiaoping's view: "He (Deng) points out...There is now in 
the US an opinion: fight a world war without smoke of gunpowder. We should be 
alerted."139
Or 24 September 1991 Jiang Zemin, commemorating the 110th anniversary of Lu Xun's 
biith, expressed the CCP’s uncompromisingly assertive nationalist themes: “International 
hostile forces will never stop using peaceful evolution against us for a single 
day.. .peaceful evolution and bourgeois liberalization are aimed not only at overthrowing 
ou: socialist system but, fundamentally, at depriving us of our national independence and 
state sovereignty.”140Apparently he believed that peaceful evolution is more than aiming 
at socialism in China - it is China itself.
The formulation heping yanbian (peaceful evolution) means in Chinese “long term 
deyelopment and change without force”.141 There are three points here: firstly, it means 
regime change for China, which is in line with “Only socialism can save China and only
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socialism can develop China”; secondly, this process is relatively not warlike, which is in 
linte with “a third world war without gunsmoke”; thirdly, this process will take a long 
time. Among Chinese IR scholars, personal and institutional advisers concentrate on the 
first point, while official intellectuals on the second and third ones.
Personal Advisers
As; strategic thinkers whose personal fates are tied up with the party, personal advisers are 
extremely worried about “regime change” namely the collapse of the CCP’s rule, which 
is the first point of the formulation heping yanbian (peaceful evolution). In their eyes it 
largely means political penetration and might lead to China’s collapse.
Liu Ji believes that both “Democratic and Republic administrations had a strong belief in, 
therefore encouraged, a ‘peaceful evolution’ in China”,142 that the US has been 
apparently trying to promote its ideology to the world and dominate it in a soft way, and 
he regards it as a conspiracy. He says: “[Some in the United States] make ideology a 
priority in international affairs...Now the United States, as the victor of the Cold War, is 
attempting to spread the American model of democracy. By using ideology as leverage in 
diplomacy, it is possible to repeat the mistakes of the former Soviet Union.”143 He calls 
on the Chinese people to pay close attention to the US conspiracy. He believes that there 
is obviously a scheme of peaceful evolution in the West against Chinese national interests 
and the Chinese people must improve their national quality and fight against the hostile 
forces against China’s political stability.144
He Xin noted the coming threat from the US peaceful evolution shortly after the 
Tiananmen incident. A sharply anti-American analysis by He Xin was authoritatively 
circulated within the CCP.145 He argued that China lies “in the way of the American goal 
of world unification.” It enumerated eight U.S. stratagems for “ideological and political 
penetration of China” in the past decade and warned, “the United States will undoubtedly 
devote all its energy to turning China into chaos and subjugating and dissecting 
China...causing a unified China to decompose into a number of tattered parts.” His attack
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that Washington wanted to disintegrate China explains China's response to President 
Bush's meeting with the Dalai Lama in the White House.146
Nevertheless, He Xin called on the party to keep balance and not to react strongly against 
the US peaceful evolution, while he advocated establishing a new political ideology 
centred on nationalism.147 He does not think anti-peaceful evolution entirely amounts to 
defending the old-type socialism. It seems to him the struggle between the US and China 
about peaceful evolution is more a conflict of national interests than of ideology.148
Deng Liqun argues that the US peaceful evolution policy toward China is the biggest 
worry for China’s national security. Chinese definitions of national security also consider 
threats to political stability. In this broader content the US is perceived as a political 
threat, employing a combination of peaceful evolution and sanctions.149 Therefore when 
Deng Liqun talks about a security threat he actually means a political one. In 1996 he 
invited some scholars in the same league to produce a secret document that emerged 
among the Chinese elite and became surprisingly popular. It is called 10,000 Character 
Manifesto and is the second of its kind. The first one surfaced in 1995, called Several 
Elements Affecting China's National Security. The second one is called Preliminary 
Discussion on Domestic and External Situation of China's National Security and Its Main 
Threat in Future Ten or Twenty Years,150 which is mainly on peaceful evolution. This 
paper opines that peaceful evolution has become China's biggest political threat.
At first, it points out the social change within China after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. 
Due to the prosperity of the private economy, a new capitalist group is emerging and 
class struggle may replace economic construction as the main social conflict. “The 
growth of capitalists and the spread of their way of life are eroding little by little the 
healthy social consciousness. The spiritual foundation of the CCP and the state is 
seriously threatened.”151
This paper argues that, in the near future, the basic threat China faces will be political: (1) 
Western powers headed by the US would start a new Cold War against China; (2) there
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would always be potential "peaceful evolution" within China; (3) separatist activities in 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and inland minority areas would surface; (4) disputes on borders 
with neighbouring countries might lead to serious conflicts.
The author also argues that peaceful evolution will be the most critical threat. Now 
“peaceful evolution” is “in fact a kind of spiritual opium more misleading and deceptive 
than opium....We must not relax our vigilance against the imperialist armed aggression
1 ^ 9and 'peaceful evolution' conspiracy at any time.” Compared with a new Cold War 
threat from outside, the danger from within is much more serious. Whether or not 
peaceful evolution will occur largely depends on whether the leadership of the party can 
be in the hands of real Marxists and, more importantly, whether the central party will 
avoid historical mistakes in policy-making. The way to fight against “peaceful evolution”
1 S3is to stick with nationalist party line.
The core of this paper is that it opines there is a strong force in the party representing 
capitalist political and economic interests. The paper challenges the current policy of 
“one focus and two basic points”, doubting the rightness o f the criteria of productive 
forces. The author categorically says it is wrong to think that there will be no need to care 
about ideology as long as the economy is improving. He warns that there will be a great 
danger of regime change, which means the CCP will probably be changed to a social 
democratic party, representing the interests of the whole nation rather than just the 
working class.
The author regards the US as the main force promoting peaceful evolution in China. He 
holds that peaceful evolution and military containment are two instruments for the US 
and other Western powers to apply Cold War policy against socialist countries. The US 
exerted great pressure on China for some time, but restored normal relationship when US 
elites observed that it was possible that China could be transformed without force. "Its 
character is reinforcing internal adjustment, using comprehensively five ways, including 
diplomatic, economic, ideological, cultural and secret activities, to achieve the end of 
Westernising, dividing and weakening China, based on military forces to fight a war
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without gunpowder." 154 This passage is almost the same as page 61 of Deng Xiaoping 
waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao (Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy 
Thought).
As per this paper, ideology and cultural infiltration are always on top of the agenda of 
Western peaceful evolution strategy. In recent years, the object of its infiltration has 
transferred from young students to leaders in charge of the party, government, army units 
and large-and-medium-scale state-owned enterprises. The tone of the paper is consistent 
with that of some PLA officers. They believe that there is a psychological war, a kind of 
war without powder, between China and the US.155 PLA officers and Deng Liqun believe 
that the US used the ideas of democracy to undermine the communist party in the Soviet 
Union and it intends now to use the same rationale for interfering in China’s internal 
affairs.
It points out that a new character in peaceful evolution is that foreign capital has joined in 
and led China to depend on the West in economy. With foreign capital pouring in, 
Chinese national industries are pounded more and more severely. The author maintains 
that some Western monopolies and companies are trying to push into China's finance, 
insurance, high tech and other sensitive economic departments, to buy national 
enterprises, to control many Chinese state owned companies with little resources. The 
author claims that the US government has observed this tendency and strategically 
encouraged its transnational companies to do so. To Americans, Chinese economic 
dependence on the US will put China’s future in the hands of Washington.156 The author 
argues that if  dependence on US capital and technologies does not cease, China’s 
modernization will hasten the demise of the current regime.
From above one can see that personal advisers’ approach to Peaceful Evolution is even 
more radical than Deng Xiaoping’s, which has demonstrated their worry over the CCP’s
1 ^ 7staWe rule in China. They expressly feel it is their “obligation” to defend the current 
regime and call on the Chinese people to fight against the US regime change conspiracy.
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Institutional Advisers
Institutional advisers in general and those working in CASS in particular are urged to 
propose alternatives to Western capitalist regimes, in order to counter the threat of liberal 
democracy. In a direct or indirect way, they resort to nationalism to defend the CCP’s 
anti-peaceful evolution position.
Some of them take the approach of social democracy under the influence of Chinese 
nationalism. They call for a Chinese self-evolution, a term called “institutional 
inrovation”, rather than being taught by the US how to manage and reform China. In 
their eyes, “peaceful evolution” is not “Chinese” at all and thus should be denounced. 
Due to their apparent collaboration with the CCP and their effort to find a middle way 
between classic socialism and current liberal democracy, they are on many occasions 
called the New Left school.
These institutional advisers go to great lengths to construct a new ideology in China. CCP 
leaders appreciate their efforts to establish a new way between traditional capitalism and 
socialism, between Western centrist and cultural relativism, so these scholars do not risk 
offending the authorities. This “safe” exploration has become a fashion among many 
Chinese young scholars, both in China and overseas, among whom the MIT scholar Cui 
Zhiyuan is a typical representative. The reason the author chooses his writing rather than 
some scholars in CASS is that he has always been regarded as the real spiritual leader of 
thii group, and he has close contact with new leftists in CASS like Wang Hui, Huang 
Pirg and Xia Yong who are President Hu Jintao’s councillors. (Xia Yong has left CASS 
and is in charge of Hu Jintao’s Office.)
Wlat Cui has done so far is to try to extract some useful genes from the Maoist era and 
apjly them to the current situation and then, achieve what he says is institutional 
inrovation. Where culture is concerned, he does not think that China should follow the 
Wtst. He notes that “Western centrists” have the greatest esteem for their own unique
1 SKtradition, wrongly viewing it as a universal one. He argues that the opportunity for the
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Third World to develop lies in institutional innovation i.e. finding a unique road, different 
from both the West and the present Third World.
Cui does not approve of the privatisation that has been carried out in Russia and Eastern 
Europe. He maintains that it will make consolidation of democracy extremely difficult. 
Through his study, he has demonstrated that all major privatisation strategies pursued in 
Russia and Eastern Europe have faced serious dilemmas. When they initially facilitated 
the transition to democracy, they soon endangered the consolidation of democratic 
regimes. Because of the dissatisfaction generated by privatisation programmes, it is not 
certain that democratic regimes will be eventually consolidated.
So what should China do? According to Cui, the Chinese can probably find an alternative 
wiih the help of J.E Meade, the 1977 economics Nobel Laureate. Meade designed a 
labour-capital partnership, whereby the workers and those who provide risk capital 
jointly manage the concern as partners. 159 Meade's social dividend proposal means every 
citizen is paid a tax-free social dividend according to the citizen's age and family status 
but without any other conditions. Cui agrees with Meade that it will promote equality by 
providing everyone with the same basic unconditional income and reduce the risks by 
providing some part of income that is unaffected by variations required by flexibility in 
the labour market.
Institutional advisers’ exploration aims to establish a theory transcending Western 
liberalism and guiding China’s future reform. Deng Xiaoping told the Chinese people of 
his generation not to debate the definition of socialism, leaving the theoretical problems 
to younger generations. Cui's effort is the beginning of this process as a member of the 
yomg elite. He has hinted that the partnership Meade advocated could become the right 
fom of Chinese socialism. If institutional advisers like Cui are right, they could save the 
legtimacy crisis of the CCP and create a new ideology for China, welcomed by the party.
Sone other institutional advisers directly appeal to nationalism as a proposed weapon to 
comter the US “peaceful evolution”. In their eyes, “once people lose their sense of
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comntry, of national defence and of nation, total collapse of the spirit will inevitably 
folllow.”160 National identity suffers as the “spiritual infiltration of hostile forces” gives 
risie to “a slavish 'conquered people'.” Therefore “we should foster the most precious 
nattional spirit of the Chinese nation, resurrect the spirit of patriotism, revive the will to 
buiild the nation.”161
A research report carried out by Fang Ning from CASS can fully represent those 
scholars’ arguments. The research is called Growing China—A Study on Present Chinese
/A?Youth's State and National Consciousness that studies the Chinese young generation's 
nattional consciousness, covering the time period from the late 1970s to the present. As 
this report shows, during the 1980s young Chinese began to examine China's historical 
development and the reality they were facing. With the Cultural Revolution as the 
background, Chinese youth longed for the rich West and unceasingly criticized China's 
past. “Learning from the US” became a popular slogan among Chinese youngsters. 
Peaceful evolution seemed to be welcomed by them.
In his opinion, after 1989 Chinese youth were compelled to re-examine their reflection of 
the 1980s, in the context of a new international environment. Many Chinese youth regard 
anti-China policies in the US as a challenge to Chinese territorial integrity. From the 
perspective of Chinese youth, the US intentionally tried to thwart China's rise in the name 
o f democracy. Because more young Chinese became well-educated in the 1990s than in 
the 1980s, as an expanding group, they began to think for themselves rather than rely on 
their teachers. It is in this context that Chinese nationalism ran high.
Fang's research shows that the Sino-American relationship's change has greatly affected 
Chinese social thought. China begins to be aware of the danger of US peaceful evolution 
policy and tries to counter it with the help of nationalism. US containment and enmity 
toward China, including bombing China's embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999 and the Yinghe 
Vessel event, has further boosted China's surging nationalism that is the main reason why 
peaceful evolution policy has lost popularity in China. Fang claims that, to the Chinese, 
democracy is unacceptable if it is against China’s national interests. He also claims that
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the CCP’s political education is successful which can be seen from the Chinese elite’s 
about-face over democracy in the 1990s.
Institutional advisers like Fang are very close to those popular nationalists, who share 
with him their firm resistance to American peaceful evolution. Among those nationalists, 
Song Qiang and Wang Xiaodong are the most famous. Song is a contributor to the book 
China Can Say No and one of the founders of the nationalist journal Zhanlue yu guanli 
(Strategy and Management) that has considerable support in the PLA.
In this book Song tells people of his own transition from pro-America scholar to an anti- 
Ajnerica one. He used to admire the US to excess. He says that in the 1980s all the old 
values were re-assessed. Among many things, “only America, America and America,
I /  ^
could give students with liberal characters a surprising view.” Nevertheless, this sort of 
good impression of the US was shattered when Song began to know the imperialist nature 
o f the US hegemony after the US challenged Chinese national interests many times. To 
many young Chinese, the American system is good, but only for Americans, not for 
Chinese. In their eyes, Americans pursue democracy, freedom and prosperity within the 
US but hegemonism outside, which is against national interests of developing countries. 
Therefore the popularity of anti-America feelings is naturally understood. Song said:" 
The anti-America voice in the world is not like the past, when it was a courageous 
gesture to fight against the imperialist will. The anti-America voice in the world now has 
the spirit plus materials as weapons. "164Song strongly believes that China has to stand up 
and resolutely defend its national interests against US hegemony, which is a just cause 
shared by other developing countries.
From the foregoing one can see that institutional scholars are concerned with regime 
change, yet they do not dwell on the CCP’s one-party rule consideration but rather focus 
on China’s political stability. Some try to explore something transcending capitalist and 
socialist systems, some try to strengthen China as a political entity with bare nationalism. 
Their writings are sincerely and truly identified with the CCP’s formalized language, yet
155
their response to the CCP’s formalized language is obviously more practical and less 
narrow-minded than that of personal advisers.
Official Intellectuals
Most official intellectuals buy the formulation “peaceful evolution” and admit the fact 
that China is under great pressure to change its regime. During the 1990s, in terms of 
economic policy, China went through a period from the left to increasingly the right. 
Naturally, some Chinese thought the task of anti-peaceful evolution in China was 
growing more urgent. Chen Daisun from Beijing University agreed that peaceful 
evolution was under way in China.165 He said that Western new liberal economics “has 
become an instrument for the West to access markets in developing countries, to carry 
peaceful evolution in socialist countries."166 Chen was well trained at Harvard University 
and played a critical role in the Chinese study of Western economics. His remarks 
reflected the old generation's worry that China would gradually become involved with the 
international capitalist system and betray socialist beliefs.
However, most official intellectuals focus more on the idea that peaceful evolution is a 
long-term and peaceful process than “a world war without smoke of gunpowder.” They 
are much less aggressive than personal and institutional advisers. They have noted that 
many more Americans begin to understand that excessive meddling in China's internal 
affairs only gives CCP leaders an excuse to resist change toward democracy and in this 
way the US also hands CCP leaders an opportunity to rally the Chinese behind them in 
their opposition to the US. In short, many official intellectuals gradually think in the 
shoes of Americans and believe the US will face reality and will encourage rather than
i fnpush China toward democracy.
As such, Feng Tejun and Song Xinning and their colleagues prefer the term heping
1 z o
jingzheng (compete peacefully) rather than “peaceful evolution”. They say: “We must 
understand that the downfall of capitalism is still a very long term historical process and 
the current capitalist regime still has some self-adjustment ability and is not at its end and 
put to flight. Socialism is a newly-born social system and has an incomparable advantage
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that capitalism has not, yet the socialist system is not mature, with some at the primary 
staige, some having hindrances and varied shortcomings. Its innate advantage has not 
been fully tapped out, in terms either of economic efficiency or political democracy. The 
old system is in decline yet still viable; the new system has a bright future yet is still in 
fledgling form. This situation in which the two systems compete with each other 
determines that the socialist system has not achieved the conditions to replace the 
capitalist system in the whole world, either to date or in the far future.”169 They follow 
the party line and proclaim that socialism will eventually win the victory in the 
competition against capitalism, although they say there is no clear sign for that at the 
moment. Their discourse is much less sincere than personal and institutional advisers 
over the fate of socialism and they try to weaken the term “peaceful evolution” with an 
alternative hepingjingzheng (compete peacefully).
Liberals
Most liberals support the US peaceful evolution policy toward China and welcome 
China’s regime change. Ren Quan says: “Peaceful evolution is a way of political 
transition through which a feudal authoritarian society peacefully becomes a capitalist 
democracy almost without violence. This is what capitalist democracies led by the US 
hope and what the Chinese people hope as well. Since the June 4 event the Chinese 
Mainland has in fact entered a new period of peaceful evolution, a period of brewing new 
democratic movement, which is the consensus of democratic activists abroad and in
17fiChina.” In his opinion, most democratic activists believe the US peaceful evolution
171policy is right and people such as Xu Wenli and Wang Dan take this view.
Conclusion
From the foregoing, one can see that, in terms of interpreting the formulation heping 
yanbian (compete peacefully), personal advisers are the most nationalistic. They view 
peaceful evolution from a strategic perspective, regarding it as a real threat to the CCP’s 
one-party rule. Many institutional advisers take a hard nationalist approach in their 
understanding of the term and try to find practical ways to counter US engagement. Their 
views are the most radical in terms of anti-Americanism due to their alliance with popular
157
nationalism. Both personal and institutional advisers stress the fact that China’s anti­
peaceful evolution effort is due to self-defence against the US pressure for regime 
change. Official intellectuals’ interpretation is much more soft-line and theoretical, trying 
to* twist the formulation to “peaceful competition”. Their approach is less sincere than the 
former two groups in following the CCP’s party line. While IR scholars from other
177groups deem that China must not allow peaceful evolution to take place, Liberals, 
understandably, are eager to see peaceful evolution come to pass soon.
3.3 Human Rights
In this section, the author will show how Chinese IR scholars respond to the CCP’s
171formalized language on human rights. Against US critics of China’s human rights 
record, the core argument of the Chinese authorities is that sovereignty comes before 
human rights, that subsistence and development are the top priority of human rights,174
1 * i c
which was articulated in the first place by He Xin. Due to these nationalist arguments, 
CCP leaders do not believe human rights are universal but rather particularly linked with
I  'T Z
culture. In the thick of the confrontation between the US and China shortly after the 
Tiananmen incident, Deng Xiaoping shifted toward nationalism and took He Xin's 
theories, imparting them into the CCP's party line and Chinese foreign policy. As often as 
China is attacked by the West over human rights issues, the CCP fights back with these 
theories.
Nationalist Understanding of Sovereignty and Human Rights
The CCP fights against Western accusations over its human rights record mainly with 
nationalism. The CCP’s arguments on human rights are closely connected with the realist 
concept “absolute sovereignty (zhu quart)”, similar to what has been termed “hyper-
177sovereignty values.” This concept was widely accepted in Europe when nationalism 
was at its peak in the 18-19th centuries. Now CCP leaders have picked it up. Deng 
Xiaoping understood the Chinese weakness in China-US relations and tried hard to avoid
1 78confrontation with the US, yet Deng Xiaoping took an assertive nationalist stance over
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issues of Chinese sovereignty: “We should never make concessions on matters of internal 
affairs and sovereignty and there is absolutely no room for compromise.”179
It is suggested that China is now one of the strongest defenders of a more traditional 
absolutist concept of sovereignty, fighting as a conservative power along with a number 
o f  developing countries to reaffirm sovereignty and internal autonomy against challenges 
from evolving concepts of human rights, domestic governance and humanitarian
i &nintervention; concepts being pushed predominantly by liberal democracies.
In the West, scholars have been questioning the concept of sovereignty. Constructivists 
like Katzenstein point out that there are numerous examples of various types of 
sovereignty, which suggests that sovereignty is not an unquestioned foundational 
institution of international politics that can be assumed at the level of the international
t o t
system. They argue that though the logic of sovereignty is taken for granted in realism,
1 89it has never triumphed in a pure form. Callahan concurs with him and points out that 
international politics in practice has already been deconstructing the very notion of 
sovereignty and its Westphalian roots.183 He has noted the strong influence of 
supranational organizations like the European Union. He even believes that the notion of 
Greater China and the Chinese Diaspora will compel people in East Asia to turn more 
attention to concepts far beyond traditional understanding of sovereignty. Some scholars 
take even more radical positions. Neo-liberalists like Ohmae claim that nation states have 
already lost their role as meaningful units of participation in the global economy.184
Under the impact of nationalism, realist understanding of sovereignty constitutes the 
main stream in Chinese IR theory. CCP leaders argue that sovereignty allows for the 
Chinese way of dealing with China’s human rights issues and external powers have no 
right to “teach” China how things should be done. This kind of nationalist understanding 
of human rights is shaped by Chinese history and culture. China has long been a country 
stressing political stability yet lacking political and civil liberty. Shadowed by China’s 
authoritarian history, the CCP’s official policy has been to pay lip-service to universalism
1 D C
of human rights but to argue for cultural relativism.
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Sovereignty is intimately interwoven with knowledge practices and one must consider
1 8^how it has operated within Chinese knowledge practices. It is important to see how the
Western concept of “sovereignty” has been constructed in China. The Chinese
dictionary defines “sovereignty” in a realist rather than liberal way. It highlights a
distinction between internal and external spheres, where a sovereign state must be united
domestically and thus able to defend itself against external forces. Zhu does not mean
state, but “owner” in the sense of control over properties. Quart is the modem word for
1 88power, “a provisional advantage that derives from exceptional circumstances.” 
Zhuquan (sovereignty) thus is the power enjoyed by the owner. With this understanding, 
CCP leaders believe Western countries should not intervene in China’s human rights 
issues that are regarded as China’s domestic affairs.
Human Rights and China-US Relations
Due to the unyielding stance of the CCP, human rights issues have been a problem in 
Sino-US relations since 1989, though not necessarily the most important. Despite strong 
opposition, the then Bush administration continued to engage China in the early 1990s. 
Nevertheless, the drama of the crackdown around Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, 
occurred just when the balance of concerns in US foreign policy began to move more
1 £Qtoward affirming the country’s values than looking after its strategic interests. Under 
pressure from the media and Congress, the Bush administration linked China’s MFN 
status with its human rights behaviour.
The two sides have opposing views on its concept and hence on US human rights 
diplomacy towards China. CCP leaders do not interpret human rights at a universal level 
as their US counterparts do. In terms of the basis of human rights, CCP leaders take a 
“developmentalist” view and regard subsistence and development as the most 
important.190 It is suggested that their stance focusing on economic human rights holds 
water to some degree, as plenty of Western scholars also argue for people’s economic 
rights.191 As for the relationship between human rights and sovereignty, CCP leaders 
support the idea that sovereignty always comes before human rights. From their
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perspective, the Americans have no moral high ground from which to teach others how to 
improve their human rights.
Though it is said that President Clinton’s decision to de-link human rights and MFN 
trading status in 1994 ended meaningful pressure on China, China is still subjected to US 
intervention over a number of human rights issues such as prison labour, family planning,
1 Q?religious freedom, Tibet, Xinjiang etc. Blame rhetoric has a destructive effect on inter-
101group relations, despite the nature of the “real” conflict of interest at stake. US 
accusations about human rights give rise to increasing nationalism among CCP leaders. 
China’s human rights situation was undoubtedly at its worst during the Cultural 
Revolution, yet the US kept silent at that time. By 1989 China had signed and ratified the 
UN’s Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment and five other treaties and covenants on human rights.194 Nevertheless 
China’s progress in human rights has been ignored by the US. CCP leaders were 
bewildered at the timing of the appearance of human rights in the relationship and suspect 
the US motive.195
US human rights accusations have also generated strong nationalism among the Chinese 
elite. Western dominance in international high politics leads many Westerners to be self- 
righteous in low politics and social values. Since the end of the Cold War, the Chinese 
elite have found themselves confronted with a Western bloc led by the US insistent on 
setting a set of human rights standards and rules that China has played no part in drafting 
but is called upon to comply with.196
Since the early 1990s, increasing numbers of Chinese professionals have been free to 
visit or study in Western countries. What they have experienced in the West is not only 
the significance of human rights but also poverty, prejudice and isolation or at best 
paternalistic Orientalism. These privileged Chinese elites are very sensitive of their 
Chinese identity. Given their allegedly unfair treatment in the West they become more 
eager to seek for their Chinese roots.
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To some extent, the CCP is successful in guiding younger elites to defend their Chinese 
values. The CCP regards the American human rights accusation against China as 
hegemonism that violates Chinese belief. This position has been widely supported by 
overseas Chinese students. Most Chinese students in the US mouth Chinese 
government’s rhetoric even when they are not exposed to its media. China’s exiled 
dissidents in the US are often confronted with hostility from such students, who question
107the dissidents’ patriotism and attack their character.
On balance, the US has occupied higher moral ground than China in terms of human 
rights, yet the US approach to human rights is vulnerable at least on two accounts. One is 
its old concept of a Cold War confrontation between liberal democracy and Communist
10fttotalitarianism, which never really fits East Asia. The other is the US tendency to 
misapply general principles to unique situations. Chinese are sceptical of universalism 
and China’s stance is in fact developmentalist.199 Nevertheless, Americans have 
overlooked the particularity side of human rights. The linking of MFN trade status with 
human rights is a prime example.200
Party Line
Deng Xiaoping claimed that China has a different human rights concept from the West. 
He said: “I should like to ask: what are human rights? Above all, how many people are 
they meant for? Do those rights belong to the minority, to the majority or to all the people 
in a country? Our concept of human rights is, in essence, different from that of the
701Western world, because we see the question from a different point of view.” He was 
angry with US policy as it intervenes in Chinese domestic issues on the excuse of human 
rights. He said: “In handling relations between countries, we should follow the principle 
of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. The People’s Republic of China will
707never allow any country to interfere in its internal affairs.” CCP leaders use the 
concept “absolute sovereignty” to defend their own way of dealing with human rights.
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Regarding US linkage of MFN status to China’s human rights record, the senior CCP 
leader, Peng Zhen, took a strong nationalist position and declared that any condition 
attached to bilateral trade could be interpreted as an insult and challenge to China and is
9fY3absolutely unacceptable. Deng believed that national sovereignty is more important 
than human rights: “Actually, national sovereignty is far more important than human 
rights, but they (Western countries) often infringe the sovereignty of poor, weak countries 
of the Third World.”204 “Some Western countries, on the pretext that China has an 
unsatisfactory human rights record and an irrational and illegitimate socialist system, 
attempt to jeopardize our national sovereignty. Countries that play power politics are not 
qualified to talk about human rights.” The book Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi 
gangyao (Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Thought) says: “The US...tries 
hard to impose its own social system and ideology upon other countries, to interfere at 
will with the domestic politics of other countries in the name of ‘human rights, liberty 
and democracy’.” It also says: “ It (America) noisily preaches ‘human rights are 
superior to sovereignty’, influences public opinion for the ‘new interventionism’, 
brazenly challenges the objectives and principles of the UN Charter, tramples on 
international law and the basic rules of international relations, resorts to or threatens to
907use force everywhere regardless of the UN, adopts new ‘gunboat policy’”.
The bottom line of the official guidelines is that US human rights diplomacy is nothing 
less than power politics. The CCP is convinced that the US intends through this means to 
pave the way for its dominance in the world. The CCP simply does not believe in 
universality of human rights, to say nothing of their promotion by the US.
The author would like to stress 4 important points here. Firstly, shengcurt (subsistence) 
only means in Chinese to “live a life without reference to spiritual and political
A A O
considerations”. Secondly, fazhan (development) means in Chinese the natural process
of changing from small to big, from simple to complex, from lower level to higher level, 
which is mainly materialistic and not on political change at all.209 Thirdly, renquan 
(human rights) is more an individualistic than a collective term, which is firmly against 
patriotism and sovereignty according to Chinese understanding. Fourthly, in the Chinese
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view, it is only an excuse used by the US and other Western countries to bully developing 
countries and to thwart the rise of developing countries as a collective in economy.
Personal Advisers
Personal advisers concur with Deng Xiaoping that China should uphold the line of state- 
in-command, even at the expense of the interests of some individuals. In fact, He Xin has 
created these formulations such as “sovereignty is superior to human rights”, and
9 i n“subsistence is the top priority of human rights”. His argument is indeed consistent 
with the Marxist belief that the foundation of human rights is subsistence and 
development. According to Marx and Engels, human rights are the outcome of change in 
economic environment in general, and development of the capitalist commodity economy 
in particular.
Marxists and their followers regard economic development as the foundation of human 
rights. This theory constitutes the basis of personal advisers’ arguments over human 
rights, and is in line with Deng Xiaoping’s productive forces criterion. Deng Xiaoping
911said that the basic principle of Marxism was to develop productive forces. He asserted 
that whether or not a policy is good depends on whether it is favourable to the 
improvement of productive forces, which is one of the most typical slogans of Deng's 
materialism.
Deng Xiaoping’s approach has been widely supported among the Chinese elite at a time 
when the parameters of human rights are expanding rapidly in international discourse and 
when the US appears stubborn in its adherence to a seemingly narrow framework of civil 
and political rights. The US urges China to ratify the twin international human rights 
covenants - one on political and civil rights, the other on economic, social and cultural 
rights - but the US Congress has no plans to consider ratification of the economic rights
9 1 9  9 1 ‘xcovenant. Therefore, the US is indeed vulnerable in terms of economic rights.
He Xin applied Deng’s criterion to human rights issues and created basic formulations 
like “sovereignty is superior to human rights” and “subsistence is the top priority of
164
human rights”. Nevertheless, personal advisers do not bother to reify these formulations 
and they mostly leave it to institutional advisers, official intellectuals and propagandists. 
However, one should remember that these personal advisers are actually the toughest and 
most nationalist as to people’s individual rights in general and political rights in 
particular.
Personal advisers such as He Xin often point out that, because of the emergence of 
globalisation, the wealth gap between rich and poor countries is growing bigger. They 
assert that most developing countries do not concur with the West on putting political 
rights ahead of subsistence and regarding it as the precondition, and they criticize the US 
for largely caring about people’s political rights rather than economic, social, cultural and 
developmental rights.214 Following the Cold War, whenever the human rights conference 
discussed developmental rights, developing countries all urged the human rights 
committee to establish a specific regime to carry out the 1986 Manifesto of
1^ c
Developmental Rights and to help the Third World with development rights.
Personal advisers like He Xin, Wang Daohan and Liu Ji deem that sovereignty is a secure 
refuge to cover China’s bad human rights record. They put sovereignty as the foundation 
of international law. Firstly, they assert that sovereignty makes it possible that the whole 
world is divided into many equal and independent entities based on territories and hence 
international relations were bom against this background. In this sense, sovereignty is the 
precondition of the existence of international law. Secondly, because states are the creator 
and practitioner of international law, the starting point of most sub-fields of international 
law, such as maritime law, aviation law, diplomatic law etc, is still safeguarding 
sovereignty. Thirdly, personal advisers are convinced that Five Principles Of Peaceful 
Co-Existence, advocated by Zhou Enlai, should be universally accepted by all countries. 
When Zhou Enlai raised these principles in the first place, he fixed his eyes on traditional 
understanding of sovereignty—absolute and independent. To him, it was certainly a haven 
for China to protect its national interests. Personal advisers deem it suitable to echo their 
support for Zhou Enlai’s policy approach in new circumstances.
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As such, personal advisers argue that the legislature of human rights should be made by 
states according to the principle of sovereignty. They agree with some Western scholars 
that the cause of human rights violations is largely national and the solutions must also be
91 f\largely national. States have their right to enact constitutional and other laws and to 
stipulate basic rights citizens can enjoy and basic responsibilities they should take, 
though states should respect international law. While making laws, articles about 
citizens’ rights and freedom i.e. human rights should come from sovereignty rather than a 
foreign country or an international organization. This position obviously aims to defend 
China’s human rights record against intervention from the West, not least the US. He Xin 
attacked Western human rights intervention as neo-colonialism. He once said: “One of 
the slogans in Kosovo war was ‘human rights are superior to sovereignty’, which means 
clash of values is prior to clash of sovereignties. The UK and US proposed ‘neo-
919interventionism’, and their theory is in fact a kind of neo-colonialist theory.”
They believe that the realization of human rights is guaranteed by states. In their view, 
International Human Rights Convention lists human rights in detail, but it is only through 
states that its stipulations can become reality. After the end of the Second World War, 
Western countries adopted the welfare system, so the least advantaged people in their 
countries could be taken care of, but this system is limited within the border of nation 
states. In fact, it is still very difficult for developing countries to get economic assistance 
from the West. The improvement of national welfare is mainly the duty of states rather 
than international society. A sovereign country’s policy determines the subsistence and 
development rights o f its people, which are according to personal scholars the most 
important in human rights. Because of the reality of the separation of nation states, if 
international society wants to raise the standard of human rights all over the world, it 
should respect the principle of equality among states. They presume that “sovereignty is
9 1 o
the last defence of developing countries”. On the world stage co-operation cannot be 
occur without the full participation of different countries as equal members. Personal 
advisers warn the US that it shall not make mistakes in this regard. Liu Ji claims that co­
operation will not work if  the US tries to impose upon other countries its values of
910democracy and human rights.
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Personal advisers harshly advise Americans to mind their own business. Liu Ji said: “Yet 
America has its own social problems and is far from being an ideal society. The best 
choice for Americans is to focus on improving their own society. If America does things 
really well, their achievement will have the force of truth and Chinese will learn from 
them. ...But if  the US does not focus on improving itself but instead tries to make China 
accept everything American, then the Chinese will naturally ask, Ts this what human
990rights and democracy means to the Americans?’ This will result in conflicts.”
Apparently personal advisers’ discourse is full of strong words in terms of anti-US 
human rights policy toward China. As they are the main designers of the CCP’s human 
rights policies, it is not surprising that they follow the party line most sincerely, truly and 
appropriately.
Institutional Advisers
Institutional advisers follow the CCP’s formalized language and defend China’s position 
in the language exchange between China and the US, trying to build up a positive image 
for China on the world stage. Their main argument is that the integrity of China’s 
political sovereignty and the importance of economic development over civil and 
political rights serve China’s national interests.
Some institutional advisers have studied US human rights diplomacy to highlight its 
hegemonism. The word “hegemonism” is surely softer in tone than He Xin’s “neo­
colonialism”. In their eyes, it started from President Carter and was fully developed in the 
Reagan administration. After George Bush came into power, human rights had become 
one of America's basic national policies, equal to such important strategic issues as peace 
and security. From their point of view, US human rights diplomacy enforces the US 
criterion upon other countries, interferes in their domestic politics in the name of human 
rights and brings about suffering to many people in the world. It is typical hegemonism 
and is hypocritical. Wang Zaibang says: “Reality has proved that some countries...regard 
themselves as the protector of human rights and force their own values and social systems
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on to other countries regardless of differences in historical traditions, development level 
and targets o f human rights protection...it might make the human rights situation 
worse...”221
In March 1999, NATO led by the US began to air strike Yugoslavia. With the war still 
continuing, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair raised a new theory to deal with 
international affairs, namely, neo-interventionism. It is regarded as humanitarian quasi- 
intervention by Jack Donnelly, who defines it as a situation wherein “one party tries to 
subordinate the other to its will through injury or punishment,” for the purpose of
999“remedying) gross, systematic violations of internationally-recognized human rights.” 
Blair proposed to confine traditional non-interventionism and spread Western values 
around the world. The basis of this new theory is that sovereignty is no longer as 
important as human rights. Americans embraced this idea immediately and adopted it as 
the theoretical foundation of the war against Yugoslavia. Many more Western scholars 
also support interventionism. They conclude that despite the restrictions of the UN 
Charter on such interventions, a new international consensus seems to have been formed
99*^that allows such interventions. Nevertheless, Western countries have failed to provide 
an effective way to ease the tension when the sovereignty norm grates with the free trade 
norm or the evolving humanitarian intervention norm.224 The CCP is aware of it and has 
called once again for “respect of sovereignty.” It is also alert to the threat to its one-party 
rule in China due to the persuasiveness of the interventionist theory and mustered many 
institutional advisers to fight back.
Institutional advisers claim that neo-interventionism justifies forceful intervention in
99 cother countries’ domestic politics. CCP leaders are afraid that the US will become the 
final judge o f international relations and then international law will come to nothing. If a 
country refuses to accept the US judgment, it will then be punished by economic 
sanctions or even military strike. Institutional advisers say it is the return of jungle law 
rather than humanitarian development of international society. Zhu Muzhi from CASS 
said: " If one asks what ‘human rights are superior to sovereignty’ means, the following
9 9 £
formula will be the most concise answer: it equals to hegemonism." His words
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orchestrate the official guideline that human rights movement is for the US nothing but a 
convenient weapon with which to bully other countries.
In this scenario, institutional advisers follow the CCP’s formalized language and stress 
the importance of sovereignty. Wang Yizhou from CASS deems that sovereignty is 
obviously superior to human rights. He says: 44 Practice has proved that nations without 
nation-states framework and accordingly without protection of international law are the 
most wretched ones, a typical examples being the Kurdish nation that has tens of millions 
of population yet are scattered in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and other countries. Human rights 
there are not protected at all and anybody can bully them. The UN can do nothing about it
'y'yn
and can only stand by with folded arms.” His opinion of the UN is obviously in line 
with some Western scholars that disregard the role of the UN in world politics, because 
they believe it was designed primarily to protect states from incursions by other states,
99Rnot to protect citizens from abuses by their own governments on humanitarian grounds.
Many institutional advisers emphasize the difference in interpretation of human rights 
between China and the West, and criticize Western scholars’ attitudes to apply their 
criteria to the entire world. They maintain that different countries have different national 
conditions, that one country's theory on human rights depends on its political system, 
economic development, spiritual life, cultural characteristics and educational quality. 
Because national conditions among nation states differ in thousands of ways, it is not 
right and also inappropriate to establish a sort of universal standard across the whole 
world. For instance, Fan Guoxiang, vice-president of the China Society for Human 
Rights Studies, advocate human rights with Chinese characteristics: “ ...it is imperative to 
properly deal with relations between individuals and the community. Public matters
99Qshould precede private ones. Justice should come before gains.”
Institutional scholars criticize Western countries because they are accustomed to impose 
their own models on other countries with their own models, though they themselves do
9Tftnot behave very well in many areas. They claim that there are too many serious human 
rights problems in the US, including lack of safeguard for life, freedom and personal
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safety; serious rights violations by law enforcement departments; plight of the poor, 
hungry and homeless; worrying conditions for women and children; deep-rooted racial 
discrimination; wantonly infringing human rights of other countries etc. Therefore, “in 
2001, without support from the majority of member countries”, the US was voted out 
of the United Nations Human Rights Commission and the International Narcotics 
Committee.
It seems to the Chinese public that their critics have a point. For example, when people in 
the West take to the street and demonstrate for the rights of pet animals, children in many 
sub-Saharan countries are still suffering from hunger and on the verge of death. These 
scholars claim that it is indeed impractical to measure human rights situation in over 180 
countries with just one criterion advocated by the West. To safeguard and promote 
people's rights, to demonstrate people's values and dignity, all countries could possibly 
come together and negotiate common objectives and basic rules, yet they should be very 
cautious and deal with each case on its own merits while facing specific procedures and 
methods.233
Seeking truth from facts and mutually respecting one another is vital in international co­
operation. Nevertheless, the point to make here is that institutional advisers have no 
intention to appeal to the consciousness of people in the West and communicate with 
them for the sake of improving the welfare of developing countries but, rather, try to 
defend China’s external image in terms of human rights, as the main target of their 
discourses is their domestic audience rather than outside world.
As China still retains the name of a socialist country, some institutional advisers defend 
China’s position from the stance of traditional ideology. They claim, “The essence of 
socialist democracy is that the people are the master of the country. The system of 
people's congress and the system of multi-party co-operation and political consultation 
under the leadership of the CPC embody this characteristic and these systems are 
constantly being developed and improved.”234 Therefore people’s human rights are well- 
observed and “Chinese government respects the people's political rights and enlists the
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people's initiatives.” They claim that with the establishment of the welfare system, 
Western societies have grown increasingly stable and have been enjoying long-term 
economic prosperity, yet capitalist countries have too many bad records in human rights 
to mind other countries’ business.
According to these scholars, people in socialist countries should enjoy more freedom and 
democracy than capitalist countries, which is stipulated in these countries' constitutions. 
Nevertheless, socialist countries have a very short history and are not yet mature: some 
faults have emerged in their construction. People's rights in these countries have not yet 
been fully realized and need improvements through economic and political reform. 
This kind of discourse is expressly in line with Deng Xiaoping’s theory of socialism with 
Chinese characteristics that asserts that the full advantages of socialism have not yet been 
displayed.
Some other institutional advisers directly attack US human rights policy and vilify its 
image to justify China’s stance. The author will examine as follows Chinese scholar Liu 
Wenzong’s article and demonstrate how institutional advisers defame the image o f the 
US. His article has two parts: one a brief history of US human rights foreign policy, one 
his comments. He starts with criticizing the sinister motive of US human rights policy, 
considering it as a barbarous intervention in other countries’ domestic issues. He says in 
1977 when Carter was elected president of the US, he began to send human rights issue 
diplomats to overseas embassies and consulates. He says this is the beginning of the US 
human rights diplomacy. It seems to him that Carter's human rights foreign policy 
covered too many areas and had no focal point. He maintains that the Carter 
administration held double standards in its human rights foreign policy. He cites 
America’s allegedly unprincipled protection of Israel to support his argument.
He then goes on to discuss the Reagan administration. He noticed that president Reagan 
did not agree totally with Carter's human rights diplomacy. The Reagan administration 
chose the Soviet bloc as the core of its human rights diplomacy. In 1981, while facing 
large-scale internal unrest, the Polish government announced a war situation.
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Immediately, the US partly ceased some economic relationship with Poland, with the 
excuse of the Polish government's violation of human rights. Liu says that as such human 
rights became a weapon of the struggle between the US and the Soviet bloc.
US human rights policy toward the Soviets played a big role at the final stage of its 
disappearance. After the Soviet Union had gone, the Bush administration switched its 
attention from the Soviets to China. From Liu’s perspective, the US was deeply involved 
in the June 4 event, providing information, finance and even guidance for the democrats 
in the streets. He says that the Bush administration's human rights diplomacy has three 
characteristics: a) clearly regard human rights as the basic US national policy, 
strategically equal to peace and security; b) In the relationship with China, link human
'y'yo
rights with the MFN status, China's WTO entry and technology co-operation; c) 
Further expand the connotation and scope of human rights diplomacy, trying to attack 
and topple other countries’ political systems. He then gives the Americans a dressing- 
down for their human rights policy.
Liu’s discourse well represents institutional advisers’ approaches to defame the US image 
in respect o f human rights. During the second part of his article, he defends the CCP’s 
position and accuses the Americans of hypocrisy. He deems that the US “unilaterally” 
interprets human rights and works its own will on others; that the US government 
intervenes in other countries’ domestic issues “in the name o f” human rights; that the US 
preaches the theory that human rights are superior to sovereignty and carries out in fact 
hegemonism in the world; that the US takes different criteria towards different countries. 
His conclusion is to repeat the CCP’s formulation that US human rights diplomacy 
amounts to “power politics”. Institutional advisers like him believe that the US aims to 
dominate the world “in the smog o f ’ human rights.
Like many other nationalists who believe their own states are always right and others 
wrong, many institutional advisers claim US human rights foreign policy is hypocritical, 
as the Americans themselves have a bad human rights record. They point out that the US 
keeps silent about its own human rights issues and does not allow others to mention them.
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For instance, one thing they cite is racism in the US. In April-May 1992, Chinese media 
extensively reported the racial riot arising out of the case of a black young driver, Rodney 
King, who was beaten badly by white policemen. Institutional advisers told the Chinese 
public that there existed an entrenched human rights flaw in the US, the most obvious of 
which is the huge gap between blacks and whites.
Apart from smearing the image of the US, institutional advisers go to great lengths to 
build up a positive image of China in terms of human rights. They assert that China has 
made a great improvement on developmental rights. Wang Zhuqian points out that, in 
China not only the problem of food and clothing for the 1.2 billion Chinese has been 
solved, but also a constant increase in people’s income has been maintained. He refers to 
Chinese statistics to support his argument. “Compared with other countries in the world, 
China belongs to the low-income countries, but the living standards of the people have 
been enhanced greatly... China, the largest developing country that had one-quarter of the 
world’s poor population in the late 1970s, now has less than one-30th of the world's 
total.” He proudly proclaims, “China is trying to eliminate absolute poverty by the end 
of 2000.”240 As one can see now, it is surely not the case.
According to their discourse, the CCP has continued to put safeguarding and promotion 
of people's rights to subsistence and development at the top of its agenda, sparing no 
efforts to develop the economy, enhance comprehensive national power and improve 
people’s access to subsistence and development. They claim that the problem of ensuring 
poverty-stricken people have enough to eat and wear has basically been solved and their 
quality of life has been greatly improved, forming a striking contrast with the situation 
worldwide in which the population in absolute poverty keeps increasing. Following the 
CCP’s party line, they present a positive China on the world stage in terms of human 
rights, justifying their claim that US accusations are unfounded.
Official Intellectuals
Generally speaking, official intellectuals take much a softer line on US accusations about 
human rights issues. They normally generally follow the party line over sovereignty and
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seldom attack the US human rights record, especially not regarding US policy as strategic 
if  not evil. They seldom mention the priority order between civic and political rights and 
economic rights. Some even believe they are all equally significant for human beings and 
acknowledge the universality of political rights, which is obviously not in line with the 
party.
Some official intellectuals resort to history to explain China’s position. It seems to them 
that history has played a great role in China’s current human rights policy. After the 
Opium War, China suffered badly from the bullying of the West and the Chinese central 
governments surrendered more often than not while facing Western and then Japanese 
threats. In the 1990s the Chinese people supported the CCP though they were not 
satisfied with the progress of China’s political reform, as they believed that its policies 
were beneficial to China’s sovereign integrity and the increase of China’s wealth. Due to 
bitter historical memories, official intellectuals are willing to tolerate the CCP’s faults as 
long as it effectively maintains national integrity and strives for economic growth.
As such, those official intellectuals acknowledge the CCP’s contribution to China’s 
national interests from the perspective of history. In other words, in their view, China’s 
faults regarding human rights are mainly due not so much to the party’s policies as to 
historical evolvement. Chinese scholar Zhu Ruiji maintains that, given China’s historical 
burden, the CCP’s achievements are impressive and worth praising. He says: The human 
rights situation of the Chinese people made overall amelioration development. China's 
comprehensive national power has been greatly improved, and China's international 
status and prestige is growing."241 From his view one can see that official intellectuals 
identify with the party, in a great measure because they believe the party has indeed 
accomplished a lot considering China’s historical backwardness and weakness in modem 
times.
Xiao Gongqin, a well-known scholar in Shanghai Normal University, who advocates 
constructive rather than radical nationalism in China, acknowledges the positive aspect of 
US human rights policy. In his opinion, US policy is not so much a strategic arrangement
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as a cultural product of its tradition. He points out, “The difference of political culture 
between China and the US lies in, on the US side, the fact that there has long been in the 
US political culture a kind of idealism or ‘human rights fundamentalism’ based on human 
rights, liberty and democracy. There exist strong Christian cultural sentiments in US 
national characters. This kind of political culture has a long-term origin, from the 
responsibility of the whites to ideas and ideal of liberal democracy aiming to ‘liberate the 
whole human race’.”242 In his view, this kind of interventionism of liberal democracy is 
really out of sincerity for some Americans and cannot be simply regarded as some rich 
people’s selfish greed for external expansion. One can see his opinion is in apparent 
contrast with institutional advisers’ view that the US approach is hypocritical.
Some official intellectuals like Tian Jin actually appreciate the value o f political rights 
though still lean to economic rights. Tian Jin wrote an article on human rights and 
particularly the history of human rights development.243 Tian Jin’s article The 
Development Of International Human Rights Activities and Issues in Debate, is divided 
into two parts, one on the development of international human rights activities and the 
other on some debated issues.
At the beginning of the article, he points out that the international human rights 
movement is an important part of contemporary world politics and international relations. 
It seems to him, from the 1940s onwards, the contents of human rights have been getting 
much broader thanks to the effort of international organizations and many human rights 
activists in the world. The 1945 UN Charter claims that the peoples of the United Nations 
were determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to reaffirm 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women and of nations, large and small. He deems that the human 
rights part of the UN Charter, largely on civic and political rights, is indeed consistent 
with the historical trend and certainly reflect public opinions across the world. In Tian 
Jin’s eyes, it is indeed positive progress. One can see from here that official intellectuals 
are not against people’s political rights while stressing the importance of economic rights.
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Tian Jin then recalls the history of human rights movement in the 1950s. During this 
period, there were many conflicts between the East and West over the contents of human 
rights. Many countries had varied ideas on the draft of Economic, Social, Cultural Rights 
International Convention and International Convention of Citizen and Political Rights. 
Tian Jin says that due to their effort, member states eventually passed some conventions 
and rules in protection of women and children, on rights of stateless people, on anti- 
discrimination in employment and on cancellation of forced labour and slavery.
He goes on to examine the human rights development of the 1960s. He says that the UN 
composition changed dramatically with the joining of many more newly-established 
developing countries. They strongly required the rights of national determination and 
stated that this was the pre-requisite of upholding individual rights, that any kind of 
colonialism and racism were an infringement of national determination. In the UN 
assembly, Manifesto of Bestowing Colonial States and People Independence was passed 
in 1960, Eternal Sovereignty of National Resources in 1962. It seems to him that these 
two conventions are the important extensions of Manifesto of World Human Rights, as 
they have reified nearly every right stipulated in it.
Tian Jin says that the 1970s are the turning point in the human rights movement history. 
In his eyes both political and economic rights were stressed on the world stage during this 
period. He points out that civic rights were stressed during this period. In the European 
Security Co-operation Conference, Western countries showed great interest in 
humanitarian co-operation with the Soviet bloc and desired to make personal contacts a 
sort of catalyst to promote liberalization in socialist countries. The West was eager to see 
flexibility in Soviet policies on family gathering, marriage between different nationalities 
and free communication on travel information.
He then moves on to the 1980s. He actually shows official intellectuals’ sympathy over 
Gorbachev’s effort to improve his people’s political rights. After Gorbachev came into 
power in the Soviet Union, he tried to accommodate critics in the West, introducing some 
fresh ideas of humanism and human rights to his people, such as socialist humanism,
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value of human beings and its full development as the starting point of reform, the 
advantage of reform for the improvement of citizens’ political, social and individual 
rights etc. Gorbachev even loosened restrictions on dissidents, religious belief and 
people's emigration rights. Tian Jin gives many compliments to these efforts though 
Gorbachev is regarded as a traitor of socialism in China.
In the 1980s official intellectuals’ arguments on human rights are mainly based upon the 
theory of class struggle. According to this sort of old ideology, they claimed categorically 
that there were no human rights at all in capitalist countries. In the 1990s, though they 
maintained that one could not expect China's human rights situation, particularly its 
political rights situation, to be changed overnight, they began to face China’s bad human 
rights record. In the late 1990s, more and more official intellectuals at universities began 
to forsake traditional ideological stereotypes and admitted that human rights conditions in 
the West were actually better than in China. Apparently they kept a distance from the 
official formulations.
Obviously, official intellectuals have accepted universalist notions of human rights in 
their developmentalist rhetoric, which is in line with Van Ness’s observations on the 
Chinese response to Western human rights critics.244 This developmentalist approach 
actually conforms to the modernization theory of comparative politics that Chinese 
nationalists agree with, which, represented by Seymour Martin Lipset in particular, 
suggests that economic modernization leads to social, cultural and political change.245 It 
is also consistent with the work of Inglehart who argues that economic change drives 
political change.246
Liberals
Liberals are the most radical in terms of human rights among Chinese IR scholars. 
Nathan believes that there is in terms of human rights “an undoubted improvement over 
Mao’s” under the current regime,247 yet Chinese liberals are not satisfied. Most of them 
are strongly against the CCP’s formalized language. Liu Xiaobo attacks the CCP’s party 
line that puts subsistence and developmental rights before political rights. He say: “ It is
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well known that, while the CCP authority responded to Western countries’ human rights 
diplomacy after the June 4 event, its most effective tactics are to cut apart human rights in 
general as a whole, separating subsistence and developmental rights from other human 
rights and political rights in particular. The authority only stresses subsistence and 
developmental rights and tries hard to play down and even cancel human rights relating 
to speech, thinking (belief), association, demonstration, election etc.” Nevertheless, it 
does not follow that Liu Xiaobo believes that there is no need for subsistence and 
developmental rights. He says there are four paramount human rights issues including the 
peasant problem, June 4 problem, Falun gong problem and unemployment, yet the most 
urgent is the peasant problem and China needs to modernize its agriculture as soon as 
possible.249
Conclusion
From the above one can see that personal advisers take advantage of the weak points of 
the US position, set the keynote from the perspective of strategy and theory, take the 
toughest and most nationalistic approach and defend China’s human rights record from 
the doctrine of exclusivity and cultural relativism based upon the concepts that promote 
subsistence, development and collective rights over individual rights; institutional 
advisers engage in a “war of saliva” with the US, try to construct an evil image of the US 
and a positive one of China; official intellectuals keep at arm’s length from the CCP’s 
formulations, divert the language exchange to abstract discourses and seldom attack the 
US for its so-called bad record. They acknowledge the universal value of political rights, 
while following official formulations and stressing the importance of subsistence and 
development rights for the purpose of economic growth for the time being. They argue 
that China’s faults in human rights are largely due to historical legacies and their 
approach is the most developmentalist. Though liberals acknowledge the importance of 
economic rights, most of them attack the CCP for its poor political rights record.
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Chapter IV: Chinafs Arguments on America: Cultural Issues
Chapter IV discusses cultural issues arising out of US-China relations. The author has 
collected 48 articles relating to cultural issues in US-China relations, largely from 
Xiandai guoji guanxi, Guoji wenti yanjiu, Zhanlue yu guanli and Shijie jingji yu 
zhengzhi, and also from some important books and websites. I focus on the Chinese 
writings on the debate over cultural conflict theory and on the US media, and try to show 
the domestic concerns of Chinese nationalism in foreign policy from the angle of culture, 
what is the CCP’s formalised language on cultural issues in foreign policy and how 
different groups of Chinese IR scholars articulate the CCP’s formalised language.
Culture is one of the core parts of nationalism, which seeks to protect or establish unique 
values. In the Chinese case, this process has been going on in opposition to Western 
culture. Zhao Suisheng said in 2000: “One important characteristic of Chinese 
nationalism in the 1990s was its harsh criticism o f ‘Western values’.”1 Nevertheless, CCP 
leaders do not aim to rid China of modernisation-driven Western culture, but rather 
deconstruct and then incorporate it into a new Chinese culture.
What the CCP aims to establish is a new culture based on a mixture of Marxism- 
Leninism and Maoism, traditional Chinese values and Confucianism in particular, 
together with liberalism. These values are not new to the world, yet this “re-orientation,” 
an effort to integrate all three together in an organic way, is surely brand new. One of the 
main reasons why the CCP resorts to China’s indigenous values to buttress its legitimacy 
is that Marxism-Leninism and Maoism largely clash with liberalism and these two trends 
need to be balanced so that they can truly take root in Chinese soil. Marxism-Leninism 
and liberalism are both the product of the Enlightenment, while Confucian ethics that 
emerged in socialist East Asia are often a confirmation, rather than a critique, of the 
Enlightenment mentality.4 New Confucianism has no intention to reverse the human 
process of modernisation that is stressed by both Marxism-Leninism and Maoism and 
liberalism.
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In this context, the CCP tries to highlight a unique Chinese identity he er butong 
(‘Incorporating things of diverse nature’)?He (harmony) is in line with Confucian 
pacifism while difference aims to proclaim the legitimacy of Deng’s Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics that tries to combine liberalism and Marxism-Leninism and 
Maoism. Guided by this new approach, China has developed a preference for the use of 
“partnerships” with other nations in foreign policy, which allows for different values.6
Chinese Cultural Re-orientation
Samuel Kim believes there are in Chinese foreign policy two schools - the exotica sinica 
“continuity” and revolutionary “discontinuity”.7 In fact, this phenomenon is also the 
reflection of Chinese cultural evolution. In the 1990s, in terms of continuity, the CCP still 
kept Marxism-Leninism and Maoism and Deng’s economic liberalism, and rediscovered 
traditional values in order to strike a balance between the former two; in terms of 
discontinuity, the CCP takes de-constructive approaches to these three strands and does 
away with factors that are not compatible with modernisation.
Generally speaking, Chinese culture has been in constant change. China’s mainstream 
culture has over time exhibited great flexibility. In modem times this attribute has helped 
China to leam from the West.8 The New Cultural Movement around 1919 brought 
liberalism into China, the PRC’s establishment in 1949 secured several decades’ 
dominance of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, yet it is impossible for China to cut loose 
from its indigenous roots. China has been going through a period in which these three 
trends begin to mingle together and evolve toward oneness since Deng Xiaoping adopted 
his reform and open-door policy, and this process has been expedited since 1989 with the 
rise of the new nationalism. The problem is that it is a huge task to mix the three strands 
in an organic way, therefore the traditional Chinese wisdom he er butong (incorporating 
things of diverse nature) serves the turn. Anyway, Confucianism predisposes followers to 
“accept the status quo as intrinsically reasonable.”9
Traditional Chinese culture has two strong points that can be retrieved and inspire the 
latter-day modem world: party-state centred on Confucianism and holistic thinking based
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on Zhou Yi.10 They might contribute to social stability and order of human beings.11 In 
conjunction with Western culture that is more atomistic and analytical yet more in clash, 
traditional Chinese culture might play a crucial role in establishing a cosmopolitan and
17peaceful world culture.
1 “7China has sustained what Wang Gungwu terms as a “historical oneness”. This oneness 
is labelled as civilisation-state by many and is owed largely to China’s party state system. 
To all intents and purposes, Confucians constituted a party, at least in its primary form.14 
As a party, the Confucian school checked the power of the Emperor, the army, aristocrats 
and other interest groups and maintained the balance of power in the central authority. It 
also established an efficient inner-party balance system to maintain self-control.15
The mainstream Chinese culture stems from Zhou Yi that emphasises holistic thinking 
through maintaining balance of Yin and Yang. Confucius believed that all factors of 
nature and human beings are linked together as a whole and accordingly should be
1 fk 17studied as a whole. Xiong Shili explained this argument. He believes that the vitality 
that engenders human creativity is the same energy that gives rise to the great earth. The 
ethic of forming one body with nature looms large in his moral idealism.
Due to this kind of holistic thinking, the Chinese most of the time take an un-exploitative 
way in dealing with outside world, as “others” are a necessary part of the universe as a 
whole. “Others” exist for the sake of “us” and the whole. In fact, “China as an empire
152was not established by conquest of other nations”. The practice-based view of “the 
other” may account for the fact that Han Chinese were “not racial or biological in any 
overt sense”.19
Shortly after the Opium War, the new world of industrialisation so relentlessly 
challenged China’s traditional agriculture-based economy and family-centred social 
structure that Confucianism seemed to become almost irrelevant to the vital concerns of
70the modem world. Due to the gradual marginalisation of Confucianism China sank into 
turmoil.
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To strengthen China and restore its past glory, the Chinese tried some form of liberalism 
in the first place, yet it failed to bring about a unified, modernised and powerful China as 
expected. Therefore the Chinese finally chose Marxism-Lennism and Maoism for a way 
out. However socialism was not as helpful as people expected either. Since 1949 until 
1978 Chinese society was subjected to profoundly disruptive campaigns approximately 
every five years. In the end, Deng Xiaoping brought in economic liberalism by the back 
door in the 1980s.
Culture and Chinese Understanding of Engagement
Domestic cultural re-orientation has affected Chinese foreign policy. To control
Liberalism and maintain Marxism-Lennism and Maoism in China, Deng Xiaoping’s
strategy in foreign policy is a mixture of Confucian and Legalist approaches, wen and
01wu, namely, to use hostile policies or to use cooperative ones with the West. In China- 
US relations, CCP leaders tend to include cultural issues, which belong to the wen 
approach, into their policies.
Neither the conditional engagement proposed by James Shinn nor the constructive 
engagement raised by A. I. Johnston and Robert Ross has addressed the cultural issues of 
the Sino-American relationship, as it is mainly excluded from the US administration’s 
China policies. As far as engagement itself is concerned, cultural matters play from the 
perspective of the US little role other than educational and technological exchanges. This 
is not the case for the CCP. The party tries to convince the Chinese public that the 
Chinese way of life is indeed different from liberal democracies yet the Chinese 
difference is reasonable. It is not right for the US to nullify this difference. Therefore
CCP leaders repeatedly claim that there is a conspiracy carried out by the US that aims to
00vilify and discredit Chinese culture and to Westernise China in the area of culture. It is 
alleged that the US is using cultural means to incite rebellions in China, particularly in
0*i
the case of the Falun Gong movement.
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Most Chinese IR scholars take on board the CCP’s approach to the US engagement with 
cultural issues. Apart from the pressure from the party, there are two other reasons. On 
the one hand, civil society has not yet taken shape in China and Chinese IR scholars often 
perceive other nations unwittingly from their own experiences of the Chinese 
environment and hence treat at times what happens in civil society as official policies. 
They regard the media and academics in the US as the government's mouthpiece, as in 
China.
On the other hand, some Chinese IR scholars, due to Sino-centric thinking, claim to 
pursue the subjectivity of the Chinese culture. Whatever the economic and political 
realities of China’s future may be, one thing is pretty certain that cultural attitudes 
forming the basis for the attitudes of Chinese intellectuals across the political spectrum 
will continue to be shaped by “compelling nationalistic aspirations.”24 Therefore, when 
Chinese IR scholars examine the US engagement policy toward China, they are tempted 
to accuse the US media and academia, to suit their own nationalistic needs. Surely this 
trend is very much encouraged by the CCP.
Party Line
The core values of the CCP’s understanding of nationalism in terms of foreign policy are 
four: he er butong (incorporating things of diverse nature), weiji yishi (crisis 
consciousness), shouhai (victim complex) and minzu zihao (national pride). One can see 
this clearly from Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping and the book Deng Xiaoping 
waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao (Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy
96Thought). The author has already extensively demonstrated the CCP’s formalised 
language on weiji yishi (crisis consciousness) and he er butong (incorporating things of 
diverse nature) in preceding chapters and this chapter will deal with these two in the first 
section and in the second section turn attention to shouhai (victim complex) and minzu 
zihao (national pride) through analysis of the Chinese response to the US media.
On the establishment of a new Chinese culture, Deng Xiaoping said, “Today we still 
uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, part of which we have inherited
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and part of which we have developed ourselves...we are building a socialism suited to
97conditions in China.” The CCP thus stresses the need to cling to Marxism-Leninism and 
Maoism and proclaims, “Comrade Deng Xiaoping time and again warned us that 
forefathers should not be forgotten, namely, Marxism-Leninism and Maoism should not
9Rbe forgotten.” “The Chinese people deeply understand from experience such a truth:
90only socialism can save China.”
The CCP highlights Confucian values hexie (harmony) and pacifism. Deng said, “We 
adhere to an independent foreign policy of peace and do not join any bloc. We are
o n
prepared to maintain contacts and make friends with everyone.” The CCP says: “The
7 1
Chinese cultural tradition highlights all along 4he wei gui (peace is highly valued)’.” 
Then how to achieve this? It says:“ (We) should during external relations stick to equality 
among nations, persuade people with reason, never become overbearing nor servile, and
09
be natural and graceful, displaying the manner of a great and proud country...”
The CCP also tries to embrace Western liberalism. Deng Xiaoping said, “ ...we must 
make it clear that our guideline is just that -- to open and not to close.” The CCP says: 
“ ...it (socialism) has to boldly...imbibe and make use of all advanced management 
means and skills of countries in the present world including developed capitalist 
countries...”34 It also says: “ The open-door policy (duiwai kaifang) is due to the need to 
consolidate and develop the socialist system, to establish and improve the socialist 
market economy, to realise the strategic objective of modernisation.”
In the mean time the CCP tries to demonstrate a strong victim complex in its official 
guidelines while showing Chinese national pride. Deng said, “We, the Chinese people, 
have our national self-respect and pride. We deem it the highest honour to love our 
socialist motherland and contribute our all to her socialist construction.” The CCP is 
surely proud of China’s history. It says, “ The Chinese people has a history of long-term 
and splendid civilisation, and made important contributions toward the improvement and
77
advancement of human beings.” Nevertheless, the CCP believes that Chinese pride has 
been tarnished by Western countries. Deng said that when he heard shortly after the June
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4 event in 1989 that seven Western countries had decided to impose sanctions on China, 
it reminded him of 1900, “when the allied forces of the eight powers invaded China.” 
He also said, “For more than a century after the Opium War China was subjected to
• IQhumiliation, and the Chinese people were looked down upon.” Following Deng, the 
CCP says, after the Opium War, “The Chinese nation fully suffered the invasion, bullying 
and oppression of imperialist powers, and the Chinese people lived in an abyss of 
suffering.”40 The party proclaims that the Chinese people resolutely do not want to return 
to “the humiliated status in the past.”41
The danger against Chinese civilisation still exists according to the CCP’s guidelines. 
Deng said, “ ...some Westerners are trying to (overthrow the socialist system in 
China).”42 The CCP appeals to the Chinese crisis consciousness and says: “ Socialism is 
still at a low tide in the world...Domestic and external enemies collude with each other 
and have never forsaken the attempt to westernize, disintegrate, infiltrate, subvert and 
separate China.” 43
Among many terms, the most important ones are jianchi ma ke si lie ning zhuyi mao 
zedong sixiang (uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought), lao zhuzong 
buneng wang (forefathers should not be forgotten), he wei gui (peace is highly valued), 
yangyang daguo fengfan (the manner of a great and proud country), duiwai kaifang (the 
open-door policy), zhonghua minzu shi weida de minzu (the Chinese nation is a great 
nation), guoqu de quru diwei (the humiliated status in the past). Lao zhuzong (forefathers) 
means largely revolutionary forefathers like Marx, Engels, Mao, Zhou etc, and also 
Chinese ancestors. Lao zhuzong buneng wang (forefathers should not be forgotten) aims 
to emphasise the CCP’s respect for tradition. Yangyang in yangyang daguo fengfan (the 
manner of a great and proud country) means “grand manner” in Chinese,44 and hints that 
China is superior to other countries in morality, which is a typical Confucian Sino-centric 
view. Quru in guoqu de quru diwei (the humiliated status in the past) means in Chinese 
oppression and humiliation suffered by people,45 and it clearly shows the CCP’s 
resentment of US dominance and aggression.
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The author will in the first section focus on the Chinese response to the theory of clash of 
civilisations, and in the second on Chinese coverage of the US media.
4.1 Clash of Civilisations
The CCP’s effort to mix Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, Confucianism and liberalism is 
still at the early stage and the foundation of Chinese civilisation is still Confucianism 
regardless of the baptism of communism.46 Its position on the status of Chinese culture 
in world society is that it is superior to others in terms of peace-keeping,47 and as such it 
should be defended for the purpose of maintaining world peace, whereas they believe the 
US culture is aggressive. The CCP has long described the US as the source of 
international problems.48
Clash of Civilisations Theory
Chinese elites believe in he er butong (incorporating things o f diverse nature) yet 
mainstream Western IR theorists do not. In Western IR studies there is a key question: 
are relations among nation states inevitably conflictual? Neo-liberalism and neo-realism 
share the rationalist assumption that states are self-regarding, yet debate whether states 
pursue relative or absolute gains. Neo-liberals maintain that international institutions and 
interdependence restrain state aggression. In the US-China case, optimists like Lampton 
regard economic interdependence and common security concerns as ensuring peace.49
Realists like Kennedy have argued that rising powers like China and hegemons like the 
US invariably go to war.50 Policymakers and pundits like Condoleezza Rice and Ted 
Carpenter have drawn on such arguments to suggest that China is a revisionist power 
destined to clash with the US.51 Tom Christensen regards China as the “high church of 
realpolitik” today. In Chinese Realism, Johnston similarly argued that Chinese are 
socialised into a “hard realpolitik” strategic culture/ideology that favours “hitting hard 
and hitting first.” CCP leaders taking this view are predisposed to choose force over
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peaceful means. Drawing on social psychology to defend realism, Mercer argued that 
ethnocentrism explains the group egoism that neo-realists take for granted. Conflict, in 
his view, is “an inescapable feature of intergroup and interstate relations”.54
Constructivists like Wendt argue against realists that conflict is not the inevitable product 
of anarchy.55Constructivist IR theorists focus on the social -  rather than material -  side of 
the debate. To Wendt structural realists are wrong to assume self-help from the material 
structure of the world system.56 In Social Theory of International Politics, Wendt defends 
himself against Mercer’s critique, arguing that the “in-group bias” Mercer cites does not
c n
predetermine enmity. Generally speaking, the constructivist approach is compatible 
with Confucian views on international relations.
After the end of the Cold War, Fukuyama's theory of the end of history was a knockout in 
the academic world. The question is: Shall we human beings from now onwards never 
get involved with conflict any more? If not, what would likely give rise to the next clash? 
Some scholars in the realist school deem that economic conflicts would be at the top of 
the agenda, whereas for scholars like Samuel Huntington, clash of civilisations would fall 
under the most possible answer. To Huntington, “the primary issue is not politics and
co
diplomacy; it is the cultural epistemology that informs certain forms of interaction.”
Similar to Mercer, Huntington has made a realist argument at the even broader level of 
“civilisations”: with the end of the Cold War the major civilisations of the world are 
destined to clash.59 Identity dynamics, in Huntington’s view, make international conflict 
inevitable and he regards China as the most powerful challenge to US preponderance.
Conservative pundits following him suggested that China was not at all a “civilised”
. 60 country.
Huntington contends that the fault line of civilisations would in the 21 st century dominate 
international conflicts. To him, the looming confrontation would somehow break out 
between different civilisations and the West would face a showdown with the Non-west 
in particular. Not surprisingly, he stresses the possible threat from Islamic and Confucian
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civilisations, and is worried about the likelihood that these two groups would eventually 
collaborate for the purpose of fighting against their common enemy.
His contention is in line with other scholars’ inclination to “other” Chinese culture. From 
the 1990s on, the dominant discourse is that China has been outside the world community 
and that has not yet demonstrated sufficiently that it will “play by the rules”.61The 
linguistic subtext is an obvious sharp “othering” of China that includes a civilising 
discourse (China is not yet a civilised state) or perhaps a sports discourse (China cheats at 
games).
Few Western scholars claim in public that they would like to see China’s change in 
culture, yet few scholars advocate cultural communication between the West and China 
on an equal basis and their views are mostly overshadowed by the teacher-student 
prototype. Scholars like Susan Strange proclaim the superiority of Western culture and 
believe that the attractive culture has played a very positive role in US foreign policy to 
secure its hegemony. ‘This sense of superiority led them to look at everything in the
fsyworld primarily through an American lens.”
Confucianism has offered a counter-argument to Huntington’s thesis. Huntington’s 
exclusive dichotomies — east/west and subject/object — characteristic of modem 
consciousness working directly out of the Enlightenment, are in striking contrast with the 
Confucian preference for the “nuanced between” in interconnected binary structures. 
The Confucian horizon extends beyond instrumental rationality and presents an inclusive 
cosmological and humanist vision by transcending an “either/or” mode of thinking.64In 
some sense, there is a strong awareness in the world community of the need for a more 
holistic ethic for sustainable development.65
After Hu Jintao took over from Jiang Zemin in 2002, his team declared a more humanist 
approach to lead China, which has been hailed by many as a Confucian turn. Anyway, if  
one word could characterise the entire history of Chinese philosophy, it would be 
humanism.66 The CCP has stressed sustainable development that is indicative of the
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expedition of organic combination of the three trends: Confucianism, Marxism-Leninism 
and Maoism, and liberalism. Hu Jintao’s modernist project follows the ideal of building a
fnsociety that is “just, participatory, sustainable and peaceful”. His new approach to 
China’s politics will add more Confucian flavour to Chinese foreign policy in general and 
its US policy in particular.
Personal Advisers
Personal advisers follow the CCP’s terms regarding culture and call on the US to accept 
the Chinese socialist system in a multi-cultural world. Liu Ji particularly stresses he er 
butong (incorporating things of diverse nature) and holds that Chinese culture does not 
clash with alien ones, though butong in his eyes actually means socialism in China. He 
says: “In 5,000 years, Chinese culture has assimilated countless elements from other 
cultures. ‘Incorporating things of diverse nature’ is a distinct feature of Chinese culture.
co
This is the reason why its vitality has lasted for 5,000 years.” .
In their view, the US should take a Confucian way and tolerate Chinese socialism. 
Among Chinese IR scholars, personal advisers are the most vehement defenders of 
Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, who identify with the CCP’s effort to mix Marxism- 
Leninism and Maoism with traditional Chinese values. They believe this is the only way 
for socialism to survive in China. They claim, “The Chinese people have chosen 
socialism with Chinese characteristics. The fundamental goal of the Chinese revolution is 
to rid China of its weakness, make China rich and to modernise China.”69Liu Ji says that, 
since the end of the Cold War, China has become the only big country to maintain a 
Marxist system and many people of bullied and humiliated nations expect China to lead 
them in confronting hegemonic politics. Thus, China is liable to be in an opposite
H(\position to the US for moral reasons. He asks the Americans why they cannot tolerate
n i
Chinese socialism as the US is a pluralistic country.
For the sake of the continuity of the Chinese socialist system, they advocate that 
socialism should be integrated into the Chinese soil. Liu Ji says, “The time-honoured and 
unique cultural tradition of China is a force for [national] integration; it includes an
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7 9ardent spirit of nationalism.” It seems to Liu Ji that the establishment of a new cultural 
identity is a natural result of the CCP’s legitimacy crisis. He Xin particularly stresses the 
significance of mixing Marxism-Leninism and Maoism and traditional Chinese values 
together. He says, “ (We) shall thoroughly study the theory of New Pragmatism 
advocated by Deng Xiaoping, the theory of Socialism at Primary Stage and Socialism 
with Chinese (national, cultural and traditional) characteristics. (We) should particularly 
regard as the core of our modem political ideology patriotism and nationalism that
T\expand the Chinese national spirit and cultural tradition.” In his view, one of the strong 
points of Confucianism is that it prefers the status quo rather than radical change, which 
serves the interests of the CCP.74
Personal advisers like He Xin, Wang Daohan and Liu Ji know that the way out for 
Chinese socialism in an isolated environment is Chinese nationalism. They have 
demonstrated an extremely deep minzu zihao (national pride), weiji yishi (crisis 
consciousness) and shouhai (victim complex). He Xin is even ready to defend the new 
Chinese culture through war. He is proud of the Chinese tradition. He says: “ Our 
ancestors established a great historical China. Now we must imbue the Chinese people
ne
with consciousness of modem nation states.” He dislikes the trend to doubt and abuse 
the Chinese and tries to remind them that they are originally the offspring of a heroic
7 f%race. Wang Daohan deems that it is the duty of the Chinese people across the Taiwan 
Straits to glorify Chinese traditional values. He says that the Chinese nation has great 
cohesive force and the basic interests of people across the straits are identical. He 
believes that the common national cultural spirit is the important cornerstone of the unity
77of the two sides. Wang Daohan calls on the Chinese people, including the Taiwanese,
70
to fight for the great resurrection of Chinese civilisation. Liu Ji agrees with He and
70Wang on Chinese pride.
Personal advisers seem to grieve over the dominance of Western culture, and blame the 
West for China’s problems. To vilify the West they substitute Chinese socialism for 
Chinese tradition. As such, they have hijacked traditional Chinese culture. Wang Daohan 
talks of the historical choice of socialism by the Chinese people and linked the rise of
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socialism with the modem Chinese history of humiliation due to invasion by the West. 
To rid China completely of the humiliation imposed by the West, he calls for unity 
among Chinese: “The Chinese people stepping into the 21st century will never accept the
on
fate o f being separated and controlled by others.” He Xin claims that Westerners do not 
respect the Chinese people and Chinese culture. He says: “ In their eyes the Chinese are
01
inferior people, and Chinese culture is inferior culture.” “As a matter of fact, in the eyes 
of Westerners, there always exists contempt or discrimination upon the Chinese people in 
race and culture.” He attacks Western scholars who are critical of Chinese socialism. “ I 
know some Westerners, so-called Sinologists, including some Sinologists that are self- 
allegedly very friendly toward and understand well China, yet I have noted almost 
everywhere that they only consider Chinese civilisation as a kind of already dated 
antique, as interesting as those African woodcuts yet of little significance.” “ The 
Chinese in their eyes are low-grade in terms of culture and race, so they are used to speak 
to us with a rebuking and teaching tone.”84
Therefore personal advisers remind the Chinese people of Western cultural imperialism 
and call for unity under the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics. He Xin tries 
to remind people that “there are still imperialists in the world” and “there is still a kind of 
cultural imperialist foreign policy”.85 Liu Ji says the US, using revolutionary means, 
violent means, means of compulsions, or administrative means to export their own 
culture, is mistaken.
By binding socialism and Chinese traditional culture together, and equating Western 
pressure on the socialist system to that on Chinese tradition, personal advisers protect the 
CCP’s interests. Personal advisers actually put the interests of the CCP before the revival 
of Chinese traditional culture. Their focus is still defending socialism though they try to 
justify Chinese socialism with Confucian pacifism. From their opinions one can see 
Confucianism is only an instrument for them to boost the CCP’s legitimacy and they are 
not nationalist enough in terms of culture.
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Institutional Advisers
Most institutional advisers identify with socialism though not as closely as personal 
advisers. They try to highlight the fact that Confucianism is in fact not a strong force in 
current China though they claim China has retained Confucian pacifism. These scholars 
do not agree with Huntington that China is a Confucian country, as Marxism-Leninism
Q'T
and Maoism still play the most important role in China. What the CCP needs at present 
is not the comprehensive revival of Confucianism, but rather some parts of it, so the 
CCP’s party line is still socialism with Chinese characteristics. It is far from true to say 
China is a Confucian country. They argue that Huntington intends to exaggerate the 
difference between Chinese and US culture, to sow the seed of evil and call to prevent 
China’s rise.
Because of this, many institutional advisers believe that Huntington's conclusion is 
scarcely tenable. They contend that Confucianism has been under attack since the May 4 
movement, sometimes greatly vilified, as during the Cultural Revolution. Wang 
Xiaodong argues that China has for a long time been subjected to “the uneasy rule” of
oo
Western civilisation, be it Marxism or liberalism. Therefore, it is unfair to blame 
Chinese traditional culture for what is going wrong in China. The opposite is true: that 
Western civilisation should take much of the responsibility.
A small number of institutional advisers claim that the core of Confucianism has “been
OQ
deserted completely” in Mainland China. Wang Xiaodong points out that, compared 
with Islamic civilisation, nations in East Asia were less concerned to save their traditional 
values, and had no intention following the Cold War to fight against the invasion of 
Western civilisation in the guise of globalisation. On the contrary, they have accepted it 
whole-heartedly. So Wang Xiaodong says that what one can see in East Asia is the 
assimilation of Confucian culture by the West rather than the alleged clash between them.
In their eyes, the problem with Confucian culture is that it could no longer reproduce on 
its own as influential a value system as Western civilisation in the foreseeable future, 
despite the fact that it has left an enormous legacy of literature, music, architecture and
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even cuisine. To survive in this world, East Asia has to become Westernised sooner or 
later. If people in East Asia do regenerate a strong will for a different identity in due time, 
their choice will be restructuring Confucianism and creating a new value system that can 
be compatible with a market economy and rule of law, to stand out as a “sub-stream 
tributary rather than an adversary of the Western civilisation”.90 This is exactly the 
CCP’s party line on the new Chinese identity that aims to integrate liberalism, Marxism- 
Leninism and Maoism, and Confucianism.
Institutional advisers seldom use the term “imperialism” as personal advisers do, yet 
Western culture is in their view too patronising and paternalistic toward Chinese values. 
Some institutional advisers criticise Huntington from the perspective of Orientalism. 
According to Said, Orientalism is “a manner of regularised (or Orientalised) writing, 
vision and study, dominated by imperatives, perspectives and ideological biases 
ostensibly suited to the Orient.”91 It is the image of the “Orient” expressed as an entire 
system of thought and scholarship. Western philosophy has created antithesis between the 
East and the West, with the former being the subject, the latter the object. Therefore, 
Western intellectuals, wittingly or unwittingly, would fall into Westem-centrism, sticking 
to the principle that the West is always superior to the East. All in all, the East could not 
save itself and needs to be studied, found, redeemed and led, of course, by the West. 
They could not represent themselves and need to be represented by others. Said’s 
discourse comports with the CCP’s formalised language guoqu de quru diwei (the 
humiliated status in the past), guoji guonei didui shili xianghu goujie, xihua, fenhua, 
jinxing shentou dianfu he fenlie de tumou (Overseas and domestic enemies are in 
collusion with each other, aiming to westernise and divide China with infiltrative, 
subversive and splittist schemes) etc., therefore the Chinese government has acceded to 
the Chinese study of his theory.
Institutional advisers even go far beyond Said's point and appeal for the restructuring of 
the East’s subjectivity. This effort is indeed in line with the CCP’s line that Chinese 
culture will play an important role on the world stage in the future and its formalised 
language zhonghua minzu shi weida de minzu (the Chinese nation is a great nation). They
2 0 0
understand that the East in terms of Said's discourse means mainly the Arab world, not 
necessarily including East Asia, yet they believe it is appropriate to apply Said’s theory to 
the Chinese case. They maintain that, though there are indeed many decayed contents in
q <y
Chinese traditional culture, through a re-construction of the Chinese value system, in 
conjunction with elements of Western civilisation, China could become equal to the 
West.
Some institutional advisers believe that Huntington’s theory is not really about “cultural” 
clash but rather “interest” clash, smacking of racism. Wang Xiaodong categorically 
claims that Huntington is completely ethnocentric. Wang points out that, according to the 
world map drawn up by Huntington, the fault line of civilisations and that of ethnic 
groups are identical. To him, this is not difficult to follow, as the real problem Huntington 
intends to address is interest clash originating from ethnic conflict rather than clash of 
civilisations.93
Institutional advisers are also concerned with the consideration of resources scramble 
behind Huntington’s theory. They believe that the West intends to monopolise the 
world’s strategic resources. One might think this has indeed gone too far beyond 
Huntington's thesis, yet Chinese scholars are indeed serious. According to these 
institutional advisers, the Whites used to monopolise most natural resources, yet things 
have been greatly changed in recent decades, for non-Westerners have gained more 
powerful capabilities to extract resources from our mother planet. Wang Xiaodong 
proclaims that this conflict could be readily resolved by advancement of new 
technologies, whereas many Westerners stick to the dated theory that scarcity of natural 
resources would certainly lead to conflict if not war among different ethnic groups.94
What's Huntington's real motive to deliver his clash of civilisations theory? Most 
institutional advisers hold that he intends to point out the forthcoming threat from the 
East and China in particular, appeals to the unity of the West at this turning point and 
hence tries to maintain the hegemony the US still enjoys.95 These scholars think that fear 
would creep into Westerners’ minds. They take fright at the rise of East Asia and Greater
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China in particular. If the West were not the only “subject” in the world, Western 
intellectuals would cry out over the possible decline of their civilisation.
Many institutional advisers believe “the value system of Western culture, with the idea of 
individualism at the centre, a decadent lifestyle based on materialism, and a concept of 
gain or benefit in interpersonal relations”96 is in decline. Ren Yi holds that it is out of this
Q7fear that Huntington delivered his controversial theory. Ren deems that Western 
scholars like Huntington could no longer bear China’s rise, worrying that the West could 
somehow become equal to the East, losing its dominance in the world. It seems to Ren 
that Huntington is much more sober than Said, noting that the West will no longer be the 
controller of international politics.
Institutional advisers like Lu Shi say that Huntington does not even try to conceal in his 
book his appreciation of Western hegemony in international affairs. Huntington feels 
comfortable with the fact that decisions in accordance with the interests of the West, 
made either in the UN Security Council or IMF, are in great measure presented to the 
world as the interests of the whole world community. Lu Shi contends that this has shown
no
in particular Huntington’s hegemonic mind.
Institutional advisers like Lu Shi have studied Huntington's proposal aimed at saving the 
West from the loss of its hegemony. They claim that, whilst facing the rise of East Asia, 
Huntington does not choose communication and reconciliation as the proper way to 
maintain world peace but rather prefers Western unity as a stronghold to fight against 
enemies which he thinks would grow stronger and stronger and possibly eventually bully 
the West.
As for China in particular, institutional advisers claim that though China is not currently a 
Confucian country both countries need to leam from Confucian teachings. They appeal 
for more understanding from the US, for ren (benevolence) and he wei gui (peace is 
highly valued). Amid the turmoil of the world, they claim that this would be of great help 
in re-adjusting current international relations. “The Chinese concept of ‘benevolence’
2 0 2
will influence international norms and make international society more civilised.”99 
Institutional advisers proclaim that the proper way to establish a new world order is 
surely not through conflict, but rather, communication and mutual learning of ren 
(benevolence) and he (harmony).
Official Intellectuals
Official intellectuals are not as radical as personal and institutional advisers in terms of 
anti-Americanism, yet they are the staunchest defenders of traditional Chinese values. 
They take a theoretical approach and claim that the purpose of Huntington’s theory is to 
address US domestic rather than external problems. They think that Huntington's theory 
is based on his perception of US domestic affairs and originated from the loss of the 
Whites' superiority over other ethnic minorities. As such, they have actually discounted 
the weiji yishi (crisis consciousness) that the CCP intends to incite among the Chinese 
people. Among official intellectuals there are some staunch followers of Confucianism 
who identify China more as a Confucian country than as a socialist one.
Since the adoption of open-door policy, a large number of official intellectuals working 
with Chinese universities have been to the US for short or long-term visits. Because of 
their training in Marxism, they are sensitive to the disparity of different classes and ethnic 
groups, and are at home with relevant analysis thereof. The quality of Chinese journalists 
working in the US has also improved, compared with the 1980s. Therefore, even those 
college teachers who never set foot on US soil begin to understand the US better.
Official intellectuals like Zhang Xiaojin tend to understand Huntington from the 
perspective of America's domestic issues.100 He holds that all grand theories originate in 
the first place from the thinkers' personal experiences of a specific point in everyday life. 
However rational the thinkers would be, the starting point of their theoretical journey is 
mainly perceptual. Zhang deems that, in the case of Huntington, the point that prompted 
him to construct this controversial theory is closely connected with his observation of 
America's population change. The US foundation was laid down by WASP (White 
Anglo-Saxon Protestants) and all other European immigrants close to them. In the history
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of this young country, they used to treat Indians and Blacks in an unfair if  not savage 
way. None the less, things have been turned upside down since the 1970s. The US 
minorities, including Blacks, Hispanics, Asians and Indians, have risen up, claiming the 
human rights they are entitled to enjoy as fellow citizens. The Whites as a community 
have had to back down and reluctantly recognise the justice of the claim from the ethnic 
minorities. Many intellectuals on the left go even further maintaining that it would be 
politically wrong to criticise minorities in general and Blacks in particular.
They observe the fact that the West has been encountering a massive problem, as it is 
likely that Westerners might one day fall in their homeland into oblivion in the sea of 
non-westerners, which worries extremely scholars such as Huntington. Many 
conservatives take fright at the assertiveness of the US minorities as well as the fact that 
they would account for half of the population. The annoying thing is, however, that it is 
nowadays a taboo to address their worry straightforward from the ethnic perspective, on 
account of political correctness. Some conservatives think that this is entirely over the 
limit but they dare not say so in public, afraid of breaking the default consensus of 
political correctness in society. Therefore official intellectuals believe that, in this 
scenario Samuel Huntington chose to express it through the paradigm of civilisation. 
Many official intellectuals even think that Huntington's tenor is to tackle a complicated 
and touchy internal problem in the guise of an international one.
Many official intellectuals acknowledge the difference between Western and Chinese 
cultures, rather than duck this problem as some institutional advisers do. After the 
Kosovo incident, Xiao Gongqin pointed out, “As I have said previously, the US ‘human 
rights fundamentalism’ based on individualistic Protestant culture and China’s collective- 
centrism and collective human rights conception in its Confucian culture will clash and 
constantly widen the gap between the two sides during mutual actions.”101 He agrees with 
Huntington that the cultural tension between China and the US might lead to conflict if  
not war. Crises of confidence will at times arise due to the political cultural difference 
existing between the two countries. “Once this crisis takes place, hard-liners in the two
1A7sides will react in a mutual-provocative way.”
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Some official intellectuals like Jiang Qing fiercely defend Confucianism from
Huntington’s attacks. They are far from China’s power centre yet live an academic life as
a Chinese scholar, writing in Chinese discourse. They are less constrained by socialism
than personal and institutional advisers. As academics, they demand equal status to their
Western counterparts and believe in a modernist approach to Chinese discourse. They
agree with Tu Weiming that the US needs to transform herself from a teaching
civilisation into a learning culture. “Since the end of the Second World War, America’s
self-image as a tutor of Confucian East Asia has been so ingrained in the public
consciousness that the teacher-disciple relationship, as in the case of John Dewey and his
disciples Hu Shi and Feng Youlan, has been accepted as the norm. It is now time to work
10%at a new equilibrium of mutual learning and appreciation.”
Jiang Qing is regarded as the most important New Confucian thinker in Mainland China. 
He attacks Western culture centred on instrumental rationality and advises Chinese 
government to promote Confucianism. He regards Confucianism as superior to Western 
culture. He asserts that Confucianism is an advanced culture that puts priority on virtue 
and justice rather than on power politics, utility and efficiency. “In my opinion, if judged 
as per the criteria of Chinese culture, ‘advanced culture’ must be a culture that puts 
priority on virtue and righteousness. In today’s words, it must be a culture that puts 
priority on goodness and justice.”104
Mencius’ culture-dominated definition of binary hua-yi relations leaves a deep imprint in 
Chinese history. Tang scholar Chen Yan’s view reflects this influence: “Some people are 
bom in barbarian lands but their actions are in harmony with rites and righteousness. In 
that case, they are barbarian in appearance only but they have a Chinese heart and 
mind.”105 Seen from this angle, Western culture is a “culture of villains”, a “culture 
subduing people by force.” Jiang points out, “According to China’s cultural criteria of 
‘education of the holy man,’ Western culture since modem times has been typical 
‘hegemonic culture’ and ‘utilitarian culture.’” 106 He says that liberal democracy is a 
culture without virtue. “The problem Western liberal democracy has solved is the
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problem of legitimacy in procedure and public opinion and this is not a problem of value. 
In Chinese words, it has not touched the content of ‘virtue’. In other words, procedure 
itself is only in connection with justice of form and not value. Public opinion is only in
1 (Y1connection with form and quantity, not with moral values.” Therefore he deems 
Western culture that Huntington tries to defend as “mediocre and vulgar”.
108Therefore, Jiang Qing firmly believes in the revival of Confucianism. In this sense, US 
culture is decadent. 109He proclaims that Chinese culture can save human beings. “In my 
view, Chinese culture is the spiritual, moral and academic force to clear away social 
Darwinism that has cursed human beings. The moral nature of Chinese culture 
determines that it is the one to ‘bring about peace and harmony for 10,000 
generations.’”110
Liberals
Liberals’ response to the theory of clash of civilisations is divided, despite their anti-CCP 
consensus. Some liberals, such as Liu Junning and Cao Changqing, deem that Western 
culture is universal and China should completely accept it. Nevertheless, they do not buy 
Huntington’s argument that future world conflict will be due to a clash of civilisations. 
Liu Junning holds that the main clash in the world is still on ideology.111 Cao believes it
119will be the clash “between democracy and dictatorship.” Cao says, “Left-wing scholars 
in the West like Huntington, seemingly respecting the Third World and their cultures, are 
in fact the greatest racial discriminationists. They believe in their heart that those in non- 
western culture are not able to accept Western culture that is obviously the most 
advanced civilisation in the present world.”
Some liberals such as Li Shenzhi and Sheng Hong do not agree with Huntington about a 
clash of civilisations and believe in cultural integration. They claim that Chinese culture 
will play a crucial role in the integration of global culture. Li Shengzhi points out, 
“Chinese culture seeks for such highest realm as harmony, even unity, between nature 
and human beings (namely, so-called ‘realm of heaven’) in order to realise harmony 
among people. It is entirely in line with the current great trend of globalisation.” 114
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Other liberals, like Feng Chuan, acknowledge clash of civilisations yet believe it is 
controllable as the Chinese culture is Confucian liberalism. They believe, “ ‘Confucian 
liberalism’ grows out of the foundation o f Chinese culture. It is not a simple copy of 
Western liberalism but rather shows expressly the innate spirit of Chinese culture in 
many ways.”115
Conclusion
The CCP aims to integrate Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, liberalism and traditional 
Chinese values, and establish a new Chinese culture that is claimed to be peaceful and 
does not clash with other civilisations. From above, one can see that there is a thin 
nationalist consensus among Chinese IR scholars that China’s culture should be protected 
(even some liberals believe Chinese culture should and will play a positive role in the 
world.) and China should continue to take duiwai kaifang (the open-door policy), yet 
differ on what China should protect the most among the three trends, how and to what 
extent. Personal and institutional advisers are more concerned with socialist culture yet 
official intellectuals are more concerned with traditional culture and Confucianism in 
particular. Personal advisers regard Western cultural dominance as “imperialism”; 
institutional advisers “orientalism,” official intellectuals “patronising and paternalistic.” 
Both personal and institutional advisers blame the West for the “clash of civilisations”, 
yet official intellectuals objectively acknowledge the difference between China and the 
West in culture. Official intellectuals are the group that mostly identifies China as a 
Confucian country.
In respect of Huntington’s theory, personal advisers believe that the US is trying to vilify 
if  not destroy Chinese culture. Institutional advisers follow the CCP’s party line and 
claim that it is more than a daydream for China to ally with Islamic countries to counter 
US aggression. They insist on the US learning Chinese values, trying to break down the 
prototype of teacher-student relationship between the West and China. Official 
intellectuals mostly avoid being too close to the party line and argue that US 
aggressiveness in terms of culture is due to its domestic worries.
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From this section one can see that the future of Chinese identity construction is uncertain, 
as IR scholars differ over what specific values Chinese should take among several 
opposing approaches. It is hard for Chinese IR scholars to "find the unifying thread, the 
balancing mean, the underlying value, or the all-embracing conception.”116
4.2 Media
Media is in the West a dynamic force that constructs and de-constructs culture on a daily 
basis. The CCP understands from its own experiences the importance of media as far as 
foreign policy is concerned. The June 4 event TV coverage is still a burden for Chinese
1 1 7foreign policy. To more clearly analyse America's China policy-making process, the 
CCP began to study the influence of US media on US foreign behaviour in the 1990s. US 
foreign policy journalists often claim that their work is objective and based on facts, yet 
the CCP proclaims that the US media is generally speaking dominated by its ideology, 
self-asserted if  not fully biased, especially over a country with different culture like 
China. In the eyes of CCP leaders, US journalists try to establish US cultural hegemony 
and they manipulate the mass media for the purpose of demonising China and thereby 
gaining public support for a hard-line China policy.
Media and PR
The Media industry is closely related to Public Relations (PR) in the West, particularly in 
terms of politics. It is created to counter media’s over-extended power by creating
1 1 O
positive publicity and image-building. Gabriel Tarde and Walter Lippman are two of 
PR’s founding figures.119 They believed that PR work could control public attitudes on 
various topics in order to “manufacture consent” for the continuing rule of the ruling
17ftelite. PR has been regarded as a recipe to “manufacture the imprimatur of ‘popular
171support’ to validate the decision-making activity of elites”.
In China the media is under direct control of the CCP. One can see this from Chinese
177media’s anti-Falun Gong movement. However, since China adopted the reform and
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open-door policy, it is suggested that Chinese media’s watchdog role has been slightly
193improved. More importantly, there has recently emerged a number of commercial 
media enterprises.124 Media control has been fragmented since 1992. So far it would 
appear that fragmentation has resulted in socio-economic but not political
195liberalisation. There is to date no apparent contradiction between a market economy as 
practised in China and the continuance of one-party rule, though party officials have no 
difficulty in reeling more independent media back to a more conservative line, through
19Acensure or sacking or even arresting those who are responsible, if  they step too far 
beyond the party line.
Since the Tiananmen incident in 1989 the CCP has been looking for new ways to 
maintain and justify its hold on power, therefore PR work has been more important in
199improving the CCP’s legitimacy. The party tries to strengthen notions of both the 
foreign Other and the Chinese Self, to present a negative picture of post-communist 
societies in the ex-Soviet bloc in order to bolster fears of the potential for chaos in China 
if the CCP was overturned, to engage in image-building activities in order to mould
198public opinion in favour of the party.
The Internet has been growing in importance as a tool of government PR work in recent 
years. Some scholars have argued that it will be one of the major means ultimately to
190undermine the CCP’s legitimacy in China, yet some others have revealed that to date 
the Internet has been effectively incorporated as a tool of the party’s PR work with its
130dangers held in check. For instance, since 1999 the bulletin board of People’s Daily, 
“Strong Nation Forum” (qiang guo luntan) has become one of the most popular sites in 
China. The boards are closely censored by the police, yet the highly nationalist messages 
there have effectively generated substantial support for the party.
Nationalism
Since 1989, the CCP has faced the difficult task of finding a positive image, a reliable 
replacement for that of a communist revolutionary party. Nationalism, fanned by the
131official media, has become an important tool to fulfil this regeneration. To some
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extent, the CCP has effectively grasped both traditional media control means in 
communist regimes and new approaches like PR in the West. The party has demonstrated 
its flexibility.132
Throughout the 1990s, the CCP has carefully fanned the flames o f nationalism and anti- 
Americanism through its propaganda system. To counter persistent denigration by the 
US, the Chinese official media has portrayed the US “as the self-appointed policeman of 
the world”. The Chinese media began to promote the view that US-led Western 
countries were now trying to “contain China”, inciting Chinese people’s crisis 
consciousness.134
The Chinese government’s handling of NATO’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade in May 1999 most vividly illustrates the way in which the controlled Chinese 
media carefully whip up and manage the masses’ nationalist sentiments. The party- 
controlled media did not report NATO’s or US statements that the bombing was a 
mistake or either’s regrets or apologies until three days after the bombing was first 
reported in China and it portrayed the bombing as intentional and barbaric, part of a 
larger US evil plan to try to control the entire world.
What is the result of the CCP’s media campaigns? Apparently the party has gained more 
support from the public though some worry that the manipulation might backfire some 
day. It is suggested that the Chinese government could hence easily whip up their people 
into a war frenzy in the name of “recovery” of Taiwan or retention of Tibet.135 Students 
are becoming more patriotic and more pro-CCP.136 The consciousness of the Chinese 
public has been distorted to some degree, as demonstrated by Chinese public’s sympathy 
toward terrorists in the September 11 tragedy.137
China’s Image Building
Chinese nationalism requires a lustrous image of China and the CCP. National image- 
building has long been a crucial component of PR in practice in international relations. 
Positive image is one of the goals that states pursue and it is an independent factor in
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international relations. For instance, Thucydides regards honour as one of the important
1^0
national goals. Morganthau regards prestige-seeking as one of his three classified 
110foreign policies. National image-building is about building images of power, real or 
imagined.140 Generally speaking, classic realists regard image-building as “human 
nature”.
It is true that classical realists have a narrow view of prestige, namely, images of 
power.141 Nevertheless, they argue that states are not only driven by the desire for 
material benefits such as national security and national power, they are also motivated by 
aspiration for national honour and prestige. This suggests that, in their eyes, pursuit of 
honourable and prestigious national images have a causal impact on foreign policy. Neo­
realists largely focus on the use of reputation in international confrontation.142 Neo-liberal 
institutionalists stress the utility of reputation in international co-operation. In their eyes, 
what makes players more likely to co-operate is their expectation for the future, i.e. future 
rewards for co-operation now and future penalty for defection now.143
Scholars in the game theory school stress the instrumental nature of national image- 
building. Most game theorists believe that governments decide what images to pursue 
depending on the issue at hand. If they want to prevent other states from taking hostile 
actions, they are likely to establish a resolute image. If they want to encourage co­
operation from others, they tend to establish an image of a trustworthy partner. Some 
game theorists stress the importance of credibility in foreign policy. If policy-makers 
regard reputation as sufficiently important, they will engage in national image-building 
for long-term benefits.144
For over 2000 years Confucianism dominated Chinese culture and public shaming is not 
accepted in Chinese culture.145 In external relations, Chinese imperial rulers tried to 
demonstrate the peaceful nature of Chinese foreign policy. Many modem China experts 
are convinced that, in terms of foreign policy, traditional China was indeed more peaceful 
than other empires and that this strategic culture continues to influence China’s military 
strategy today.146
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During the reform period, the CCP has all but abandoned the image of a bastion of 
revolution/liberation. Instead it has given unprecedented emphasis to the images of China 
as a peace lover, an independent actor and a major power. China has consistently pursued 
the images of China as a peace-loving nation, an opponent of hegemony and a justice 
defender. Since 1989 the CCP has tried to incorporate Confucianism into the new 
Chinese culture, to promote the traditional idea of he er butong (incorporating things of 
diverse nature) in Chinese foreign policy and present an image of harmony on the world 
stage.
Different Understandings of Media
Images are largely established by media, either through PR or government control, yet 
China and the US have different approaches to how national images should be 
constructed. Firstly, in terms of foreign affairs reporting, the Chinese way is typically 
Confucian i.e. holistic, as the CCP regards journalism and foreign relations as an entity 
and stresses the responsibility of the media industry in foreign relations. The CCP’s focus 
is on “fair” coverage, i.e., balanced reporting that supports a stable US-China 
relationship. The US media were criticised for failing to use a broad range of sources in 
reporting on China, imposing preconceived notions on their stories. The US view, in 
contrast, is that journalists are obligated to report exactly what they see rather than stress 
the responsibility of journalists to foreign relations.147
Secondly, as discussed above, Chinese media is still not an independent power in society. 
The Chinese government still relies more on propaganda control than PR to deal with the 
media. By contrast, the US media is independent of the government and aims to provide 
the “unvarnished truth” about US foreign affairs.148 Due to the dominance of the state 
media, popular Chinese objections to the US tend to sound oddly uninformed. Chinese 
public have accepted the CCP’s portrait of the US as a “hegemon”.149
These differences lead to media war between the two countries. The CCP claims that the 
Chinese public has substantial access to US media, which provides the possibility for a
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richer and broader understanding of US culture and society. Chinese foreign affairs 
journalists assert that China’s coverage of the US is much more extensive than US media 
reports on China.150 In the meantime the CCP claims that the Americans know little of 
the Chinese culture and the current situation due to the poor work of US journalists. At 
times the media war between the two sides can be very tense if  not ugly.151
Party line
The CCP is resentful of the US effort to “defame” China’s image. To maintain a positive 
image in the world, CCP leaders carefully defend China’s position while attacking the US 
media. Deng Xiaoping once said: “The American public got its information from the 
Voice of America and from American newspapers and periodicals, which reported that 
blood was flowing like a river in Tiananmen Square and that tens of thousands of people 
had died. They even gave the exact number of casualties. The Voice o f America has gone
I
too far. The people working for it tell lies (sahuang); they are completely dishonest.” 
He also said that China should not bow down before the Western media: “At the moment, 
the media worldwide are putting pressure on us; we should take it calmly and not allow 
ourselves to be provoked.”153
CCP leaders regard the party as the guardian of Chinese culture and image. The party 
deems that there is a US conspiracy that aims to vilify and discredit Chinese culture and 
hence calls for self-defence. It urges Chinese IR scholars to follow such formalised 
language as guoji yilun ya women (the media worldwide are putting pressure on us), 
zhonghua minzu you zhe youjiu huihuang de wenming shi (the Chinese people has a 
history of long-term and splendid civilisation), zhonghua minzu shi weida de minzu (the 
Chinese nation is a great nation). The CCP constantly tries to remind the Chinese people 
of the evil committed by the West by formulised language like zhonghua minzu baoshou 
diguo zhuyi lieqiang de qinlue qinling he yapo (the Chinese nation fully suffered the 
invasion, bullying and oppression of imperialist powers), guoqu de quru diwei (the 
humiliated status in the past), guoji guonei didui shili xianghu goujie, cong wei fangqi dui 
woguo jinxing xihua, fenhua, jinxing shentou, dianfu he fenlie de tumou (domestic and 
external enemies collude with each other and have never forsaken the attempt to
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westernise, disintegrate, infiltrate, subvert and separate China). The party appeals to 
history and calls on Chinese IR scholars to defend the CCP’s contribution to China.
After the mid-1990s Jiang Zemin began to enjoy dominant power in China. He was 
sensitive enough to notice the change in social values among the Chinese people due to 
the emergence of new classes in China, particularly those of the middle class and 
entrepreneurs. Behind this state of new social stratification rests a widespread cynical 
view of power and politics in China. Therefore Jiang used propaganda themes appealing 
to nationalistic sentiment in order to foster a more cohesive populace.154 In the late 1990s 
the Chinese media was inundated with articles or programmes strongly promoting Jiang’s 
new theories of the “Three Represents” and the call to rule China by law and virtue (yifa 
yide zhi guo). Jiang’s concept of which “traditional” socialist and “Chinese” values might 
be adopted was further articulated and his nationalist approach to save the CCP was laid 
bare.155
Personal Advisers
Personal advisers believe that the US media is an instrument of US government’s cultural 
“imperialism” and is not objective at all, following Deng Xiaoping’s terms like guoji 
yilun ya women (the media worldwide are putting pressure on us) and sahuang (tell lies). 
Liu Ji once said, “the Western media and the US media in particular all along have their 
bias, and often attack China without reason.”156 He even made fun of US journalists that
1 ^ 7they could not see real China in daytime due to the 12-hour time difference. He Xin 
deems that the US media is rumour-mongering in support of the US government. He 
attacks the state-funded VOA: “ There are other varieties of rumours. For instance, this 
March the VOA attacked me by name in its News Figures according to libel materials. I 
am really lucky!” During an interview, He Xin expressed his disappointment with the 
Western media for its distortion of facts. “In terms of disappointment, I mean this point, 
namely, I used to believe that the Western news media has so-called objectivity and 
fairness. However, I have noted that since the 1989 event many of their reports on 
Chinese issues have very strong bias of ideology, value and conception.”159 He Xin is 
obviously aggrieved by the global worship of US culture due to US media world
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dominance. He says: “ It seems to me, the US culture in the 20th century established for 
the human world a number of modem totems through such media industry as Broad 
Avenue. (The US) has conquered many relatively backward countries in terms of culture 
with your unrivalled advertising means. A number of new totems, one of which is the 
totem of political democracy, are the totem of US ideology in terms of culture, the totem 
of US way of life in terms of economy.”160 As such he believes that the positive image of 
the US in the world is largely due to the US PR movement backed by its power 
dominance rather than from facts.
Institutional Advisers
Institutional advisers closely follow the party line that the US media tells lies (sahuang). 
When the CCP is under great pressure from world opinion {guoji yilun ya women) and 
the Chinese people begin to doubt the legitimacy of the CCP’s one-party rule, 
institutional advisers try to convince the Chinese public that what the Western media and 
particularly the US media say is not true. They claim that US journalists intend to defame 
the CCP. They largely base their argument on their theoretical analysis over ideology of 
cultural hegemony.
In their view, ideology is innately biased yet the US media is indeed highly ideologised. 
They hold that ideology is still a crucial component of US foreign policy. Bian Qingzhu 
points out that the US was in dispute with European countries for a long time after it 
became independent. Against the “Old Continent”, the Americans boasted publicly about 
their values of freedom, democracy, and diplomatic morals.161
The question is where on earth the ideology, in the context of this totally new 
international environment after the end of the Cold War, comes from? To answer this 
question, personal advisers fix their eyes more on the PR work of the US government yet 
institutional advisers more on the media industry itself. The latter think that the media 
industry has contributed a lot in ideological factors of the US China policy and it is 
always in the shadow of US social values and way of life. Liu Kang is a scholar working 
with the University of Pennsylvania, very influential among institutional advisers and
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having close contact with CASS, so the author puts him in the league of institutional
1 f k ladvisers. His book Behind the Demonization o f  China reflects a growing nationalism in 
China as well as concern over the US media. “Laden with criticism of both American 
culture and the motives of US foreign policy, these books hypothesise a conspiracy 
between the media and the US government to ‘contain’ and discredit China.”
From his point of view, the role of ideology is in short to interpret and construct some 
specific values and judgment as universal truth accepted by the public.164 He agrees with 
PR theorists like Tarde and Lippman and asserts that intellectuals take cover in the name 
of the public from being regarded as biased while trying maintain and improve the 
interests of some groups in a society, rather than the public.165
He argues that the US mass media is amazingly successful in interpreting US nationalism 
into a sort of new internationalism or universalism i.e. international norms. A growing 
number of international relations scholars have noted the impact of international norms 
on national practices.166 For most human beings, group norms are among the most 
important sources of influence over their behaviours. Therefore if  a superpower like 
the US hijacks international norms with its narrow nationalist approach, other states’ 
reasonable interests will be in danger.
In his view, liberty, rule of law and technology are typical US national values. On 
account of the great power of US media like CNN, TIME, Washington Post, New York 
Times, movies made in Hollywood etc., American values in the guise of international 
norm have advanced by infiltration into almost all comers of the world. The power of the 
US media has been further increased due to the advance of new technologies, which can
1A8be shown by its coverage of the June 4 event in 1989.
"'Freedom* is America's national myth and the fundamental pillar of American 
ideology,"169 Liu Kang says. In his view, it is through the US media that freedom turns 
into an eternal tmth regardless of historical, time, racial and cultural differences. He 
argues that "freedom" indeed has been building up a solid foundation and framework for
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America as a big tower. However, the problem is, if one steps out of this big tower, one 
might have different views of freedom and would somehow consider it as a sort of 
specific product arising out of history. Nevertheless, thanks to the US media, “US 
freedom” has become an international norm.
170Rule of law is for Liu Kang the second pillar of US ideology. It seems to him that law 
is to some extent if  not totally a procedure only, short of justice. The Americans respect 
their legal system, as rule of law is by nature the core of Western culture, but Liu Kang 
takes a Confucian view (or following Jiang Zemin’s “rule of virtue”) and argues that this 
does not necessarily mean it represents justice. As long as rule is followed, the authority 
of law will be well maintained despite that truth could in a measure be discounted or 
distorted. In his eyes, it is this sort of value that the Americans move heaven and earth to 
preach to the world.
To a certain extent, Liu Kang is slightly post-modem in his argument as to media's role in 
US culture-moulding. He deconstructs the whole legal system and doubts its justice and 
universality. In his view, the US legal system cannot be promoted to other countries on 
account of its own faults and its typical US national characters. Liu Kang cites the 
Simpson case to shore up his argument. His opinion is that due to a range of solid 
evidences against him, Simpson manipulated successfully the US legal system with the 
support of his lawyers who shrewdly turned this obvious murder case into one of racial 
discrimination. Despite the failure of the US legal system, Americans still continue to 
trust in the principle of mle of law. In Liu Kang's view, the mass media has contributed 
greatly in persuading the public to put their faith in a system that benefits elites the most.
171Technology cult is the third pillar, according to Liu Kang, of US ideology. Due to mass 
media's propaganda that Americans have grasped the most advanced technology in the 
world comes the credible evidence that they have indeed discovered the very truth of 
human beings ahead o f other nations. Technological preponderance leads to ideological 
self-righteousness and technology itself has been ideologised.
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Traditionally, Chinese try to separate technology from ideology and only accept Western 
technology without its cultural attachment. In an information technology era, it is more 
difficult for Chinese to continue in this way, as Western culture is more closely integrated 
into technology. For example, the Internet through which the Chinese people can more 
readily access Western news reports and spread opinions poses a serious threat to the
171)CCP’s rule and its political propaganda. Many institutional advisers like Liu Kang 
have noted this danger and try to de-link the US technology and its social and political 
implications.
Liu Kang says, “Lots of Americans think that America has freedom, rule of law and more 
advanced technology, so Americans, in their own right, have got the truth, universal and 
almost valid everywhere. This is America’s ideology. This is the spiritual pillar of
171Americans.” This belief has been input by US media on a daily basis, and the media 
fills Americans with pride and confidence in their country, which goes to such extremes 
that many Americans then believe that the US has human beings’ truth in her hands. In 
Liu’s eyes this is definitely not the case.
Based on their assertion that US mass media is not as objective as claimed, institutional 
advisers show very strong interest in the concept of cultural hegemony. Due to the rise of 
new conservatism in Chinese academia, the tallest theory of post-modernism becomes 
surprisingly popular. Many Chinese intellectuals have embraced Foucault's idea that 
knowledge is power and believe accordingly that Western intellectuals make the most of 
their advantage in knowledge, to become teachers if  not preachers to the Third World. 
Chinese scholars deem that Western intellectuals’ domestic PR work has secured elites’ 
social, economic and political advantages over other classes,174 their international PR 
work helps them enjoy these privileges against other nations. Many institutional advisers 
exposed to Western academic training champion this idea with extreme zeal.
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Li Xin is one of them. He divides US cultural hegemony into three categories: popular 
culture, language and news information hegemony. It seems to him that the essence of 
these three lies in other nations' voluntary acceptance of US cultural dominance. As far as
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popular culture is concerned, he is amazed that US products have infiltrated all comers of 
the world. In the case of Chinese youth, many Chinese IR scholars deem he is quite right, 
for young students that are mostly Americanised in their way of life are those who are 
most likely to turn a blind eye to China's complicated reality.
As for language hegemony, Li Xin deems that, in information society, whoever gains 
language superiority over others would dominate information flow. As a former colony 
o f the British Empire which took control in its heyday of a quarter of the world’s territory 
and population, and which promoted English as official and business language among its 
colonies, the US takes advantage of this legacy and spreads its values in a surprisingly 
efficient way. At present 80% electronic information in the world is saved in English, 
two-thirds scientists are able to read English. Therefore one can say that English is 
undoubtedly the dominant language in international relations.
To institutional scholars, “Much U.S. coverage...is selective, negative and presents an 
incomplete picture of China. As a result, the American media are not helping the US 
public to be better informed.’” 176 One of the most important reasons for this failure is
|  nn
lack of understanding Chinese language and hence Chinese culture.
As far as the media hegemony is concerned, Li Xin contends that 90% of international 
news information is controlled by the West and the US in particular. Through the 
selection and interpretation of news materials, they are trying to brainwash people in the 
Third World into willingly accepting Western values. Back in 1997 in Britain, he 
conducted a survey in the College of Journalism, Media and Culture at the University of 
Wales. His interviewees were 24 research and taught course students from 12 African 
countries. The result o f this study supported his presumption. Over 80% of the 
international news these countries were using was from Associated Press and Reuters; 
secondly, 60-70% of the international news were covering the US, only 20% covering the 
Third World, mostly on the negative side.
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He regards it as carpet-bombing of the Third World by the West. As long as you take 
news from the CNN, you would become brainwashed by American values. This is Li 
Xin's logic. His view is surely in line with the party’s stance over information 
globalisation. The rapid extension of the information highway has created a space beyond 
geographic boundaries and hastened China’s modernisation. After the original 
enthusiasm of embracing the technical breakthrough, the CCP has realised that the 
Internet would make Chinese people more influenced by Western thought and stopped 
describing it as fair and secure. Many worry about the dominance of English resources on
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the Internet and the danger of brainwashing.
Based on theories of ideology and cultural hegemony, institutional advisers attack the US 
media for the purpose of rescuing the CCP’s image among the Chinese people. To them, 
the US media, as one of the most crucial foreign policy instruments, takes advantage of 
its hegemonic status in the world and actively promote its hegemony. In their view, they 
intend to achieve this goal at the expense of China’s image and consequently demonise 
China to the best they can.
The concept of demonisation is arguably raised by Li Xiguang and Liu Kang in the first 
place. Li used to work with Xin Hua News Agency. In 1996 they edited a book named 
Behind Demonizing China, all the rage among Chinese youth. Liu Kang says that China's 
image has been deliberately smeared in the US by the media and some China study 
scholars. Liu Kang entirely disagrees with Huntington on his theory of clash of 
civilisations, and looks down on his academic contributions. For some Chinese scholars 
like Liu Kang, Huntington's research is not an academic work but rather a PR work and 
only represents the superiority of the whites over others. He has lashed Orville Schell and 
Perry Link as they have criticized emerging Chinese nationalism. Liu Kang says that 
most Americans have no deep prejudice against China, nevertheless, those like Perry 
Link, Orville Schell, Andrew Nathan and Yu Yingshi play a negative role. “Amid the 
present adverse trend to demonise China in America, these authorities and experts do not 
play a role of critics with sober rationality as scholars should do, but add fuel to the
1 70flames and stir up trouble. It is very regretful and worrying." In their eyes, China
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studies scholars’ works (or PR) have played a critical role in “regimenting the public
1 Rflmind,” inputting negative images of China into the Western public’s minds.
In China, institutional advisers are among those who are most accustomed to the West. 
They claim they do not mind negative stories when these stories are accurate; rather, they 
say, their concerns originate from the perception that Western reporting is predominantly 
negative without being tempered by coverage of the positive aspects of China's 
development. “Such coverage, they posit, undermines the healthy development of the
1 ft 1Sino-American relationship.” Those institutional scholars thus argue that the picture of 
China in the Western public’s minds is not complete, due to the one-sided Western 
coverage of China. Wang Minjuan and Shi Anling have studied some popular books on 
China in the US. Their conclusion is that they have a single-minded stereotype to smear 
China’s image, exposing China's darkness and even horror since the late 1980s and
1 ft?Cultural Revolution in particular and never mentioning China’s bright side.
Some institutional advisers have already realised the role of popular books in Sino- 
American relations. Like Liu Kang, Wu and Shi, they claim that these books, in order to 
accommodate the mainstream ideology in the US, have demonised China in public and 
replaced the Soviet Union with China as a new enemy. They believe that “the U.S. press 
has its own ideological framework or is excessively responsive to an agenda set by
■I
Washington D.C.-based editors or the US government”. The main objective of the 
media is to maintain the US hegemony. These scholars claim that what the US media has 
done will greatly damage relations between these two countries.
To counter-attack the US media, institutional advisers from the PLA have proposed some 
war-like ways to defend China’s positive image.184 They have meticulously studied the 
US media during the 1991 Gulf War and during the fight for Kosovo. They have noted 
with great interest psychological-warfare activities and the increased strategic role that 
the mass media played during both operations. In “Ow PSYWAR in Recent High-Tech 
Local Wars”, Wang Zhengxin and Yang Suping emphasize the importance of gaining
IftC
media superiority and of controlling the negative effects of media coverage. Xu
2 2 1
Hezhen says that one cannot believe that “the foreign moon is rounder than our own”, for
1 8Athis is defeatist psychology.
Official Intellectuals
Official intellectuals are the most nationalist among Chinese IR scholars in culture, as 
they are either more concerned with the status of Chinese academia as an interest group 
in the world academic community or more pro-Confucianism. They keep a distance from 
the official formalised language guoji yilun ya women (the media worldwide are putting 
pressure on us) and sahuang (tell lies), as it mainly stresses the interests of the party 
rather than the whole Chinese society or rather the Chinese academic community.
Many official intellectuals highlight the urgency to improve the quality of Chinese 
academic products, establish the authority of Chinese academia. To them institutional 
advisers’ radical approach to Western culture is in fact a Western rather than Chinese 
response, an emotional rather than sober response, falling short of academic quality. 
Some o f them publicly expressed their dissatisfaction over institutional advisers’ 
approach. A famous scholar working with Beijing University, Sun Liping, tries to 
pinpoint extreme ideas among institutional advisers to interest-driven and Cold War
1 87thinking and advocates more high quality research. He deems that little valuable and 
innovative research has been done by institutional advisers yet they readily follow the 
fashion of post-modernism and particularly its Chinese derivative “cultural conservatism” 
(i.e. socialism with Chinese characteristics, more than just traditional values). In his view, 
the reason for this phenomenon is connected with the composition of this elite group. Sun 
has noted that they are actually a club that are best informed of Western academia among 
Chinese intellectuals, either well trained in Western academia or greatly influenced by 
Western scholars. Most of them speak Western languages well. It seems to Sun that their 
radical reaction toward the US media and academia is either due to their bitter personal 
experiences, bullied or despised, as foreign students in the West, or due to their own 
desperate effort to survive and to find a place in Western academia, which has reduced 
the quality of their research as Chinese scholars.
2 2 2
Sun has also pointed out that the rise of Chinese cultural conservatism is closely related 
to the new economic reality China has to face in a new era. When China was still self­
closed the West was viewed from a distance as the world of rational and reasonable 
institutions, of overflowing energy and full creativity, of advanced technology and 
abundant capital, yet since the 1990s, when China was further exposed to the world 
economy, the West has surely become China’s competitor in terms of world market. The 
ideal image of the West is broken and many Chinese IR scholars (mainly institutional 
advisers) begin to doubt the motives of the US media and academia towards China. Sun 
himself keeps a distance from these scholars and believes that they are still under the 
spell of the “Cold War thinking” though most of them are quite familiar with Western 
literature and have plenty of contacts in Western academia. When he uses the term “Cold 
War thinking,” he does not mean the ideological thinking style arising out of the Cold 
War period when the socialist bloc fought against the capitalist bloc, but rather means the 
CCP’s victim complex. He contends that this complex, which took shape due to the 
modem Chinese history of humiliation, has greatly strengthened the Chinese sensitivity 
about economic competition between China and the US and inequality in international 
relations. In terms of its impact upon the quality of research, he does not think it benefits 
Chinese academia if Chinese IR scholars study international relations through lenses of 
such thinking patterns like strong powers and weak powers, like suzerainty and the 
colonised.
Another scholar from Beijing University, Zhu Wenli, deems that institutional advisers 
have actually wrongly interpreted the US media in an emotional and not an academic 
way. She argues that it is due to the US policy of plural culture rather than cultural 
hegemony that the anti-China voice can be heard in the US media. After examining US 
cultural history she holds that cultural pluralism took shape in the late 1980s yet its root 
could be tracked down to the period of the civil rights movement in the 1960s when 
liberalism was all the rage in the West. Those who believe in plural culture deem that 
there should be no dominant culture in the world and all kinds of cultures and values are 
equal. No culture is right enough to command other cultures to leam, if not copy, its own 
values. They also deem that the current dominant status the WASP culture enjoys is due
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to the preceding US history, and now the US situation has turned out to be greatly 
different, therefore the US politics and legal system should become plural and the US 
value system should also become plural. Zhu Wenli is pretty sure that the policy of 
cultural pluralism has been well carried out in the US and therefore one can always find
i oo
diversified opinions from US academia and the media industry. She believes that, in 
line with liberalism or rather political correctness, there is a consensus in the US that 
when China tramples these “universal values” within its border it should be criticised.
Confucian thinker Jiang Qing is more interested in the nature of media in modem time - 
both Chinese and Western media - than the media war between China and the US. It is 
true that he tries to discredit the US media yet he does not really follow the party line. He 
argues that both the Chinese and US public are under the spell of media and he advocates
1 SQ“close communication” or “face-to-face communication”. Why should human beings 
need this kind of traditional communication? He believes that “it is determined by 
spreading means of truth. It is only through face-to-face communication that truth {dao) 
of the universe and life can be spread. Media nowadays cannot do it, as there is a medium 
standing between, cutting off the true existence of human beings and making it hard for 
human beings to communicate in a direct way.”190 He even goes on to blame modem 
media for human beings’ alienation. In his view, language has been turned into a pure 
instrument due to modem media’s control over our life world. Therefore he calls on elites 
to “use as little as possible modem media to communicate at a deep level.”191 Apparently, 
serious topics like China’s cultural re-orientation and China-US relations should be 
discussed at this level.
Liberals
Almost all liberals are against the CCP’s media control in China and appreciate US press 
freedom. Liu Xiaobo published several articles during the trial of the South China 
Metropolitan Case (Nan Du Case). He deems that the editors of this well-known 
newspaper have been trapped due to their laying bare the SARS epidemic and other 
negative events in Guangdong. He says, “The current CCP regime is proclaiming to 
‘establish modem political civilisation’, yet one of the main symbols of ‘modem political
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civilization’ is press freedom. A society that wilfully frames up consciousness of 
journalism and oppresses liberal media is not able to produce a journalist army with 
social responsibility and professional morality, not able to cultivate an independent fourth
1 QOpower, let alone modem civilisation of press freedom.” Neither has he talked about the 
US government’s PR work nor ideological bias of the media. Likewise other liberals 
mostly focus on the CCP’s misconduct. On April 30, 2003, Wang Dan made a comment 
in Radio Free Asia, attacking the CCP’s media control during the SARS epidemic. He 
blamed media control for the disaster. He says that media control brings about social 
instability, contrary to the CCP’s expectation, ruins the government’s credit in economy 
and prevents the fledgling Chinese market system from maturity. His conclusion is: “If 
(China) does not carry out political reform and media reform in particular, (the problem) 
will probably not be solved once and for all...It will be strange if such a political and 
economic system does not go wrong.”193
Conclusion
From the above, one can see that, by and large, the CCP’s approach to the US media is 
self-defence. Personal and institutional advisers take an aggressive stance against the US 
media to defend the CCP’s party line, political terms like guoji yilun ya women (the 
media worldwide are putting pressure on us) and sahuang (tell lies). Personal advisers 
have a repelling sense of crisis consciousness and are most critical of the US media. They 
believe that there is a conspiracy in the US government to discredit the CCP and call on 
Chinese to stand up and fight against US “cultural imperialism.” Compared with official 
intellectuals, they are much closer to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism among the three 
components of the new Chinese culture. Institutional advisers engage in debates to 
discredit the US media and to defend what the CCP has achieved in the time of reform 
and make proposals to take PR measures to produce a positive image for the CCP. They 
are less concerned with the PR work of the US government than personal advisers.
Many official intellectuals are eager to improve the quality o f Chinese research. To them 
institutional advisers’ response to Western culture is not academic enough. Official 
intellectuals try to avoid the party line, taking a different approach, trying to explain the
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clash in terms of media between the two sides in a balanced way and showing much less 
critical sentiments about the US media. They do not buy the idea that there is a consistent 
and intentional cultural attack from the US government. Nevertheless they are those who 
are the most conservative among Chinese IR scholars in terms of Chinese traditional 
values. As always, liberals expressly attack the CCP’s party line. In the media war 
between China and the US, they take the side of the US.
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Chapter V China’s Arguments on America: Economic Issues
In this chapter, the author will move on to the CCP’s formulations on US-China relations 
regarding economic issues. Based on 47 articles on this topic, the author will examine 
and discuss the Chinese writings on US economic power and China’s WTO entry, for the 
purpose of presenting the CCP’s nationalistic stance on economic issues in the bilateral 
relationship and how Chinese IR scholars respond to it.
The CCP’s legitimacy claims now rest heavily on its achievement of nationalist and 
economic objectives. Despite its rhetoric, the CCP has only a limited ability to deliver 
nationalist goals such as reunification with Taiwan, control over the Diaoyu and Spratly 
Islands, and increased international prestige. Therefore it is vital for China to join the 
world economy and expedite its economic modernisation.1 Regardless of suffering from 
the dislocations of modernisation, China has to remain dependent on international loans, 
foreign investment and access to foreign markets. To all intents and purposes the core 
component of the CCP’s foreign economic policy is economic binding. However, it is 
suggested by Karl Gerth that economic bonding encourages and spreads nationalism in 
China.2
In the 1990s, China became one of the world’s manufacturing centres and began to 
produce enormous amounts of labour-intensive and even high tech-intensive goods. 
Many Chinese people began to take pride in China’s contribution to the world economy 
and to readily slip into the Chinese glory of the past. On the other hand, there emerged an 
increasingly growing belief that China as a nation needs its own national brands whose 
core technologies are in the hands of Chinese. The labels of “foreign goods” were 
flaunted by some rich people who had strong links with abroad and generated contempt if  
not hatred among the majority.
For the sake of nationalist goals, the CCP intends to maximise China’s gains from 
international economic activities. Since the mid-1990s, China has hoped for a multi-polar 
world in which it could readily develop its economy, yet it did not happen at the
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beginning o f the 21st century. What the CCP faces is an increasingly globalised world 
with a still strong and dominant power - the US. The party thus adopts a pragmatic 
strategy that aims to at times bend current international rules and norms in order to 
achieve national wealth and power while largely complying with international rules. 
China has never aimed at becoming a western “market economy” but rather at engaging 
and using other market economies to become a great power.4 As such the US is not a 
model to copy or learn from but rather an objective to exploit. This strategy apparently 
challenges US engagement policy toward China.
Economic interdependence is the core of US engagement toward China. The rationale 
behind engagement is that it may bring about a China that will be integrated into world 
capitalism and will be more accepting of the contemporary international order and more 
committed to bringing about social changes in it through peaceful means.5 It encourages 
China to behave well as a responsible major power in the world and it tries to push China 
gradually toward democratic political change.
5.1 US Economic Power
The CCP’s observation of US economic power in the age of globalisation is the 
foundation of China’s increasingly strong economic nationalism. Rapid economic growth 
since 1992 has greatly boosted the CCP’s confidence in China’s comprehensive national 
power and national pride. Therefore the CCP’s party line is centred on the view that the 
US heyday has gone and its gradual yet irreversible decline is under way. Jiang Zemin’s 
close friend Liu Ji even publicly claimed in 2004 that the September 11 event would 
hasten the US decline.6 This tendency has been supported by the US decline theory in the 
West.7
Most Chinese IR scholars follow the US decline thesis yet some do not agree and argue 
that the US is still the dominant power in the world economy and there is little sign of its 
weakening. However, it does not follow that these scholars affirm the US policy of 
engagement. They also call on CCP leaders to take notice of China’s financial and
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economic crisis, warning them against US hostility and arrogance. Financial and 
economic crises are in general one of the main causes of the emergence of nationalist 
movements or regimes, since nationalists might grasp the opportunity and proclaim their 
capacity for solving the crisis, which can be seen clearly from the upsurge of nationalist 
movements in countries like Turkey, India and China in the first half of the twentieth 
century. Therefore, in terms of economy, these scholars are actually more anti-US than 
those who closely toe the party line.
Economic Globalisation and US Power
From the 1990s onwards the debate of US decline was set in the new context of economic 
globalisation. Due to different interpretations of globalisation, different Chinese IR 
scholars have different perceptions of the American decline theory. However, by and 
large they regard globalisation as a double-edged sword that might delay the US decline 
yet might also constrain its international behaviour.
Economic globalisation benefits US dominance in a number of aspects in the short term. 
Firstly, as the country that has most powerful transnational corporations, the US draws on 
corporate power to maintain its dominance in the world. Corporate powers in the US 
have developed the concept of “disciplinary neo-liberalism”, which means they are in 
charge of the rules of international trade. They ask the US government to implement
Q
these rules in the world and in turn help the US government maintain its hegemony.
Secondly, economic globalisation has promoted the ideology of liberalism in the world 
and has provided opportunities for the US to spread democracy in non-Western areas. 
When the US draws on its military might to protect and secure its economic interests in 
non-democratic countries, its liberal allies will only pay lip service to protest.9
Thirdly, ongoing globalisation is flanked by gigantic US global military dominance, 
which has secured US power for the moment. Globalisation is about international norms 
yet, in general, international rules are defined by the strong. The cases of Kosovo and
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East Timor have the same character but the US adopted opposite policies toward each. 
The US claimed that these different policies were both responsible.10
Fourthly, globalisation helps the US government find new ways to manage rising powers 
like China. It has intertwined Chinese and US economic interests and China’s economy is 
now heavily dependent on the US. The CCP’s economic development strategy creates 
interdependence which means that an end to interdependence is far more costly to the 
CCP than to the US.11 Due to China’s dependence on the US market, capital and 
technology, one can say that, to some degree, the US holds the key to China’s economic 
growth. A US scholar pointed out, the CCP’s strategy can only succeed if  Americans 
allow it.12
On the other hand, plenty of factors restraining US power supervene with globalisation. 
In the long term they will function to the disadvantage of the US. Globalisation is about 
networks of interest, devolution and trans-national power. Due to the diffusion of 
advanced technology and management skills, one after another emerging markets stride 
into the capitalist economic system as heavy-weight players. State power is steadily 
undercut by market forces and bypassed by corporate powers and myriads of non­
governmental actors. Regardless of its dominant power in the world, there is also no 
escape for the US in this inexorable world-wide move.
Globalisation might expedite China’s economic growth and restrain further the behaviour 
of the US government. China's greatest threat to the US is not military but its 
determination to become an economic superpower. The Chinese economy is competitive 
in the world due to its huge market and cheap yet well-trained labour force. Due to 
China’s long-term policy of “fu  guo qiang bing” (enrich the state and strengthen the 
army), the CCP has always pursued the improvement of China’s technologies. 
Globalisation has made it much easier for China to acquire advanced technologies from 
the West. Therefore China’s economic challenge to the US is not simply its wealth 
increase but also a comprehensive one, as China has the potential to catch up with the US 
in almost every industrial field.13
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In addition, corporate forces in the US also tie Washington’s hands. US transnational 
corporations are increasingly dependent on China as a market, source of imports and 
offshore manufacturing base. For the sake of their own interests, they might lobby the US 
government to allow for China’s economic expansion in the world. The US economy is 
remarkably heterogeneous by virtue of the strength of those transnational corporations 
and it is hard to manage all corporations in line with some politicians’ strategy to ensure 
US preponderance in the world.
Theory of American Decline
Though globalisation will in the long run move on to the disadvantage of world-wide US 
economic dominance, it is hard to tell whether this will lead to US decline, and, if  so, 
when the juncture is or will be. The US in decline theory tries to offer an answer to the 
questions. It was first raised by Paul Kennedy in his classic book published in 1987, The 
Rise and Fall o f  the Great Powers.14 This book led to a “decline debate” about whether 
the US is in decline from its Cold War “superpower” status in the post-Cold War era15 
and prompted the rise of a sub-discipline within International Relations studying Global 
Change, mostly from a long-term perspective.16 Kennedy believes that there is a clash 
between military and economic establishment. He says that a very heavy investment in 
armaments, while bringing greater security in the short term, may so erode the 
commercial competitiveness of the US economy that the nation will be less secure in the 
long term.
Kennedy’s theory was refuted by scholars like Susan Strange and J. S. Nye, as they 
believed that US comprehensive national power would continue to dominate the world 
and as such no other power could replace the US as the world leader in the near future. 
Nevertheless, even during the booming 1990s, doubts about US preponderance still 
existed. Inspired by Kennedy, authors like Pat Buchanan, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Edward 
Luttwak and Kevin Phillips argued that the US moved toward a decadent phase. Their 
voice was unfortunately justified by the Sept. 11 event in 2001. More and more scholars
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have since accepted the premise that al Qaeda attacked the US because terrorists had this 
perception that the US was weak.
In this scenario, views that the US is in decline have run rampant once again in the era of 
globalisation when the process of power de-centralisation is hastened. Scholars like 
Immanuel Wallerstein, Charles A. Kupchan and Emmanuel Todd contend that Pax 
Americana has come to a close.
Wallerstein, the originator of world-systems theory, says in his book, The Decline o f  
American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World, that the US is a lone superpower that has
17lost direction amidst a global chaos it cannot control. He believes that power devolution 
in international relations is in process and the Sept. 11 event marked the turning point. 
Kupchan believes that all great nations must fall. In his book The End o f  the American 
Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics o f  the Twenty-first Century, Kupchan 
asserts that the rise of the EU and East Asia will create a serious challenge to US
I o
preponderance. He regards optimists’ assumption as shaky, as he does not believe a
unipolar system can last, due to the centrifugal force of globalisation. Emmanuel Todd, a
French scholar, is famous for predicting the fall o f the Soviet Union back in 1975 before
it occurred.19 Now he has written After the Empire: The Breakdown o f  the American
Order, which is regarded by many as the most important work since Francis
Fukuyama’s The End o f  History and the Last Man, positing that the U.S is overextended,
regardless of its current preponderance in the world. In his view, with its trade deficits,
dependence on foreign capital and emerging plutocracy, the US economically depends on
71a world that it increasingly antagonises.
The theory of American decline is linked with the thesis of Western declinism in general.
77Its history can be traced back to philosophers from Frederick Neitzche to Martin 
Heidegger23 and writers from Henry Adams24 to Robert Bly,25 yet the most influential 
authors o f this thesis are Spengler and Toynbee. The viewpoint of Spengler and 
Toynbee on the decline of the West is an insidious thesis whose continued popularity and 
beguiling appeal endures. Contemporarily, left-wing authors like Kirkpatrick Sale28 and
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Noam Chomsky29 tend to insist that Western culture must be transformed as the West's 
rapacious drive for profit and expansion threatens to bring about its own demise.
These books have been introduced to Chinese IR scholars and help to generate a huge 
market for US declinism, as it means the Chinese civilisation might dominate East Asia 
once again. Chinese statecraft has long been inspired by historical experiences from the 
Warring States era when several weak kingdoms fought against the strongest Qin 
kingdom. CCP leaders regard the US as the Qin kingdom of our age and are hoping to 
check its power in conjunction with other powers. Their followers have quantitatively 
analysed the relative power of the nations of a new international political and economic 
order in which the US and maybe the West will decline economically, socially and 
militarily, and China will become one of the definitive great powers in a multi-pole 
world. Some, like He Xin, predict that the US will decline in 15 to 20 years, others, like 
Wang Jisi, argue that it may take longer.
Following this theory, many Chinese strategists in the PLA are confident of China’s rise 
in the world and believe China will become too strong for the US to control. They 
calculate power ratios and predict US decline. They acknowledge that China is still weak 
as compared with the US, yet they are pretty sure that China is safe. The U.S. military 
forces can be defeated through ancient strategic techniques known collectively as “the 
inferior defeats the superior”.
China’s Economic Expansion
Though not many Western declinists regard China as a serious challenger to the US 
power, they acknowledge China is one of the world's fastest growing economies.31 China 
is now widely regarded as one of the engines of world capitalism and China “is no longer 
an enemy of capitalism.”
Chinese economic growth has been confirmed by data from the IMF and World Bank. 
China had become the 9th largest exporter in the world.34 It is predicted that by the year
 ^r
2020 China might have the largest economy in the world. China has now become one of
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the favourable countries for FDI. Combined with trade and technology transfer, this 
amounted to a truly massive shift of Western resources to China, greater and faster than
i /:
any other shift of resources in the history of the world.”
Nevertheless, despite harsh words occasionally, Chinese foreign policy has shown no 
intention to bring down US leadership in the world. “China is still a country whose real 
interest lies mainly within its boundaries and, to a lesser extent, in the Asia-Pacific
in
region where developments may have a direct impact on China’s national interests.” 
The CCP has no real power to challenge worldwide US preponderance. Their penchant 
for declinism can only be well understood as an instrument to serve its domestic 
legitimacy rather than a sign of its aggressiveness.
Party Line
In this scenario, the CCP’s party line on the theory of American decline is ambiguous. On 
the one hand, it embraces this theory to boost the CCP’s achievement and accordingly its 
legitimacy among the Chinese people; on the other hand, it entails voices challenging this 
theory to maintain a low profile, keeping the Chinese people alerted against the US 
hegemony, to heighten a crisis consciousness among the Chinese people. However, the 
former is the focal point that the party intends to propagandise.
The CCP is confident of the increase of China’s share in world GNP and believes that the 
US share will steadily decline in the long run. The CCP tries to explain the reasons for 
the US decision on engagement toward China from the angle of China’s growing 
economy as opposed to the US. The CCP says: “Facing the fact of China’s rise, the US 
administration also realised that it does not benefit itself to allow for further worsening 
China-US relationship and began to gradually adjust its China policy.” “ ...the US 
administration understood that China’s rise and development is irresistible, and China 
will play a crucial role in world economic and political relations. It is impossible to
TQisolate and contain China.”
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However, CCP leaders also point out, in the short run, despite rapid economic growth 
China is still the weaker partner in China-US relations. Deng Xiaoping said that the 
world economy is still controlled by international monopoly capital led by the US. He 
said: “The Western imperialists are trying to make all socialist countries abandon the 
socialist road, to bring them in the end under the rule of international monopoly capital 
and set them on the road to capitalism.”40 Due to this advantage, the US will continue to 
seek China’s disintegration. The CCP sticks with the US conspiracy theory. In the 
concluding remarks of Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao (Introduction to 
Deng Xiaoping’s Foreign Policy Thought), the CCP points out: “From the perspective of 
the world scope, socialism is still at a low ebb, the contrast of world power is still that the 
north dominates the south. International and domestic enemies, collaborating with each 
other, have never given up their conspiracies to "Westernise’, ‘split up’, infiltrate, subvert 
and break up China.”41 The CCP also says: “Exactly as comrade Deng Xiaoping said, 
‘The international monopoly capital is controlling at present the economy of the world, 
the market has been occupied by them, and hence it is not easy to fight out. It is even 
harder to fight out for a poor country like China.’”42
The main formulations here are zhongguo jueqi (China’s rise), xihua (westernise), fenhua 
(split-up), guoji longduan ziben kongzhi shijie jingji (the international monopoly capital 
is controlling at present the economy of the world), fendou chulai hen bu rongyi (it is not 
easy to fight out). They aim to create both national pride and crisis consciousness among 
the Chinese people. Jueqi means to become a great power in economy, xihua (westernise) 
means to terminate socialism and even Chineseness in China, fenhua (split-up) means to 
split up the whole country. They try to show the evil motive of the US toward China. 
Kongzhi (control) means to control and manipulate43 and it demonstrates the relative 
weakness of China against the US in terms of the economy.
Personal Advisers
How do different groups of Chinese IR scholars react to the CCP’s formulations on US 
economic power? One can observe they differ much more than they do over security, 
political and cultural issues, while interpreting the official guidelines.
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By and large personal advisers focus on the long-term prospect of the US economy and 
its strategic implications for China. He Xin deems that US dominance is temporary and 
China’s rise is irresistible. “...Even if this world empire in American dream can be 
established, it will be destined to live a short life.”44 In his view, the collapse of US 
dominance will start from its finance and the outbreak of new large-scale international 
financial crisis is inevitable 45 He Xin’s prediction has been justified to some degree by 
the economic policies of George Bush’s second-term administration. While the US 
economy is sitting on a volcano, in his view, China might lead the world economy. “If 
China can continually keep up social stability for over 10 years, China will probably 
become, in terms of overall comprehensive national power, a superpower in the world in 
the first half of the 21st century.”46
Liu Ji is also confident that US power is in decline. “In my view, it is not wrong to say, in 
terms of strategy, the US has begun to decline since the Sept 11 event, and this super 
giant will fall down in the 21st century.”47 In his eyes, the dilemma for the US is, if it 
stops hegemonism in the world, it cannot continue to maintain its high standard 
consumption and prosperity; if  it carries on its aggressive foreign policy in the world, it 
will surely become public enemy No. 1 and be destroyed by people in the world. When 
predicting the US will decline, he declares, “China will become the locomotive of world 
economic development in the 21st century.”48
In the meantime, personal advisers understand that the Chinese discourse should not 
become too over-confident as the CCP still needs the consciousness of national crisis to 
unite the Chinese people and stay in power. He Xin claims that, for the moment, the US 
is still the preponderant power in the world economy, taking advantage of China’s 
weakness.49 In his opinion, the US has no intention to use its dominance for the sake of 
universal interests but rather exploiting non-Western countries like China. He points out 
that those advanced in industry and technology have already occupied the advantage in 
the world market and can take a commanding position.50 He also says: “10-20 years ago, 
the Soviet Union and East Europe were still newly-developed industrial countries rising
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in economy. Now those countries are all in decline and dire straits in terms of economy. 
To all intents and purposes, they are defeated in a clever way from three frontlines: 
ideology, economy and politics, in fierce competition with Western countries in world 
economy, industry and technology.”51 What he says is entirely in line with formulations 
such as xihua (westernise), fenhua (split-up) and fendou chulai hen bu rongyi (it is not 
easy to fight out), despite the fact that he does not use them as such.
Liu Ji holds that US economic supremacy following the Cold War makes it arrogant and 
ambitious to impose its own will upon the world in general and China in particular. In his 
view, currently the US economic preponderance is still undisputable. However, the US 
has abused the economic power it enjoys and its foreign policies are unjust. He says:
r  <3
“Being dizzy with success, it (the US) is prone to arrogance.” The US became a world 
power this century during the two world wars and the Cold War. Several generations 
grew confronting definite enemies like Germany and the Soviet Union. Therefore, since 
the end of the Cold War the US as the strongest economy in the world has somehow lost 
direction in policies. In Liu’s view, some Americans continue to think in accordance with 
Cold War logic. “In so doing, China naturally comes up when some people seek a new
»54enemy.
Institutional Advisers
Due to political considerations, most institutional scholars take responsibility to maintain 
and improve the CCP’s positive image, therefore they closely follow the party line and 
claim the US will decline in the long term. One can see the consistency of nationalistic 
arguments of those scholars from 1988 to 2000, who tried hard to present in public an 
increasingly powerful China in contrast with the US. In the meantime they have to 
provide practical advice for the government on current US-China relations, facing US 
preponderance in the world. As such, they have to defend China’s policies on two fronts, 
analysing US economic power in the world from both long-term and short-term 
perspectives.
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Wang Huihong published a paper in 1988 on the US economic status in the world, which 
actually represented mainstream thinking among institutional advisers as to US economic 
power in the long run.55Though it was written before 1989, the author deems it 
appropriate to analyse it here due to its argument that is widely supported by most 
institutional advisers. Wang argued that US financial status was obviously in decline, and 
it was difficult for the US to turn back this tendency.
Wang’s article is divided into 3 parts, respectively on the decline of the US international 
financial status, on its irreversible fate of misfortune and on its negative influence on the 
world economy. In the first part, Wang examines the history of the US financial status 
since 1945. He has noted that the US had always been a creditor country since 1919, and 
long remained the biggest net creditor country in the West. Nevertheless, from 1985 
onwards the US began to become a net debtor country and its foreign debt reached 
$111.9 billion. In the meantime, Japan rose to become the biggest net creditor country in 
1985 and its net foreign asset was $129.8 billion, surpassing Britain and West Germany.
Wang deems that the US has already lost its leadership in the banking industry. During 
mid-1980s, Japanese banks began to ascend and then dominated the world banking 
industry. In 1987, Japanese banks had 35% of world banking assets, over double that of 
American banks. Wang has also examined the dominant status o f the US dollar in the 
international monetary system. He points out that, during the 1980s, the US dollar was 
forced to raise its value for 5 years, which led to an enormous American foreign trade and 
balance sheet deficit. With the help of the market and government policy, the US dollar 
began to devalue again after Feb. 1985. Wang has also noticed that the US dollar's 
function as a savings currency decreased. In 1987, in the world foreign currency reserve, 
the ratio of the US dollar had been cut to 60-65%. In 1988 only 50% of world trade was 
settled in US dollars. From his perspective, the status of New York as the largest 
financial centre was in this scenario challenged for the first time. During the 1980s, 
Japan's financial liberalization speeded up and the financial market in Tokyo quickly 
prospered. Britain reformed its old financial system in the 1980s and made London's 
financial market vibrant again.
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In the second part, Wang contends that the tendency of the US economic power's decline 
would continue for a long time and was difficult to reverse. He maintains that the US 
total debt would expand further, though the speed of its increase would be lower. 
Financial debts and foreign trade debts would not decrease rapidly in the short term. 
Wang also contends that the status of the US dollar in the financial market would 
continue to diminish. He noted that due to Japan's rapid economic development and the 
internationalisation of the Yen, Japan would soon raise its financial status in the world, 
not least in East Asia. Soon after the emergence of the European Monetary Unit, it 
became the fourth strongest currency in the European capital market. Thus, in the West, 
as far as world currency was concerned, one would see multi-polarity rather than US 
dollar dominance.
In the third part of his article, he seems to be fairly sure, in the long run, that the Western 
economy and the US economy in particular would be bogged down, that the struggle 
among these powers would become more and more tense and that the US would certainly 
lose its economic leadership in the world. In the meantime, China further expanded 
rapidly its economy in the world. Institutional advisers thus claim that the US has, in this 
scenario, to opt for engagement policy toward a stronger China, aiming to xihua 
(westernise) and fenhua (split-up) China. This is apparently in line with the CCP’s 
nationalistic proclamation that the US intends to disintegrate China for fear that it might 
become too strong.
Institutional advisers like Wang Huihong try to show Chinese people the US in a dire 
situation in the long term, in contrast with the CCP’s great economic performance. 
Nevertheless, worrying that some Chinese might become overconfident of Chinese 
capabilities and ask for radical policies toward the US, some institutional advisers call on 
the Chinese people to face the reality that the US is still a superpower, advocating a low- 
profile policy toward the US that is supposed to be in line with China’s national interests. 
Yan Xuetong deems that the external environment for China’s rise is not at all ideal.56 Hu 
Angang, a famous scholar in China Academy of Science, is confident of China’s growth
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in economy yet reminds the Chinese people of China’s low per capita income due to its 
huge population. He predicted that though China’s GDP would surpass the US around 
2015, nevertheless its per capita GDP would only amount to one-fourth of that of the
us.57
Wang Jisi is among those who acknowledge US dominance in the near future and try to 
argue against the theory that America will become even weaker in economic terms. They 
warn Chinese leaders not to exaggerate the weaker side of the US and face the great 
danger.
Wang Jisi edited in 1999 a book called Gaochu bu sheng Han—lengzhan hou meiguo de 
quanqiu zhanlue he shijie diwei (Lonely on High-The US Global Strategy and World
C O
Status After the Cold War). In the last chapter of this influential book, Wang tries to 
acquaint some Chinese scholars with some facts that they have reckoned incorrectly. It is 
claimed that one of the main reasons some Chinese scholars contend that the US is in 
decline is that Germany and Japan's economic growth rate has been for some time higher 
than that of the US. Wang argues that this phenomenon began to change during the mid- 
1990s. He says that during 1995-1997, the US economic growth rate was respectively 
2.0%, 2.4% and 3.9%, much higher than Germany’s and Japan’s during that time.
Wang challenges another theory - that the US has lost the edge of economic competition 
in contrast with Japan. Some Chinese scholars claim that the growth of the US productive 
rate has declined rapidly, that Japan beat the US in manufacturing and that foreign banks 
have further invaded the US financial market. Wang cites some new research and says 
that the US is, on the contrary, still among the top 3 as far as international competition is 
concerned. For example, he quotes a report by the World Economic Forum in 1997, 
which says the US secured third place in the list of international competitors, second only 
to Singapore and Hong Kong.
Wang also discusses other good US economic performance during the Clinton 
administration. He points out that the US unemployment rate in Dec. 1998 was only
244
around 4.4%, far lower than that of the EU. He says that there are some other indexes 
which show that the US economy is actually in good shape, such as the exchange rate, 
consumers' confidence index, Dow Jones industrial index, productivity rate and corporate 
profit rate.
Apart from providing some “right” facts, Wang Jisi also tries to highlight some faults in 
the theory of America in decline. Firstly, he does not think the trade deficit is a really 
important index by which to judge the US economy. It seems to him that the trade deficit 
only covers tangible commodities and excludes service trade. Secondly, as for the debt 
problem, Wang has highlighted its benefit for the US. He regards the budget deficit as an 
important part of US economic policy and not a bad result of economic crises. He points 
out that foreign investment is very helpful for the US to make up budget and current 
account deficits due to trade deficit, and hence is good for the US to achieve overall 
balance of international balance sheet. Thirdly, as for the average GNP, Wang does not 
think that it is an at all good index. He highly recommends PPP as more effective to 
judge a nation's economic development. He points out that in 1994 the average GNP of 
the US adjusted by PPP was $2, 664 billion, No. 1 in the world.
As such, Wang follows the CCP’s line and shows his apprehension toward a hegemonic 
America that is reluctant to see China’s rise. He deems it unwise for Chinese to have faith 
in US good will. “ The US surely will not change its strategic objective for almost 100 
years, namely, change China as per the US interests and value system. We should not 
have any illusion. The Chinese should walk their own way, therefore the leeway for 
better US-China relationship is rather limited, not to mention that the US has never put 
the amelioration of US-China relationship as the top objective of its China policy.”59 As 
for the future status of the US in the world, he refuses, like the CCP, to give an abrupt 
answer.60 To sum up, Wang Jisi is in fact a believer in the CCP’s conspiracy theory, 
since he deems it a real threat to the CCP’s rule in China.
Zi Zhongyun, his colleague in CASS, supports his argument. She deems that the US is 
still in the driving seat of the world economy and still attracting most talents in the world,
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which ensures its hegemony in the 21st century. What she worries is how China currently 
responds to the US preponderance. In her view, “Though the theory of American decline 
lingers on now, what people in the world worry is not what influence it will bring about if  
the US declines, but rather, whether it is good or bad fortune for the world that a US is 
the only superpower, still far ahead of other countries in all aspects....”61
Official Intellectuals
Most official intellectuals are more concerned with the impact of US power on China’s 
domestic economic issues and prefer not to ignore the prevailing US economy in the 
world and call for protection of Chinese industries. To them the debate about whether the 
US is in decline is unimportant, as they focus on the Chinese national economy whatever 
direction the US power evolves. They are more concerned with the economic 
implications of US dominance than its political implications.
There are yet a number of official intellectuals who claim that US power, and particularly 
its economic power, is indeed in decline. They try to tell the Chinese public that China is 
safe as the US cannot afford to take containment policy toward China. Shi Yinhong is 
one of them and he agrees with US declinism, particularly economic decline. At the end 
of last century, Shi doubted US leadership capability in the world. In his eyes, there has 
not been a fresh, coherent and long-term US strategy, either global or regional. Shi argues 
that the US has entered a long-term war against the Muslim world since the Sept. 11 
event; that the war in Iraq has overstretched its military and economic resources. In his 
view, the power transition in East Asia might benefit China’s rise. These official 
intellectuals deem that though the US is still the only superpower in the world, its policy 
has been checked by other powers and international law. “It is strong but not strong 
enough to do whatever it likes.”64
Nevertheless, the long-term prospect of US economic power is not what concerns the 
majority of official intellectuals. To all intents and purposes they focus on its short-term 
impact upon China. Generally speaking, the majority of official intellectuals highlight the 
official terms like guoji longduan ziben kongzhi shijie jingji (the international monopoly
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capital is controlling at present the economy of the world) and fendou chulai hen bu 
rongyi (it is not easy to fight out). In terms of economy, they stress the fact that the world 
economy is still dominated by the West and warn of a decisive and immediate threat from 
the US to the Chinese economy.
Li Yongsheng, a scholar working with Liaoning University, published in 1999 an 
influential paper on the US financial hegemony.65 He expressed his worry that it is hard 
to reform China’s financial system due to the threat from the US financial industry. The 
paper is divided into two parts, with the first on the content and nature of financial 
hegemony, the second on the forms of financial hegemonic exploitation. In his opinion, 
hegemony simply means leadership and domination, financial hegemony means a power 
that dominates the international monetary system by right of its overwhelming advantage 
in politics, economy, finance and military forces, and work its own will, principle or rule 
upon the whole system and then gain the hegemonic profit. It seems to him, financial 
hegemony amounts to the extension of economic and military hegemony. He claims that 
a hegemonic country like the US is destined to exploit other countries and particularly 
developing countries like China.
In the second part, he has explained how the US exploits other countries through its 
financial hegemony. The first is to make the most of the US dollar's dominant status in 
the international monetary system. He points out that, due to this privileged position, the 
US is able to loot large quantities of mintage tax and seize foreigners' resources without 
payment. According to IMF statistics, almost half of the U.S dollar circulation is outside 
America and the US government benefits by around $15 billion. At the same time, the 
US can enjoy the fruit of other countries' economic development. If the US burden of 
debt is too great, it can devalue US dollars to reduce its debt and then stimulate its 
exportation. Another advantage of the US dollar's dominance is that it can shift its crises 
to other countries. If there is a deficit in America's current account, the US government 
can make it up with issuing more notes and then the inflation will be transferred to other 
countries. During a financial crisis, the US can avoid deflation with currency circulation 
increase and thus avoid economic recession.
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Li Yongsheng has done much research on the flow of international capital, and concludes 
that the US has benefited greatly from it. He says that international capital moves among 
countries with a speed and amount unseen before. With the rapid development of 
emerging markets, enormous capital amounts flow to specific areas for colossal rewards, 
particularly South America and ASEAN countries. During financial crises, Western 
investors leave emerging markets with high rewards and, as a result, these areas’ 
economy is hit heavily if not blighted. Li Yongsheng contends that the main body of the 
ill-gotten wealth in reality returns to the US. It seems to him that most mutual funds and 
hedge funds are based in the US. What they have earned from emerging markets flows 
back to the US. Li Yongsheng contends that invasive financial speculation by private 
financial funds is the most damaging way that developing countries are exploited. In this 
scenario official scholars like him argue that China should be very cautious in opening its 
financial market to the West.
Even some old-generation official intellectuals forsake the classic Marxist teaching that 
“capitalist countries are decaying day by day” and argue against the theory of American 
decline. Huang Annian, a professor in his 70s at Beijing Normal University, is their 
representative. He calls on the Chinese people not to duck US supremacy and the 
problems China has to face. “There are now some experts, scholars, media and even very 
few government officials that lack sobering assessment of the difficulty of Chinese 
modernisation process...proclaiming that China will catch up with the US in 30 and even 
20 years’ time. Neither does this assessment conform to the Chinese reality, nor is it in 
line with the situation of advanced countries in the world, therefore it is very harmful.”66 
In his view, China’s dependence on the US economy has added to the complexity of 
Chinese modernisation. He agrees with Thornton that the Chinese are thus worse off than 
the Soviets were because China’s economic health is tied more directly to the US than the
fnSoviet Union's ever was. Scholars like him call on the CCP to develop further China’s 
domestic markets.
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Liberals
Most liberals are glad to see a strong US that contributes to China’s democratic 
movement. Cao Changqing welcomes the emerging American Empire. In his view, the 
US has “the most powerful military might in human history”, “the US economy is the 
combination of Japan, Germany and Britain”, the US “soft power covers the whole 
world”, it is “Mecca of spirit and knowledge”, its pop culture affects the world, therefore
/ o
the US is indeed an empire now. He says, “the US is indeed establishing an empire yet 
not a military one, but rather a ‘spiritual empire’ whose value of freedom and democracy 
covers the whole world. The ‘American Empire’ that is founded on this liberal spirit and 
thinking shall not decline, and even the whole 21st century belongs to the US.”69
Nevertheless, they have no intention to follow the CCP and call for attention to the US 
evil strategy against China, despite the fact they are eager to see the development of the 
Chinese economy. Liu Xiaobo has showed contempt to those who exaggerate the danger 
from the US. In his view, they are not so much afraid as jealous of the US. “ ...in their 
sub-consciousness, (they are) waiting for the decisive blow against the US, waiting for 
the resurrection of the Arab world or Mainland China, waiting for the US to decline or
70perish...” Liu is angry that some Chinese people and scholars in particular “gloat at US 
misfortune” when the Sept. 11 event and the Columbia Spacecraft accident happened. 
“Some thank Allah for protecting Iraq, some believe it is God’s punishment of the US for 
its intention to dominate the world, some predict that the US will soon decline and China 
will eventually rise and defeat the U S...”71 The point to make here is that almost all 
liberals regard a strong US economy as vital in China’s democratic cause.
Conclusion
From the above one can see that Chinese IR scholars’ views on the US economic power 
is diversified and even antagonistic, yet there are mainly two branches: one that takes 
pride in China’s economic expansion and the US decline in the long term in the era of 
globalisation; the other that stresses crisis consciousness due to US continual dominance 
and US determination to delay US decline in the short term. Except for liberals, both 
views are based on nationalist sentiments though with different focuses.
249
In spirit, personal advisers care most for the interests of the party and follow the CCP’s 
terms most sincerely and appropriately. They analyse the US economy more from long­
term strategic angles. When claiming that China will arise in the long term they actually 
mean the CCP’s rule will continue for a long time. Institutional advisers have dual tasks 
given by the CCP. On the one hand they help the CCP claim credit from China’s 
economic growth, on the other, they have to cope with current complexities in China-US 
relationship shadowed by the present US preponderance. In terms of the economy, most 
official intellectuals have demonstrated a more nationalist approach than the CCP. They 
highlight the aggressiveness of US economic power and worry about vulnerable Chinese 
national industries as opposed to the dominant Western corporate power. It is those 
scholars that argue for more protectionist measures to bend international rules at times 
and protect Chinese industries. Liberals firmly believe that the US will continue to rule 
the world. In their eyes, the US is a benign empire that deserves acclaim.
5.2 WTO Entry
The author will discuss in this section the communication between Chinese IR scholars 
and the CCP’s formalised language on China’s WTO entry and try to demonstrate 
Chinese nationalistic sentiments in the most liberal foreign policy decision China has 
ever made.
CCP leaders pursued WTO membership as a means to continue China’s rapid economic
79growth, which would help the party maintain its monopoly on power. Nevertheless, it is 
apparent that current globalism has melted away many taken-for-granted norms and
7Tnational identities are re-examined. The CCP recognizes this impact on the Chinese 
people following WTO entry and is conscious of the necessity of maintaining social 
stability.
China finally gained membership of the WTO at the end of 2001. However, the party was 
not fully prepared for admission.74 CCP leaders opt for WTO membership yet it does not
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follow that they entirely accept WTO rules. On the contrary, they publicly vowed to
nc
impose Chinese values on international institutions like the WTO. They opted for WTO 
membership, yet they did not do so mainly for the purpose of willingly embracing world 
market economy, but rather due to the fact that they had no other choice. Only from this 
point can one understand why the anti-WTO voice among Chinese IR scholars could be 
heard without hindrance in an authoritarian country while the government had already 
shown its determination to enter this free trade community.
China and International Organizations
Does China intend to revise international rules? This question is closely related to the 
following one: does a rising power intend to change international rules as its relative 
power increases? There is some tension between Morgenthau and power transition 
theorists like Organski and Kugler in answering this question. Morgenthau believes that 
any rising state is by definition a revisionist one in so far as it wants to increase its power 
and change the global distribution. For Organski and Kugler only rising states that want 
to change the rules as the power distribution changes are non-status quo powers. 
Revisionist states have a “desire to redraft the rules by which relations among nations 
work.”77
If one follows the power transition theory and examines China’s foreign policy after 
1989, it is hard to say China intends to change international rules. China has now become 
deeply involved with international organisations. Before the 1990s, China favoured 
bilateral rather than multilateral channels, as China harboured strong suspicion toward
*70
international mechanisms. Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War, China has 
rapidly departed from this position and has come to acknowledge international norms and
70advocate interdependence and co-operation. The principle of co-reliance and co­
development in international economy has been more respected than before.
There can be little doubt that China’s membership in international organisations has
OA
increased dramatically in the post-Maoist period. By 1997 China ranked eleventh in 
belonging to most international governmental organisations in the world with 45. The US
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ranked ninth with 47.81 Johnston argues that China has complied with international rules 
o f international institutions.82 Since China entered the WTO, it is suggested that China 
has generally accepted its overall decision-making procedures and structures, and has
O'!
been cautious about taking a leadership role inside the institution. There are indeed 
some primary compliance problems, yet many experts argue that they will not be so 
much a wilful disregard of WTO commitments by the central government, but rather non-
OA
compliance by hard-to-control provincial and local authorities.
To ensure China enters the international community in a peaceful way, the US has put
85multilateral economic organisations at the heart of its engagement policy toward China. 
The main objective of economic engagement is to promote the development of economic
o /
and democratic reforms in China, as well as regional stability in Asia, building up in 
China a domestic constituency for more open-minded orientation and thus enmesh China 
in international institutions. Nevertheless, there are in the US many politicians and 
scholars who suspect China might use its increasingly powerful economic strength “to
R7challenge the status quo in the WTO.” Some Americans suggest that, though China 
showed signs of becoming more of a “trading state”, China is not satisfied with the
oo
current international system despite gaining from it.
In this scenario, many Americans believe it is a must for international organisations 
involved to stand firm.89 Americans then impose a hard negotiating posture on the terms 
of WTO admission. They claim that to argue that better relations encourage reform in 
China is not to argue that the US should compromise its principles but rather that the 
right tools must be adopted in order to exert enough leverage.90
History of China’s WTO Entry
The WTO is the international organization with the greatest influence upon China’s 
social system, among all the international institutions that China has joined. Due to the 
demands of the US and other Western countries, China failed to reach agreement with the 
GATT. In July 1995, China began negotiations for entry into the newly-established 
WTO. China stuck to its position as a developing country. As such, China would not have
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to open its markets to foreign companies on an equitable basis and it would be exempt 
from the provisions of the WTO treaty concerning subsidies and intellectual property 
rights. Americans worried that China’s mercantilism would ultimately destroy the US 
economy and insisted on regarding China as a special case, rather than just a developing 
country in the normal sense. In this scenario, the CCP allowed for different voices from 
the official line rising to surface, i.e. opinions that are against China’s WTO entry, partly 
as negotiation tactics.91
In April 1999, the then Chinese premier Zhu Rongji visited the US, telling the Americans 
that China was ready to make more concessions. Zhu is one of the most liberal leaders in 
the CCP in terms of economics. When he became the premier, one of the most difficult 
issues for the central government to tackle was how to reform state-owned enterprises 
that were on the brink of bankruptcy. Due to strong resistance from interest groups within 
the CCP, it is hard for Zhu to carry out his more radical policy from within. Against this 
backdrop Zhu was personally eager to make a deal with the US, at the expense of some 
interest groups in China.
Interest groups in China demonstrated their anger over the concessions Zhu Rongji was 
planning to make. Under great pressure from Chinese conservatives, Jiang Zemin 
withdrew from his original position and allowed for public critics of Zhu’s concessions in 
the US. Due to the party’s encouragement, nationalism ran rampant. Therefore, very 
unusually in the CCP’s history, voices of opposition against the Politburo’s decision 
began to be heard. It is said that Wu Jichuan, minister of information industries, even 
tendered his resignation, as he was really angry that Zhu made those concessions without 
consulting him.92
Soon after Zhu returned to Beijing, the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was bombed by US 
forces. The WTO negotiations were not reopened until after the Jiang-Clinton meeting in 
New Zealand in September 1999. Facing the volatile relations with the US, Jiang’s team 
took a pragmatic approach and tried to anchor the China-US relationship in economic 
interdependence. Chinese negotiators came back to the table and bilateral agreement on
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China’s entry was reached in mid-November after heated bargaining. China finally 
gained membership of the organisation in late 2001, with too many concessions in the 
eyes of a number of Chinese IR scholars.
Problems with the WTO Entry
China’s WTO entry is of gigantic consequence to Chinese society. It “will either 
transform China into the golden goose, as many Americans claim, or be the poison pill 
that kills it.” It took many years for China to reach an acceptable agreement with the 
US, yet those CCP leaders who argued for the agreement deemed it worthwhile as they 
recognised that joining the world is the best way to deepen China’s reforms.94 Fewsmith 
has provided a critical analysis of the political and social implications of China’s 
accession to the WTO.95 He believes it will also reinforce some positive trends apparent 
in China’s political economy. Participation in the WTO will have considerable impact on 
China’s political system. It will play a vital role in developing the rule of law in China. In 
addition, WTO accession will help further remove the government from people’s lives 
and expand the political breathing space of non-government associations.
Nevertheless, reforms do not surely and naturally bring about social stability and 
economic prosperity. The short-and long-term consequences of China’s WTO entry are 
difficult to anticipate in what appears to be a trade-off between stability and 
restructuring.96
There are many economic difficulties for China to face. On top of all the costs of the 
WTO entry is its negative impact upon China’s agriculture. China's agriculture sector is 
the weakest link in the entire economy and peasants will be hit hardest by WTO entry at a
Q7time when rural incomes are falling. The rural economy will be further put under 
pressure because of competition from the West.
Zhu Rongji expected to further the reform of China’s state-owned enterprises with
QO
China’s WTO entry, yet it did not appear to be easy. In inland China they are still the 
main-stay of the local economy, producing the largest part of local tax income and
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providing most jobs for urban residents. Local authorities resisted Zhu’s radical reform 
policies.
China’s financial system is fragile compared with its Western counterparts. WTO 
requires that China allow RMB-denominated financial transactions to be handled by 
foreign financial institutions by the end of 2006. Nevertheless, China has not yet been 
ready to fulfil its promise." AMC authority in operations of the indebted SOEs needs to 
be substantially enhanced and more transparency needs to be brought into the valuation 
and disposal of state assets.
WTO membership will surely exacerbate the already existing severe unemployment 
problem. Over 6.5 million urban workers lost their jobs in 1999, excluding the rural 
jobless, who are not recorded in official tallies.100
The net loss of jobs will depend on how many jobs the increased exports and FDI will 
create, as the Chinese market will be much easier for FDI to access.101
Another challenge facing China after the accession is the impact on the legal system. The 
WTO is the most important international organisation ruled by clear-cut trading rules 
rather than personalities. The requirement of the WTO is an open, transparent and
1 f)1)efficient legal system. Without this, the broader objectives for economic transition 
cannot be accomplished. It is a huge task for China to reform its legal system to follow 
WTO rules.
Pragmatism
CCP leaders believe that there is no choice for China to maintain rapid economic growth 
other than joining the WTO. In this sense, the Chinese way is extremely pragmatic. It is 
completely in line with Deng Xiaoping’s famous saying on China’s economic 
development approach: “It doesn't matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it 
catches mice.”
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China has made broad concessions to the WTO. There are several practical and 
contingent reasons for this. Firstly, Jiang Zemin prefers to establish a stable relationship 
with the US, lest China lose a peaceful regional environment in which it might continue 
to focus on its economic modernisation agenda. Jiang and his team deemed that China’s 
entry into the WTO would impart new momentum to the relationship and give it an 
underpinning that has been noticeably lacking since 1989.
Secondly, Zhu Rongji planned to use China’s WTO membership to encourage state- 
owned enterprises to break up monopolies and become more competitive in the global 
economy. Zhu expected this would make the Chinese economy more efficient and reduce
I
the heavy burden of subsidies on the central government. Due to the strong resistance 
from a variety of interest groups, Zhu was convinced that a commitment to WTO rules 
might subdue these conservatives.
Thirdly, there was also concern that pressures would mount for admitting Taiwan into the 
WTO ahead of Mainland China.104 In the eyes of CCP leaders, it is imperative for 
Mainland China to have stronger influence in international organisations than Taiwan.
Considering the contingent factors above, the then Politburo decided on signing the WTO 
against great odds. The whole policy-making process was kept secret. The central 
authority made a decision not to keep informed those in ministries whose interests would 
be greatly diminished by China’s WTO membership.105 The People’s Bank of China, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Information and other institutions including 
many large-size state-owned enterprises were basically excluded from the negotiation 
process.
In some sense, the West could readily be used by top CCP leaders as a scapegoat if 
something goes wrong in the near future. The result is that the credit would belong to the 
CCP while the agony arising out of the process would certainly be ascribed to the West. 
In case of anything going badly wrong, it is good for the party’s legitimacy to prepare a
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fallback, say, a conspiracy of the US, as an excuse for its failure to keep the reform on 
track. As a result, pragmatism entails nationalism.
Party Line
The CCP’s party line on China’s WTO entry is a mixture of pragmatism and nationalism. 
Pragmatism does not clash with nationalism. One might see both nationalistic sentiments 
and pragmatism of the CCP as to China’s WTO entry from its official guidelines and 
formulations. Deng Xiaoping pointed out the disadvantage of China in the international 
market. He said: “The Western imperialists are trying to make all socialist countries 
abandon the socialist road, to bring them in the end under the rule o f international 
monopoly capital...The international market has already been fully occupied, and it will 
be very hard for us to get in. Only socialism can save China, and only socialism can 
develop China.”106 He then called for a new international order based on the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. He said: “We must therefore take the Five Principles 
of Peaceful Coexistence as the norms for the new international political and economic 
order.” In Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao (Introduction to Deng 
Xiaoping’s Foreign Policy Thought), CCP leaders say: “International trade should be 
established on the foundation o f equality and mutual benefits, helping meet each other’s 
needs...(We) should gradually establish through dialogue an equal and co-operative 
North-South relationship, against the inequality and varieties of discriminative policies 
and approaches in international trade, forbidding frequently taking economic sanctions
10ftagainst other countries.” The CCP expressly states that China will not follow the 
Western regime in terms of the political system under the new circumstances.109 It says: 
‘“The socialist system and socialist public ownership should not be touched. We can not 
permit producing a new capitalist class.’ ‘Whatever the openness, public ownership 
economy is still the main body.’”110 From the above one can see that the CCP continues 
with the open-door policy that brings economic growth to China, yet has no intention to 
carry out political reform, but rather try to impose Chinese values, a mixture of traditional 
Chinese culture, socialism and liberalism, upon international economic institutions.
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Following Deng’s teaching, in 1993 Jiang Zemin proposed three principles to guide 
China’s GATT negotiations over market access: 1. The GATT was an international 
organization and without China it was incomplete. 2. China should enter as a developing 
country. 3. There should be a balance between China’s rights and obligations.111 In the 
ensuing negotiations, China held to these three principles throughout.
Formulations like pingdeng huli (equality and mutual benefits), duihua (dialogue), fandui
bu pingdeng, fandui qishi (against the inequality and varieties of discriminative policies
and approaches), gongyouzhi jingji shizhong haishi zhuti (public ownership economy is
all the same the main body), fazhanzhong guojia (a developing country) show vividly that
the CCP does not completely buy WTO principal, though largely in voice. Qishi
(discriminative policies and approaches) means in Chinese dictionary to treat somebody 
11?unfairly. It is one of the main tasks to put right what the WTO has done wrong to 
developing countries, namely, discriminating against these countries. Many CCP leaders 
claim that, as a developing country, to defend China’s national interests in the WTO is 
surely to promote the values of developing countries, as the CCP is the defender of third 
world interests. This is in line with the victim complex in Chinese nationalism.
Personal Advisers
Nationalist sentiments come from both pros and cons of China’s WTO entry. The former 
blame international institutions like the WTO for flaws in international economic regime, 
blame the US for delaying China’s entry and taking advantage of China during 
negotiations; the latter believe that WTO membership will greatly threaten China’s 
national interests. Personal advisers belong to the former group.
Following the CCP’s pragmatism and nationalism, personal advisers have clearly 
expressed China’s reasons and intentions to join the WTO, though not necessarily with 
the CCP’s formulations literally. They try to criticise globalisation, depict a Chinese 
vision of the WTO while justifying China’s WTO membership. According to them, it 
seems possible for China to participate and lead the WTO toward a new direction in a 
Chinese way. Therefore, in spirit, they are the sincerest followers of the party line. Wang
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Daohan has echoed his support for gongyouzhi jingji shizhong haishi zhuti (public
ownership economy is all the same the main body) and stressed the importance of a
11^market economy under the CCP’s leadership in the context of China’s WTO entry. He 
believes that it is also “stressing politics” to know clearly both the advantage and 
disadvantage of China’s WTO entry.114 Liu Ji always takes a nationalistic stance over 
China’s WTO entry. He says: “It is our objective to realize the great resurrection of the 
Chinese nation in the 21st century.”115 Liu Ji believes that the current regime of the world 
economy is flawed and he tries to deliver a Chinese vision as a better one. He says: 
“Nevertheless, real economic globalisation is not only liberalisation of trade or finance 
but also should be the comprehensive liberalisation of all productive variables. 
Technology should also be liberalised, there should be no restraint over technology 
transfer. The flow of human resources should also be liberalised, and it should not be that 
only Chinese Ph.Ds and masters are permitted to go to the US and not those who 
labour.”116 On the one hand, Liu supports China’s WTO membership and follows the 
CCP’s formulations; on the other hand, he has offered his prescription for the flaws of 
current international economic institutions.
He Xin has voiced his concern over China’s WTO entry yet agrees with the CCP’s 
decision to join. He believes that there is a conspiracy in the West to weaken the Chinese 
economy through the WTO regime. “As a country that steps late into the global capitalist 
market, China has not been and also not been able to become equal to advanced 
countries, but rather, has been only in a position to be dependent and exploited 
passively...it is due to China’s dependence and weakness that they agree to accept China. 
Their aim is nothing but try to, step by step, annex, digest and even destroy in some areas
11 n(yet not all industries) our economy.” Nevertheless, He Xin also regards the WTO as 
an opportunity for China to dramatically expand its power into the world. He encourages 
Chinese entrepreneurs to step audaciously into the global market, serving China’s 
national interests, dominating the world. Domestically there are plenty of problems in 
China, yet He believes that, if  China regards the whole world as its market and resources,
1 1 9these problems will be sorted out and it will be impossible to contain China.
259
Institutional Advisers
Most institutional advisers belong to the group that follows the CCP’s formalised 
language, welcoming China’s WTO entry yet very critical of the nature of international 
institutions and the US hegemonism in particular. A small number of institutional 
advisers are apparently against China’s WTO membership, at least at the turn of the 21st 
century.
Most institutional advisers have expressed their appreciation of China’s WTO 
membership. In their views there were three main goals for China to join the WTO. 
Firstly, WTO entry will help create a more favourable external environment for China’s 
domestic economic reform and development. Secondly, entrance into the WTO will 
further domestic economic system reform. Thirdly, it would help strengthen economic 
ties and trade between Taiwan and Mainland China and contribute to the completion of 
the great nationalist task of re-unification.119
Some institutional advisers like Zhang Shuguang and Zhao Nong believe that the 
situation after China’s WTO entry can be well controlled as long as China takes proper 
measures to counter the negative impact of entry. They have made some proposals: 1, 
accordingly adjust relevant provisions of international trade and FDI, in accordance with 
WTO rules; 2, draw on WTO’s provisions for developing countries’ discrimination 
treatment and protective measures, in order to delay as much as possible the effect of 
WTO membership; 3, adjust China’s economic structure so as to achieve the aim of 
avoiding disadvantage.
During the negotiation, the Chinese government tried hard to join the WTO as a 
developing country, therefore it encouraged its officials and institutional advisers to 
express their anger regarding the current international economic regime. Long Yongtu, an 
LSE IR department graduate and the chief Chinese negotiator for China’s WTO entry, 
once talked about his understanding of the WTO regime. He says that, in the congress of 
the WTO, there is a small negotiation room only for Western countries. There is 
meanwhile a big cafe, where other members wait for the policy results from the small
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1 9 1negotiation room. Institutional advisers like Long on the one hand understand clearly 
that it is a must for China to enter the WTO, in order to enjoy the benefits of international 
trade; on the other, they are afraid that China is too weak to compete with the West. For 
them, attacking the US hegemony can only add more credit to their support for China's 
WTO entry.
Like Long, Wang Yizhou in CASS is glad to see China’s WTO entry yet deems that the 
current international economic regime is unfair to most developing countries. 
Nevertheless, he is pessimistic about any hope of overhauling the international regime 
soon. He believes that, for a fairly long time to come, the revision of international rules 
and organisational regulations will probably be incompatible with the wishes and
199demands of the majority of countries in the international community.
Zhang Yuncheng from the CICIR agrees with WTO entry, yet is worried that, with 
China’s WTO entry, China might face fierce competition from the US, not only 
economically but also politically. Zhang Yuncheng deems that, with China’s WTO entry, 
China is entering a period of increasing international economic friction. Due to the 
differing political and economic systems of the two countries, future economic 
competition between China and the US will carry political significance. As such, CCP 
leaders are facing a severe challenge on how to gain economic benefits while avoiding 
political risks.123
These scholars mentioned above, like most institutional advisers, demonstrated China’s 
eagerness to join the WTO and accused the US of delaying China’s entry. Their views are 
basically in line with the CCP’s formulations like fazhanzhong guojia (a developing 
country), pingdeng huli (equality and mutual benefits), zunzhong zhuquan (respect a 
country’s sovereignty), duihua (dialogue), fandui bu pingdeng fandui qishi (against the 
inequality and varieties of discriminative policies and approaches), gongyouzhi jingji 
shizhong haishi zhuti (public ownership economy is all the same the main body). 
However, a very small number of institutional advisers go even further and are publicly 
against China’s WTO entry, beyond the constraint of these formulations. They are
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actually used by the CCP to achieve its different political goals before, during and after 
China’s WTO entry negotiations. They are allowed to voice in public their disapproval of 
China’s WTO entry, as they are used by the CCP to achieve at least three objectives: to 
add more weight to the advantage of China during the negotiations, to blame the West in 
case of turmoil in the wake of the WTO entry and to increase crisis consciousness among 
the Chinese people through the bankruptcy of state-owned enterprises.
These institutional advisers have extensive contacts with middle-rank officials in central 
and some local governments, who are not at all eager to join the WTO. In their eyes, 
China had already enjoyed most favoured nation (MFN) status with all countries except 
the US. Despite the annual China-bashing ritual in the US Congress, they know the US 
will grant it to them anyway.124 To middle-rank central and local officials, the costs of 
conforming immediately to the expectations of the US were relatively large, yet the gains 
from the WTO membership are not that attractive.125
A scholar in the league of New Leftists, well trained at Yale University, Wang 
Shaoguang, believes that WTO membership will influence China in a negative way 
economically. Aside from this, he has discussed another important issue: the social and
10Apolitical impact of China’s WTO entry. Wang does not buy the idea that “globalisation 
is an economic phenomenon, not a political one.”127 In his eyes, this can lead to the belief 
that takes economic organisations like the WTO as given, or as something that is 
divorced from politics, which is not the case.
Wang points out that the victims of China’s WTO membership are those workers and 
peasants, the least advantaged people in China, who have borne the cost of China's recent 
reform. He deems that those people are the social foundation of the CCP's reign. During 
the last 10 years of the last century, they saw no improvement of their living standards 
but instead the emergence of a new class of wealthy people. It is too hard for them to 
come to terms with the growing gap between the rich and the poor.
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It seems to Wang that the increase of inequality could water down the legitimacy of the 
CCP’s rule. Firstly, if  the Chinese government cannot solve soon the problem of the gap 
between the rich and the poor, it will lose its ethical foundation. Secondly, too much 
inequality would lead to slow economic development. He cites the study carried out by 
Alesina and Rodik, and Persson and Tabellini, to support his argument and points out that 
the basic reason why the Chinese economy is slowing down dramatically is the 
worsening of its social equality.
Wang contends that if  the CCP decides to join in the WTO and carries on the policy that 
bestows most benefits from economic reform on a minority, the public would no longer 
bear inequality. Wang argues that no country can survive under severe economic 
inequality. Is there a chance that China joining the WTO thereby manages to build up a 
workable welfare system? Wang is very pessimistic on this vision, as he thinks that China 
is at the moment crying out for more investment and cannot afford such a luxury. To him, 
the wise decision is to avert the WTO entry.
Wang is not alone among institutional advisers. Zuo Dapei in CASS has always fought 
against China’s WTO entry and regards the agreement as an unequal treaty. “The way we 
have joined the WTO agreement will make China the victim of the WTO, make China 
unable to have the status to enjoy exporting to foreign markets opened by other countries, 
yet at the same time must open its markets to import more foreign products than member
1 7 o
states at the same level.” He publicly calls for withdrawing from the WTO. Regarding 
WTO membership, the CCP is caught up in the tension in diplomacy between China’s 
determination to show itself as an active, involved participant in international institutions
190and its desire to minimise commitments and constraints. Zuo Dapei is clearly in favour
of the latter as, in his eyes, it is more real. He agrees with the idea that it is much better to
withdraw from the WTO in order to gain substantial space of economic development
110than to stay in it for a false reputation.
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Official Intellectuals
Official intellectuals’ opinions are even more fractured than institutional advisers. Some 
of them simply follow the CCP’s formalised language, optimistically agree with China’s 
WTO entry, though believe international regime is flawed; some support the CCP’s line 
with many concerns, highlighting the fact that China is still a developing country; some 
are staunch anti-WTO scholars, proclaiming that China’s national interests will be 
devastated by the WTO regime.
A small number of official intellectuals are happy to see the Chinese government join the 
WTO, in order to maintain a close relationship with the US. In some sense, they are quite 
pro-America, though at times they feel angry about the American hegemonic style. A 
scholar at Beijing University, Zhu Wenli, does not believe the WTO regime can check 
US power in a real sense. With China’s WTO entry, it is still reasonable to guard against 
US hegemony. “The golden time of free trade sounds rather like a myth and many
131Chinese analysts tend to believe friction and retaliation are keynotes of world trade.”
Her colleague, Wang Yong, agrees with her about US dominance in the international 
regime. To maintain this dominance, the US in his eyes tries to draw on any kind of 
possible excuses to protect its own national interests. He argues that, after the end of the 
Cold War, China and the US have to compete fiercely for the world market. To hold 
down the Chinese economy, the US government as well as those business leaders 
collaborate to demand China joining the WTO not as a developing country. Wang points 
out that the Americans have cited 5 excuses not to let China enter the WTO as a third
1 39world country and profit at the expense of America's national interests. It seems to him 
it is due to the fact that the WTO will bring substantial benefits to China that the US tried 
to restrain China’s economic expansion, therefore China should join the WTO to pursue 
its own interests.
Some official intellectuals have no problem with China’s WTO entry, but they do have a 
consensus that China should join as a developing country. They were angry that the US 
was too demanding during China’s WTO negotiations. They suspect that Americans want
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to halt China’s rise. They suspect that the US begins to curb Chinese ambitions by raising 
their business costs.133 To them China has therefore been bullied by the US during the 
WTO negotiations.
They point out that it is true that the Chinese economy has been growing apace since 
1978, but China’s development is mainly through the increase o f quantity rather than 
quality. Compared with advanced countries, China is still a quite backward rural country 
that is fighting against time for foreign investment to aid industrialisation. From the 
point of view of these official intellectuals, the world should not turn a blind eye to the 
reality and too highly evaluate China's economic status due to some selfish if not evil 
motives.
Before China joined the WTO in 2001, the US Congress debated every year whether or 
not to give China MFN treatment, which was an embarrassment for Chinese intellectuals 
and CCP officials. A scholar at Fudan University, Zou Genbao, says that, since 1990, the 
struggle between China and the US on MFN status has been closely related to the fact 
that many Americans are trying to establish another Roman Empire in the name of 
freedom and democracy. Zou argues that China has obviously become America's biggest 
obstacle to promoting such an ambitious global strategy.134
As a well-known scholar, Zou’s view in his work is ostensibly nationalistic in terms of 
his interpretation of the CCP’s formulations such as pingdeng huli (equality and mutual 
benefits), fandui bu pingdeng, fandui qishi (against the inequality and varieties of 
discriminative policies and approaches). He says that there are always people in the US 
administration and Congress who try in vain to force China to submit through cancelling 
the MFN status in order to achieve their political goals.135 He is surely on the side of the 
CCP and worries about the social disorder that would come with WTO membership, a 
new role that requires rule of law rather than party policies.
Zou Genbao has explained the reasons why some Americans were inclined to cancel 
1China's MFN status. He points out that there are some interest groups, for example,
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some unions in manufacturing industry, who felt that their interests were extraordinarily 
threatened by goods made in China and therefore were strongly against China's MFN 
status. Zou has also disputed the US accusation that China had breached the "Sino-US 
Trade Relations Agreement", signed in 1979. Zou contends that the US was employing 
wrong statistical methods. The US took account of the huge volume of goods from Hong 
Kong on the Chinese side rather than Hong Kong itself, in light of the principle o f origin.
The second point is on intellectual property protection. Zou points out that China was 
forgivable in this case, in that it was quite late for China to impose the legislature and 
practice o f intellectual property law. He argues that China is such a vast country that it is 
really difficult to make sure every individual acts properly in accordance with intellectual 
property law. The third is on the goods from reform-through-labour camps. Zou contends 
that China used to export these goods to the US but had already prohibited it due to 
mounting external pressure. In his view, it is a bit fussy for the US to raise something 
from ages ago.
A large number of official intellectuals are strongly against WTO entry and some of them
1 ^ 7are authoritative scholars like Wen Tiejun and Han Deqiang. They are the most
nationalist scholars in terms of China’s WTO entry. They voice their discontent over
WTO rules, particularly over provisions as to China’s agriculture, following the
formulations fandui bu pingdeng and fandui qishi (against the inequality and varieties of
discriminative policies and approaches). After two decades of reform and opening, it is
evident that some industrial sectors such as textiles, machinery and electronics have
1become competitive in international markets, yet China’s industries like agriculture, 
aviation, banking, motor manufacturing etc. are still vulnerable. As such, these official 
intellectuals are very concerned about the negative impact on vulnerable sectors of 
China’s WTO membership.
Han Deqiang, a young professor working in China University of Aviation and Aerospace, 
is famous for his concerns about China’s unbalanced and unsustainable development and 
is regarded as the most nationalist and outspoken scholar on a range of issues and the
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WTO problem in particular. In June 2001 he was invited to a conference in Brussels and 
organised by the EU council, in which he delivered a powerful speech against China's 
WTO entry. His main argument is that joining the WTO does not conform to China's 
national interests, and would definitely lead to economic disaster and hence put an end to
11QChina's glorious national resurrection. He then called for a unique Chinese identity in 
terms of national economy.
He contends that Chinese enterprises have no capability to compete with their Western 
counterparts. As far as production scale is concerned, the total yearly sales for China's top 
500 enterprises are only the same as General Motors. An enormous proportion of China’s 
products are made in myriads of relatively small- and medium-sized enterprises, and the 
scale of each enterprise is too small in terms of productivity. As far as technology is 
concerned, compared with the West, the technical equipment of Chinese enterprises is 
rather backward and they are unable to compete with their Western counterparts in 
quality, function and varieties. With regard to capital, Chinese enterprises are generally 
short of abundant investment and can hardly increase their market occupation ratio. 
Chinese brands do not achieve high profits as quality goods, for lack of international 
reputation.
Due to these problems, Han points out that Chinese banks' bad debts would become over 
the limit and put the whole economy at high risk. According to his argument, market 
competition is the main source of Chinese bad debts rather than corruption, as people 
normally say. If China joins the WTO, Western corporations would force most Chinese 
enterprises into a comer. The bankruptcy of those businesses would produce more and 
more new bad debts.
Most worrying, from Han's point of view, is Chinese agriculture. It is well-known that 
China's agriculture has no scale efficiency, compared with the US, Canada, Australia and 
Argentina. Until 2001, the annual income per peasant in the Chinese countryside was no 
higher than $80. Therefore Han argues that, if  China joins WTO, peasants’ income will
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go down further, and they would have no choice except migrating into cities, where there 
are already millions of unemployed workers.
Therefore Han Deqiang doubts the motive of the West in accepting China as a WTO 
member. In his view, China was a victim during the WTO negotiations. Han is not the 
only one in China to harbour this perception. The US conspiracy theory has been widely 
accepted among PLA officers.140
Han enjoys a reputation in China against copying the US model. He said in his speech: 
"Since taking the reform and open-door policy, China has learned everything from 
America.. .This sort of thinking stereotype has played a great role in persuading the 
public to support joining WTO."141
Official intellectuals like Han thus call for protection of national industries. In their 
minds, nationalism won attention as a corollary to self-reliance.142 There is no problem 
for these scholars to refer to historical cases to back up his opinion. “Modem China saw 
patriotic intellectuals with the Chinese spirit, like Zhu Ziqing, who ‘would rather die of 
starvation than receive relief grain from the United States’.”143Self-reliance has long been 
regarded as a vital component of Chinese national pride. In history, even buying goods 
made in foreign countries used to be regarded as betrayal of national interests.144 
Therefore protection of national industries can be justified in terms of both national 
interests and ideology.
Liberals
Most liberals support China’s WTO entry as they believe that it will bring about 
democracy in China in due course. CCP leaders have determined that economic opening 
is required for the CCP to remain in power. Historically, such behaviour led to 
democracy, in cases such as Chile, Spain and Taiwan.145 In the eyes of these liberals, 
anything beneficial to democracy should be encouraged. It is said that economic 
globalisation brings about “ideological” or “ideational” change.146 Liu Xiaobo is thus 
confident that China’s WTO entry will follow suit. Though he believes that the high
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demand of Western countries in China’s WTO negotiations originated from their “own 
economic interests”, he deems that China will benefit objectively in politics, as “WTO 
entry can most powerfully accelerate China’s change toward a state ruled by law from 
one ruled by personalities.”147
These liberals are glad to collaborate with reformers within the CCP. After Deng 
Xiaoping died in 1997, which means the last main old charismatic guard of communism 
had already receded into history, young generation reformers in the party could at last act 
out their opinions with less restraint. To sort out China’s economic problems in their own 
way at the turn of the century, they even kept the whole WTO negotiation process secret 
from the public and made bold to decide on some disadvantaged clauses against China’s 
social stability in the coming 3-5 years, as they understood clearly what the WTO meant 
to China in the long run in terms of its economy. During WTO negotiations, CCP leaders 
sought to shore up support for the government’s economic reform programme.148 Once 
China decides to go in, it would have little excuse to carry on the old Chinese 
management style. Most liberals appreciate reformers’ polices and call on the US for
149support.
These liberals do not think excessive pressure will work in the case of China and have 
noted that the Chinese people traditionally have not responded positively to confrontation 
and coercion.150 Facing US pressure, the Chinese largely stay defiant and try to find a 
wayout with tough messages to the US. For instance, in 1994 just before the US 
Congress’ decision on MFN, the Chinese rewarded former German Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl with large contracts, including a big Airbus deal, for his “co-operation” in not 
making trade contingent on human rights performance.
These liberals also deem that tough policies are not in line with the interests of the 
international community. They argue that China has not been a real threat to the US, as it 
is suggested that the Chinese challenge to US economic dominance in East Asia is based 
upon an economic system that is still too weak and dependent upon its very power being 
challenged to succeed.151 MFN revocation would hurt US companies doing business in
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China, particularly corporations such as Motorola, IBM, Boeing and Chrysler, whose
1 Osuccess in China boosts the US economy. Martin Lee, head of Hong Kong’s largest 
democratic party, once said he would not like to see the US use MFN as a bludgeon, even 
if  China mishandles the Hong Kong transition, “because it hurts Hong Kong first and 
badly...” and because doing so is like saying: “‘If you still beat your wife and violently, 
I’ll shoot her.”153
Nevertheless, there are some liberals like Wei Jinsheng who are strongly against China’s 
WTO entry as they believe China should not be rewarded by the international community 
due to its poor human rights record. He says, “It will be a mistake if  the US business 
community believes that they will enjoy an ideal business environment in China while 
Chinese workers’ rights have not been improved.”154
Conclusion
Varieties of views over China’s WTO entry can ostensibly demonstrate the fracture of 
nationalism among Chinese IR scholars. They have achieved the most uniform agreement 
over the Taiwan problem (though not monolithic), yet showed their different 
understanding of Chinese nationalism by their conflicting views on China’s WTO entry.
Chinese IR scholars all believe the US tries to slow if not stop China’s rapid economic 
growth against China’s national interests. Personal advisers accuse the US of obstructing 
China’s WTO entry; most institutional advisers do as personal advisers, yet a small 
number voice their concerns about its negative impact on the country; some official 
intellectuals support entry while criticising US hegemony, some support it although 
worry that it will put China in danger, and a large number of them are resolutely against 
it. Even liberals have among themselves opposing opinions on China’s WTO entry.
In terms of truth, sincerity and appropriateness of their discourse following the CCP’s 
formalised language, personal advisers are most in line. The writings of most institutional 
advisers are closer to the party line than those of official intellectuals. A small number of 
institutional advisers and the majority of official intellectuals have expressed their
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opposition to entry, concerning problems like unemployment and bankruptcy of national 
industries. In terms of economic nationalism official intellectuals are obviously the most 
radical group. At least in words, their views are in direct opposition to the CCP’s official 
terms. Nevertheless, both pros and cons support or disapprove the party line on the same 
account: China’s new nationalism.
Due to its worry that WTO membership might add to domestic pressure for dramatic 
social and political change, the CCP on one hand tries to persuade the Chinese people to 
understand the necessity of WTO membership; and on the other, allows in private for the 
anti-WTO voice to ensure the legitimacy of one-party rule. Thus the CCP has also 
prepared its wayout for possible breaches of WTO rules. The encouragement for different 
voices shows the CCP’s intention to retain its right not to follow all WTO regulations, if 
not trying to call for adjusting WTO rules. These future moves might be justified by 
domestic requirements. Whether the CCP’s tactics will work is still uncertain, yet one can 
obviously see the tension of Chinese nationalism within Chinese IR scholars through 
their approaches to the CCP’s stance on WTO entry.
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Chapter VI Conclusion:
Nationalism in Chinafs Response to the United States
Adopting the methods of comparative studies and formalised language analysis, through 
the case study of the Chinese response to US engagement, this study has illustrated and 
discussed the nationalist momentum in Chinese foreign policy in the 1990s and how the 
CCP loosely controls Chinese IR scholars’ nationalist views. My analysis has focused on 
what are the focal points of Chinese nationalism in foreign policy, how Chinese IR 
scholars are trying to follow the CCP’s party line in foreign policy and how various 
groups of Chinese IR scholars interpret the party line in different ways.
It has been found that nationalism became an important factor in Chinese foreign policy 
during the 1990s. China has become a post-communist society that still retains its 
communist government since the early 1990s. The CCP has undergone a repackaging, 
similar to the re-invention of the British Labour party under Tony Blair.1 The new 
economic and political goals of the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao leadership are adopting 
marketisation and other capitalist-type systems without describing them as such, while 
maintaining the CCP’s one-party rule. Academics are encouraged to study the fate of the 
CPSU in the Soviet Union and other one-party states, such as Mexico and Singapore, 
trying to learn from their mistakes and successes. In doing so, the CCP needs to move 
from being a revolutionary party to a political party and needs to forge a new consensus 
in China, a logic for continuing CCP rule indefinitely.
According to Xiao Gongqin, the emotions and reasoned concepts stemming from
•j
nationalism form an extremely valuable and natural political resource. The general loss 
of confidence in Marxist-Leninist revolution and economics, caused by the internal 
capitalist-oriented reform, forced the CCP to rely on nationalist objectives to unite the 
nation.3
The CCP led by Jiang Zemin stressed traditional Chinese values, in addition to 
“traditional Marxist-Leninist ones.” Jiang’s concept of which traditional Chinese values
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must be incorporated was articulated in the late 1990s by the new theories of the “Three 
Represents” (san ge daibiao) and the call to rule China by law and morality (yifa yide zhi 
guo), both of which have been promoted in Chinese academia. The evolution of “Jiang 
Thought” means indeed a nationalist turn.
The CCP has carefully fanned the flames of nationalism and anti-Americanism through 
party-controlled academic institutions. To counter persistent US objections to China’s 
behaviour in Taiwan, weapons proliferation, human rights etc, the CCP has portrayed the 
US as the self-appointed policeman of the world, whose foreign policy is inherently 
aggressive and bent on undermining China’s national sovereignty. CCP leaders 
consistently characterise the US as a "hegemon", connoting a powerful protagonist and 
overbearing bully that is China’s major competitor, but they also believe that the US is a 
declining power with important vulnerabilities that can be exploited. The CCP has 
projected these negative images while also deliberately portraying China as an emerging 
power, seeking its great power identity.4
It has been found that the focal points of nationalism in Chinese foreign policy are 
domestic-oriented: legitimacy of the CCP’s one-party rule, territorial control and 
modernisation. In the 1990s, China’s foreign policy still served the main goals of its 
leaders: namely, strengthening, reforming and ensuring the survival of a Leninist political 
system in transition. It has also been found that the CCP’s promotion of nationalism and 
anti-Americanism reflects a larger strategy to maintain social stability and control as the 
economy rapidly opens up to the outside world and western values and culture.
Johnston has argued that foreign policy is critical for identity construction and thus for 
regime legitimation.5 Regime legitimation involves, among other things, the construction 
of a “national identity” among the members of a society. Identity construction rests on 
establishing and perpetuating differences between the ingroup and all other outgroups. 
Foreign policy is a process in which differences between a sovereign nation-state ingroup 
and a sovereign nation state outgroup are created.
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When CCP leaders come to believe their legitimacy is declining, foreign policy becomes 
a key tool used to intensify ingroup identity inside China. The CCP’s foreign policy 
strategies are both positive (e.g. designed to cue national pride in being a member of the 
ingroup) and negative (e.g. designed to exaggerate threat from outgroups). The specific 
content of these positive and negative strategies depends on the specific, contingent 
contents of national identity. Generally speaking, the purpose and effect of the CCP’s 
foreign policy strategies serve to increase the strength of realpolitik rhetoric directed 
towards the outside and particularly US engagement toward China.
The most useful instrument to separate the Chinese from others is the concept of 
sovereignty. Thus, at a time when US and European leaders increasingly stress the 
interdependencies that have eroded political and economic sovereignty, CCP leaders 
stubbornly cling to orthodox principles of sovereignty that many US and European 
scholars view as antique.
Territorial sovereignty is at the core of Chinese nationalism in the 1990s. The strong 
words from the CCP have actually demonstrated the party’s main concerns for China’s 
security. The gesture to achieve nationalist goals such as reunification with Taiwan and 
control over the Diaoyu and Spratly Islands will unite the whole nation around the CCP. 
CCP leaders sternly warn the US of a “bloody war” over Taiwan, though, in practice, a 
potential military confrontation over Taiwan is viewed as a distant possibility.6 The main 
audience of the CCP’s tough rhetoric is in fact the Chinese people within Mainland 
China.
The CCP’s legitimacy claims also rest heavily on its economic performance and 
emphasise the achievement of modernisation objectives. The government has only a 
limited ability to achieve these goals and will have difficulty satisfying the rising 
expectations created by its own claims. The CCP thus uses nationalist rhetoric to cover its 
failures, though it does not follow that the CCP will isolate China’s economy again as 
modernisation requires continuous and expanded access to the international economy.
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It has been found that Chinese nationalism is a weak force. As a Leninist party in 
transition the CCP is slow in theory development and has mainly to rely on official terms 
to control Chinese academia. In the 1990s the party used a set o f nationalist terms in 
foreign policy to guide Chinese IR scholars and encourage self-discipline. While IR 
scholars’ response appears to be in thin consensus in security areas, it also encompasses a 
set of widely differing opinions on political, economic and cultural aspects of the CCP’s 
party line.
In China the main function of academics is still to support and disseminate the ideas of 
the CCP. The party decides what the people should know rather than what they want to 
know. Since the CCP controls academic institutions, which in turn exercise a great deal 
of power in their active control of the flow of information, academic institutions in China 
are essentially the tool for the propagation of foreign policies and both the content and 
structure of Chinese academics reflect the dominant ideology — in our case, the new 
Chinese nationalism — of the party and the state.
Since the early 1990s, there appears to be some change in the Chinese academia. The 
process of making foreign policy in China has become much more institutionalised and 
decentralised, and is far less dependent on any individual leader. The CCP has also acted 
to diversify the sources of policy analysis it receives from inside and outside the 
government. For example, newly invigorated IIS of the foreign ministry and CASS now 
play a prominent role as think-tanks, and the ministry has also begun to hire specialists 
from outside the government to serve as consultants on technical issues. Institutional 
scholars and some official intellectuals increasingly participate in internal study groups, 
write reports and draft policy briefs. These scholars help sensitise CCP leaders to 
international trends as well as presenting them with a range o f policy options.
However, various groups of IR scholars play different roles in Chinese foreign policy­
making structure and interpret the party line in different ways.
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Chinese IR scholars, on the one hand, reach a thin consensus on security issues with the 
CCP and, on the other hand, demonstrate various different opinions from the party’s 
nationalist line. The nationalism among Chinese IR specialists and practitioners is 
divided on many non-territorial issues. Regarding what constitutes the Chinese 
nationalism, they have not reached a strong consensus on political, economic and cultural 
issues. Following he er bu tong (incorporating things of different nature), the new 
Chinese nationalism aims to incorporate strands including Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, 
Confucianism and some elements of liberalism. But Chinese IR specialists and 
practitioners differ widely in their opinions about what should be the main theme of the 
new Chinese nationalism. Most personal and institutional advisers regard Marxism- 
Leninism, Maoism as the dominant force, but an increasingly large number of official 
intellectuals suggest Confucianism should prevail.
With regard to how to achieve China’s nationalistic goals, Chinese IR specialists and 
practitioners also have different agendas. On economic reform, most personal advisers 
advocate open-door policies to ensure steady growth of GDP, yet a very large number of 
institutional advisers and official intellectuals appeal for protecting national enterprises to 
keep local jobs safe. On political issues -  say, peaceful evolution - personal and 
institutional advisers feel threatened by external forces, but official intellectuals are not 
much concerned about it and virtually appreciate gradual political reform.
As such, if  one examines China’s foreign policies in the 1990s and early this century, 
including China’s decision to join the WTO, one can certainly see that nationalistic 
momentum is not uniform enough to form a strong national will. The new nationalism is 
centred on the CCP as the embodiment and object of patriotic sentiment, but the party 
needs to accommodate different groups’ clashing arguments. If one group wins in one 
case at one time, its rival’s interests/opinions must be addressed in another case at 
another time. The implication of this is that top leaders will continue to be constrained in 
the way that they deal with domestic politics.
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In general, on security and political issues, personal advisers and institutional advisers 
use more radical discourse than other groups; over economic and cultural issues, official 
intellectuals use more nationalist discourse than other groups. Apart from security issues, 
personal and institutional advisers adopt a more nationalist approach to political issues 
than economic and cultural issues, while official intellectuals and liberals adopt a more 
nationalist approach to economic and cultural issues than political issues.
It was found that US engagement policy toward China has failed to achieve its objectives. 
It has generated nationalism in China and China has become a strong competitor of the 
US in East Asia as the CCP has successfully responded to the US engagement, using 
military balancing, economic integration, political buffering, cultural incorporation and 
reorientation. The CCP regards the US engagement as paternalistic and arrogant and sees 
some American approaches toward China as overbearing.
It was also found that the CCP’s response to the US is defensive. The CCP’s counter­
attack to the US is mainly words rather than acts. The China-US relationship is 
profoundly asymmetric. The US is the dominant power in the world today — militarily, 
economically, politically and culturally. China aspires to be a prosperous and powerful 
nation, but it still has a long way to go. China needs the US — for markets, technology, 
investment capital, specialized training opportunities and preservation of an international 
climate conducive to rapid Chinese development — far more than the US needs China. 
Disparity between China and the US means China is still weak and the US still holds the 
key to China’s rise. The US can manage Chinese power expansion so that it will not 
challenge US core interests in East Asia.
The US should take a more enlightened approach, especially with respect to China’s 
internal problems. Many of the problems are best seen as growing pains of a developing 
nation. They are China's own problems and they would be better off left to the Chinese to 
solve.7 The US should prepare to deal with the CCP with neither ill will nor illusion. In 
particular, the US should prepare to engage China frankly and equally.
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According to David Shambaugh, China’s support for the American war on al-Qaeda and 
global terrorism has contributed to new stability in their relations. In addition, the two 
economies have further integrated. If wisely managed by both sides -  and if  the key 
sensitivities of each are respected rather than provoked -  the new stability in Sino- 
American relations may endure.8
To conclude, the new Chinese nationalism is not a threat to the current international 
order. Gilpin uses three operationalizable components to examine revisionist countries: 
the distribution of power, international rules and the hierarchy o f prestige.9 Thus, it is 
legitimate to ask the following questions to test for status-quoness: how does the state 
speak and act regarding distribution of power, the specific rules of diplomacy, of 
international economic institutions and hierarchy of prestige? For Gilpin, revisionist 
states demand fundamental changes in these three components. Anything less, it becomes 
problematic calling the state non-status quo.
There is always a gap between the CCP’s words and pragmatic acts. Both words and 
pragmatic acts have their respective merits in China’s foreign policy: while words paint 
China’s foreign policy with a colour of nationalism, pragmatic acts create flexibility and 
allow the CCP’s foreign policy behaviour to maximise China’s national interests. If 
western observers take the CCP’s words too seriously, they may lose sight of the 
pragmatism driving China’s foreign policy behaviour.10
From the discussion in this thesis one can see that, due to the security and particularly 
Taiwan problems, there are indeed strong nationalist sentiments among the CCP and 
Chinese IR scholars that US power is a threat to the survival of China. In practice, 
Chinese foreign policy behaviour has not yet demonstrated any systematic and substantial 
dissatisfaction with the current power distribution. Chinese words regarding the security 
issue are obviously rather tough yet the CCP is still relatively cautious in terms of action. 
For instance, despite tough words, in fact many CCP leaders noted that Taiwan should be 
dealt with in a patient manner.11 China does not act as a blatant initiator of
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confrontations, but rather seems to be responding to aggressive political rhetoric by the 
Taiwanese pro-independence movement.
Since the mid-1980s, China has advocated the establishment of a fair and reasonable 
international political and economic order and has frequently criticised the unjust nature 
o f the existing world order. However, the CCP seems to hold high this flag only in words, 
while it acts very pragmatically in deeds. The CCP understands it has no capacity to 
challenge US power either at present or in the foreseeable future. Also, the CCP does not 
view itself as a sheer loser in the current international structure: as a permanent member 
o f the UN Security Council and one of the five recognised nuclear powers, China 
possesses some significant political and strategic weight in international affairs.
The CCP chooses not to make unilateral attempts to alter the existing power structure but 
seeks to make use of it. The compromise between words and pragmatism represents a 
recognition of the reality and China’s position on the US military presence in East Asia is 
a good example. In word, China does not approve of the stationing of troops on the soil 
o f another sovereign country. But, in reality, the CCP realizes that the US military 
presence in Japan is useful in preventing it from becoming a full-fledged and destablising 
military power.
Generally speaking, the CCP follows international rules. Free trade, at this point in 
history, is perhaps the international norm least contested by national governments around 
the world. In the reform period China has moved generally to support norms of global 
free trade outright, even though compliance with and implementation of these norms will 
be difficult even after entry into the WTO. China’s entry into the WTO is the clearest 
statement that officially China embraces the extant free trade regime. No doubt there will 
be failure to follow rules of status quo institutions and accusations of violations. 
However, it will be very hard for China to escape international scrutiny on this score. It 
will probably use many of the loop-holes in WTO rules to protect politically important 
economic constituencies when necessary. This is no different in kind from the arbitrary 
use of anti-dumping rules by the US to protect important economic constituencies.
283
Regarding international prestige, the CCP still keeps a low profile. The CCP’s foreign 
policy dictum: “Stay out of trouble and never take the lead”, stated by the late Deng 
Xiaoping, has been the guiding beacon for Chinese foreign policy thinking in the 1990s. 
This has set up a pattern of action in China’s response to US engagement: principles, not 
workable proposals, and words, not deeds.
19Therefore the author agrees with Ross that China is still a status quo power, though 
China and the US have different opinions about whether the Taiwan problem is entirely a 
domestic issue of China.
The CCP under Hu Jintao’s leadership in the 21st century is facing unprecedented 
domestic and international challenges. The lines between domestic and foreign issues are 
diminishing. China is undergoing marketisation, urbanisation, and potentially 
democratisation in the context of globalisation. China is still searching for its proper role 
in a world full of economic troubles, political instability and security threats. CCP leaders 
will face more and more complex challenges, including serving the needs of sustainable 
economic development, fighting against terrorism and ethnic separatism, dealing with the 
war against terrorism and crisis in North Korea, managing the issue of Taiwan and 
seeking for national unification, and maintaining regional stability and global peace in the 
long term.
In addressing such multiple challenges, there is no doubt that Chinese foreign policy will 
experience significant transition. Understanding international affairs is an increasingly 
important and challenging task. In fact, both CCP leaders and Chinese scholars are 
engaging in a serious learning process from the international community. National 
interests and practices stem from the national identity that itself is formed through an
13evolutionary and dynamic mechanism and particularly imitation and social learning. 
While recognising those deep-rooted elements and their effect on China’s strategic 
culture and formation of its national identity, constructivists argue that institutions can 
socialise China and China can learn new interests through a complex set of ideational
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channels.14 For instance, some scholars, by examining China’s performance in 
international institutions, believes that China’s participation quality has steadily improved 
in the past few years.15
In addition, the outside world needs to change its perception of the CCP and accept 
China’s peaceful rise. This thesis has found that Chinese nationalism is not a strong force 
as it is mainly domestic-oriented and plural, yet some countries perceive it as a revisionist 
change in international relations. If it is hard to find concrete evidence that China is a 
revisionist state, there is a second explanation for the growing concern about Chinese 
power. That is, the primary changes have been in regional perceptions of Chinese goals, 
influenced by China’s growing power relative to other states in the region, rather than the 
CCP’s diplomacy per se.
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